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ABSTRACT:
The proceedings of the Monterey Symposium on Design Problems in
Aircraft Structures provide a basic survey of design problems
from the engineer's viewpoint. Further analysis of the present
situation draws attention to some essential aspects which are
not yet generally recognized. This leads to the conclusion that
recent design problems cannot be solved on a technological level
alone. An organizational effort is needed to disseminate available
information. Beyond this, the complexity of interactions must
be understood more thoroughly and this requires an educational
effort on a broad basis. A practical and systematic approach
toward the solution of these problems is developed.
The present report covers the final phase of a project under the
title Interface of Materials and Structures on Airframes. This
project is supported by: Naval Air Systems Command
Work Request No. WR- 2-6059
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This report forms the final part of the project Interface of
Materials and Structures on Airframes and includes the Proceedings
of the Monterey Symposium on Design Problems in Aircraft Sturctures.
The project Interface of Materials and Structures on Airframes
has been sponsored by the Naval Air Systems Command under the
cognizance of the Structures Administrator and has been conducted
at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Two
earlier reports were published as Part 1: Basic Design Considerations
and as Part 2: Outline of Decision Process in Structural Design.
They were concerned with basic aspects of the design process as
they influence problems of interaction between materials and
structures
.
In order to coordinate these considerations with recent
experience in industry and to recognize those design problems
which most companies have in common, a symposium on Design Problems
in Aircraft Structures was held at the Naval Postgraduate School
in Monterey, California, on July 15 and l6, 1971. About twenty
invited participants represented aerospace industry, government
agencies, and research institutes. Prepared talks on particularly
significant aspects of design problems were given by engineers
thoroughly familiar with the present state of the art and
discussion sessions followed.
The proceedings of the symposium are given in Section I and
related questions with various comments are listed in Section II to
stimulate general thoughts regarding design problems.
Section III contains some basic considerations and conclusions,
attempting to bring together the viewpoints of design engineers,
engineering management, and government agencies. It begins with
a consideration of technological problems and recognizes that they
are being approached systematically and competently on an
engineering level. This leads, however, to the realization that
such work on a purely technological level will not suffice to
solve our design problems. Additional organizational and
educational efforts will be required. Some of them have been
recommended already by committees concerned with these problems.
Some more aspects are added and an integrated approach is
suggested on the final pages of this report (pages III-21et seq.).
There is no consensus of opinions in this field. Conclusions
must be based on the subjective interpretation of facts. They
always have to be submitted to much discussion and careful
examination. The considerations of Section III incorporate ideas
developed by widely scattered people. Any shortcomings and
V
controversial aspects of the discussion are the obvious responsibility
of the coordinator of this project. The conclusions must not be
construed as necessarily representing the attitude of the Navy
Department
.
The participants of the symposium and many individuals
throughout the aerospace industry made this report possible by
extending a spirit of full cooperation and giving generously of
their sparse time and hard-gained experience to discuss problems
which were not always easily defined.
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It is with some feeling of nostalgia that I come "back into
this closer contact with men from the aircraft industry. After
having spent quite a number of years building airplanes , I am
glad to tell you how very pleased I am to welcome you here at
the Postgraduate School and how appropriate I think it is to have
a conference of this sort at this time. I am sorry that Admiral
Goodfellow is in Washington and is not able to also extend his
most hearty welcome to you. We are also very thankful to the
Naval Air Systems Command for the sponsorship of this symposium
and we welcome Commander Cundari in the efforts to organize and
help sponsor this work.
I would like to take a few moments , because I have this
sort of background and continuing interest, to speculate a little
bit about the future but I would like to get a running start
from the past. The 19^0's were certainly the great days for the
aircraft industry as I remember. There was the dictate of
President Roosevelt that we were going to build 50,000 airplanes
and it really happened during World War II. Then came the very
interesting transition to jet airplanes and even rocket airplanes
and I can remember the time I spent on the design of the Skyrocket
airplane which held the world's altitude record and several speed
records and how we had to work our way through some new thinking.
Then, in the fifties, we turned to rockets with all the trials
and tribulations and in the sixties we had the ability to really
have ballistic missiles and space programs, with the emphasis
on complex systems and ultra-reliability.
Now, as we come to the seventies, it is very interesting to
see this return to emphasis on the aircraft but there are some
trends which, it seems to me, pose a little bit of a dilemma.
It is this problem of complexity. Costs have gone up as an
exponential function. With our concern about the cold war and
about our competition in the scientific war, as you might call
it, and our space competition with Russia, somehow we always
felt that a great nation could afford the increase in price.
We seem to still want to make things even more complex but we
must recognize that in the last few years the nation is no longer
willing to support an exponential rise in costs
.
If you add together the R&D costs on such things as DoD,
AEC, and NASA, you get a nearly constant growth rate of about
20$ per year from World War II to at least the middle sixties.
But at the same time, the population was growing only 1 or 2%,
and the gross national product only about 5$- This trend cannot
continue indefinitely.
1-3
Further, we probably can no longer accept a reduction in
the numbers of airplanes we buy in order to be able to obtain
the greater complexity. The military services clearly cannot
afford to procure just one very costly airplane . I think the
new situation throws a double burden on the designer. He must
now make the equipment more effective and at the same time
cheaper
.
There will be a great responsibility on the designer and
many people will be watching as the realities of the situation
do unfold. It is a real challenge to get people together who
will think about how we are going to handle the complexity of
design and at the same time can make the airplane continue to
be more effective and not just keep going up in price
.
Here at the Postgraduate School, as in a number of universities,
we certainly realize the needs and problems which our graduates
will face. We recognize the obligation to give them the intimate
knowledge to cope with the decision-making and operating problems
of the future. So it is a pleasure to find a way to interact
with the aircraft industry more intimately and it is a pleasure
to have you here. Anything we can do to make your stay here more
profitable, more enjoyable, we stand ready to do it. I thank
you very much for the opportunity to welcome you this morning.
I-U
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS:
THE NATURE OF DESIGN PROBLEMS
Ulrich Haupt
Naval Postgraduate School
Design problems in aircraft structures have existed as long
as there has been aircraft design. They usually found their
solution by following a general pattern along the lines of
engineering judgment and experience, experiments and analysis.
In case of special difficulties the specialist had to exert
special efforts, usually resulting in more experiments and more
refined analytical methods . Adding up all these efforts over
more than six decades, we see the results in form of jet trans-
portation and space flight and there is good justification for
taking pride in substantial accomplishments.
Now, however, we have reached a stage where recent experience
forces us to reappraise our situation. We feel that we are close
to the boundaries of our present concepts and that the complexity
of our problems is somewhat frightening. In the past, we could
approach a problem by isolating it and applying all the available
expert knowledge and experience. This is still the case for many
of those present and future problems which are the bread and
butter of the engineering profession. Yet the really challenging
problems which we have to face become increasingly difficult and
usually we cannot isolate them anymore. They are actually of a
different nature.
Think of our situation in fatigue. We began by isolating
the problem of crack initiation. This took us to the problem of
rate of crack propagation, then to the problem of fail-safe
design, then to the problem of residual strength and fracture
mechanics. In each one of these fields we have to deal with a
subset of problems -- including material selection, structural
concepts, stress level and stress concentration, manufacturing
methods, load spectrum, and service life. Fatigue is a problem
of detail design but it frequently has its roots in early
decisions far upstream in the design process and may result in
catastrophic consequences due to a special combination of
circumstances way downstream in the service life. All of them
are interwoven.
In addition to such problems of detail design, we have




How do we define the criteria when we want to apply
newly developed materials to present-day aircraft --
considering weight, cost, risk, life cycle, uncertainties
of load spectrum, etc?
How do we optimize materials and structural configuration
for thermal and chemical environments as complex as we
have to face them for supersonic cruise or space shuttle?
These challenging problems in detail design and in advanced
design have in common that they incorporate a large number of
parameters
.
Most of them are interdependent and many of them are
not clearly defined at all. Beyond these aspects of interdependence
and quantity, a new qualitative aspect is introduced. Up to now,
the main emphasis in aircraft has been on airworthiness. For
our new type of design problems, however, we have to combine
airworthiness with design optimization under very complex
conditions. This takes us into a new field. For both detail
design as well as advanced design we have to develop an outlook
which is much wider than the conventional knowledge, experience,
and expertise of the specialist. This question of basic outlook
is closely connected with design problems.
-*
-* *
It may be helpful if we look at developments which have
become visible in engineering education. Throughout the 1950 's
increasing emphasis was given to science curricula until we
realized in the later 1960's that engineering aspects had been
seriously shortchanged. We came to understand the basic
difference between science and engineering. The scientific
approach starts from a given problem and proceeds by analytical
and experimental methods -- simplifying and clarifying a problem
to its skeleton in order to establish and understand basic
principles. On the other hand, the engineering approach envisions
a goal and proceeds by defining the problem, creating alternative
possibilities, analyzing them by scientific methods and making a
decision about the optimum solution — taking into account all
the inherent complexities and practical consequences in order
to find a practical answer.
So we finally began to realize that engineering is more than
applied science. The engineer must have a different attitude and
a different viewpoint than the scientist. Slowly, much too
slowly, there is a growing emphasis on creative engineering,
value judgment, and interdisciplinary responsibilities. It
will take some time until this process becomes clear and the
results will penetrate into industry, but a new trend is visible.
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There seems to be an analogy between the situations in
education and in industry. Science and engineering in education
have their counterparts in the professional activities of
analysis and design in industry. In education we are realizing
that engineering incorporates science as a most essential
ingredient but has to reach into wider aspects. Correspondingly
in industry design may include analysis as a most essential
ingredient but again it has to reach into wider aspects. However,
I should not belabor this point because some of my friends hold
different opinions on it.
There is full agreement that our analysts have been at the
forefront of developments during the last few decades . In the
field of structures they have, among many other things, developed
a beautiful system of finite elements for basic airworthiness
calculations and they are working on mathematical aspects for
structural optimization. Yet our actual difficulties are not
covered by these somewhat abstract considerations of airworthiness
and optimization. Our difficulties are of a very practical
nature with an endless number of real-life complexities. Beyond
analytical aspects we have to
recognize any possible mode of failure;
evaluate uncertainties and risks;
establish a value system for any optimization procedure.
Here we have design problems in the fullest and widest sense
of the word. For their solution we require an analytical mind
coupled with an imaginative spirit. This is expressed in the
designer's intuition as it has been applied in the past when
the designer could handle a few parameters on his sliderule
.
Yet for our present design problems with an ever-increasing
number of parameters we have to develop a new methodology.
Such a new methodology is a challenge to do in a systematic
way what we have been doing intuitively. Two different aspects
can be considered:
firstly, a technological effort to reduce the risk of
structural failure;
secondly, a methodical effort to establish a process of
decision making under complex conditions.
Regarding the first aspect, namely the technological effort,
a decisive step is taken in the new Air Force program on Advanced
Metallic Structures. This program is directed toward improved
technologies in materials, structures, and manufacturing and
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emphasizes the importance of a systematic transfer of information.
It is an eminently practical, hardware -oriented program. As such
it does not sponsor any ideas which are still somewhat vague in
themselves.
Regarding the second aspect, the methodical effort toward
the decision making process, this is unfortunately still in a
category of vagueness. Perhaps it depends mostly on becoming
aware of the problem and on communicating about it. There will
not be any quick and ready solution but it seems that fundamental
elements could crystallize sooner if a common concern would be
developed. A great effort is exerted by specialists regarding
mathematical aspects of optimization but before we can ever hope
to use any mathematical refinements, we have to clarify some of
the most basic aspects of the decision-making process.
Decision making is an essential part of design. Many
variations can be found in other fields and it should be easy to
point out how primitive the state of the art is . From the
highest level of deciding about national policies and war or
peace to the very personal level of choosing a marriage partner,
important decisions are being made in a somewhat haphazard way.
Any self-respecting gambler would estimate his chances more
thoroughly.
There is nothing mysterious about decision making and
optimization. The basic requirements are an adequate problem
statement and objectivity -- and this is where we usually fall
short. Clearly defined values as well as uncertainties have to
be included. The values will generally be of a variety of
dimensions -- weight, cost, time, reputation, etc. Utility
theory or similar methods of decision making provide a basic
tool to express these multi -dimensional values on a single
scale. The corresponding detail manipulations can be left to
operations analysts but every designer will have to acquaint
himself with the underlying concepts
.
Notions like uncertainties and value systems still have a
long way to go before they become household words in aircraft
design. Yet it is the designer who has to establish a merit
function, basing it on his experience and making it clearly
visible so that any parameters can easily be submitted to
scrutiny and modification. This field is still wide open and
largely unexplored. It concerns both detail design and advanced
design and represents design problems of a very different nature
from those to which we have been accustomed.
In the subsequent presentations and discussions we want to
stay at first on familiar grounds and consider some specific
problems of technology which are of much concern for new materials,
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including fatigue, fracture mechanics and fail-safe. Afterwards
we will see whether we can proceed toward some basic aspects of
methodology. This should take us to some ill-defined problems
which, nevertheless, may be of fundamental importance.
There are many viewpoints which sometimes look quite
different but frequently can be reconciled when some good will
exists and a real effort is made. Good will can be created as
soon as we become aware how important a problem is and how much
we need a solution. How successful our efforts will be — that
is often beyond our jurisdiction. All we can do is to make a
sincere attempt -- and that is the purpose of this symposium.
1-9
TRANSLATING HIGH-STRENGTH STEEL CHARACTERISTICS




ABSTRACT: Development of test methods to characterize high-
strength steels is discussed up to the present fracture
mechanics methods. These test methods are related
to service experience by specification requirements,
structural criteria, and design practices. Examples
are shown for parts which failed unexpectedly- -pointing
out the need for materials and structures engineers
to improve their ability to communicate with design
engineers
.
I would like to review briefly some of the attempts of the
materials engineers to characterize high-strength steels for the
design engineer. For the purpose of this discussion, high-strength
steels will be defined as those having an ultimate strength of
200,000 psi or above, used in the range of -65° to ^00°F. These
steels have yield-to-ultimate ratios from .80 to .98 with minimum
elongations of approximately 5$> in 2 inches.
My basic thesis is that we have not provided the designer
with many quantitative numbers to work with for load-carrying
capacity designs. We give him tensile strength and modulus and
that is about all he can put into a formula. When you talk about
things like ductility, impact strength, corrosion resistance,
these are just comparative values. There is no ready way to put
them into a numerical calculation and use them.
I would like to go back, since I have about as much gray
hair as most of you here, and think of the 30 's when we looked
at the mechanical properties, including impact and ductility,
of a new steel. If they were similar to one which had already
a lot of good service life, you assumed that you could endorse
it for design. Then, when we got into the war, much acceleration
went on, and we used a big variety of steels with a lot of odd
combinations of chemistry because of alloy shortages. We worked
pretty much from the basis of tensile strength and hardenability,
and we used all kinds of things which probably would make us
shudder today. We also worked with a lot of specialized tests,
including notched tensile fatigue tests. But again, we had a
hard time relating those numbers to a specific design and
idealized specimens bore very little resemblance to actual parts.
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Now the latest thing is the fracture mechanics approach and
here we are getting a little closer to the numerical idea. But
the first thing for which we have to characterize a steel is K^c
and many of you know the war which is going on about the type of
specimen to use and the wide variety of values for a given heat
of steel. The designer is pretty much at the mercy of an empirical
system when he is making a part out of a slightly different
cross-section or form. He cannot make a clear-cut decision
without a lot of specialized help and specialized work in the
laboratory, and even with all that, we still have failures.
In the early 1950' s, we got enamored with the idea that we
could take some of our more conventional steels, specifically
good old SAE ^3^0, and move them up to the 260,000 psi heat-treat
level. A classical paper by Melcon of Lockheed-California* was
published in 1953 and many of the aircraft companies, including
mine, did work of their own and decided that this was a promising
approach to get the weight down. We proceeded on the F-8 Crusader
airplane, which was designed in the 1953 period and flew in the
early part of 1955 and which had a considerable amount of steel
parts in the 260,000 heat-treat level, particularly in the landing
and arresting gear systems.
We had some problems and I would like to review several
typical examples to show you how the designer and the materials
and structures engineers can get themselves into a trap. I am
sure all of you have dozens more in your own experience. Some
of the problems occurred fairly early in the programs; others
took time to develop in the environment in the fleet.
Fig. A-l shows the main landing gear inner cylinder shell,
made of 260,000 heat-treat steel, with a clevis at the upper
end. The interesting thing in this design was that the designers
found the space in this upper cylinder could be used as a pneumatic
bottle for an emergency actuation of flaps and gears in case of
a hydraulic failure. This was not part of the landing gear system
at all. Every time the engine was running, the cylinder was
pressurized to 2000 psi and when the engine was shut down, it
bled off slowly by leakage. Explosive failure occurred not during
a landing but while the airplane was being pivoted on the carrier
deck around one wheel which resulted in maximum stress at the
clevis
.
We did not have an electron microscope at the time but it
was obviously a very brittle failure. All the standard tests
had been performed but we never had a failure nor any problem at
*Melcon, M.A. , Ultra High Strength Steel for Aircraft Structures,
Product Engineering, October 1953-
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all with this part in the plant at any time. No matter what we
did, we could not explain at that time exactly what was going
on. Being 260,000 heat treat, we did not use electrolytic cad
plate on it. We knew about hydrogen embrittlement, so we tried
to keep away from that area. At that time, vacuum cadmium
plating was not developed and so we just had an organic finish
on these parts.
Subsequently, when we got the electron microscope several
years afterward, we found out that some minor scratches in the
paint had permitted the part to corrode in a very small area,
about 10 or 15 thousandths in diameter. The little bit of
corrosion resulted in enough hydrogen to hydrogen-embrittle
the part in that local area and also to give it some stress
corrosion. The designer had veen quite ingenious but the
combination of maximum stress in the clevis, hoop tension due
to internal pressure, H-embrittlement, and minor stress corrosion
resulted in failure. The part is now vacuum cadmium plated and
painted and is no longer pressurized as a pneumatic bottle.
Fig. A-2 shows the horizontal stabilizer shaft which is
heat-treated to 260,000. Through a series of offset tapered
pins, a little over an inch in diameter, it is attached to the
actuating horn of Fig. A-3. We found a few of these shafts
cracked and after some checking --it was also in the pre -electron
microscope era -- we decided that a washer at the tapered pin
might be getting misaligned. So we designed a specially shaped
washer to fit the inside contour of the shaft and to avoid local
high stresses. We also added some more paint in local areas
and did not seem to have any more problems.
Then, about six or eight months later, we found some cracks
again. We could not put our finger on the definite thing but
we made a few more changes and still have had occasionally some
cracked parts. Examination of these later parts by electron
microscope revealed hydrogen embrittlement and we have tried
to trace the source of it and to keep control over the processing.
The part is vacuum cadmium plated and does not get any electro-
lytic cadmium. So here we have a design which, from the
designer's point of view, looked like an efficient and good way
to get high strength and close tolerance and where impact and
ductility values did not indicate any reason why this would
not work.
Fig. A-3 shows the stabilizer horn which is also a 260,000
heat-treat part. For this part it turned out that the 260
high heat treat was specified because the structures engineers
were told by value engineering that this would cost hardly any
more. Like most structures people, they were looking to a growth
version of the airplane and left an extra margin where it can
be done without overpenalizing design and weight. So this
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is one part where we moved the heat treat back to 200. With
U3U0 steel you have to stay out of the 220-2U0 range for
metallurgical reasons, just as a precautionary move.
Then, recently, we had a failure again. The reason was
typical for the way things can happen. We had a new vendor
who came out a little high in hardness . He pulled the test
part which went with it, got the ductility, and felt there was
no problem because he was giving a little more than required.
However, when we dropped the heat-treat to 200,000, we decided
that we could electrolytically cad plate it because, generally
speaking, there is not any hydrogen embrittlement problem with
200,000 heat treat. Now with 246,000 heat treatment and electro-
lytic cad plating, we had hydrogen embrittlement coming out the
ears. Again the designer did his job but there was not enough
communication about the processing precautions with the
manufacturing people.
Fig. A-k is a swinging arm for the arresting gear at the
260,000 heat treat level. It gets a certain amount of impact
and we had failures as shown. This was a good old traditional
case where we had a big discussion among the structures, design
and material engineers about how much interference fit these
pressed-in bushings could have without getting above the thresh-
hold stresses for stress corrosion cracking. However, in cad
plating there was some tolerance which could get involved
occasionally. You will say in pressing them in you should have
shaved the excess cad plating off. But we had a manufacturing
operation which deep-freezed the bushing and dropped it in.
So they shrunk it down to undersize and did not have to get the
cad plate shaved off but when it came back to room temperature,
we were above the stress allowables by just enough to get us
into trouble.
This part is now 200,000 heat treat. There seems to be
some magic about this number. Things like hydrogen embrittlement
and stress corrosion are not very critical at this level. For
any bushings which we have now in high-strength parts, both
aluminum and steel, we try to prevent water entrance. We provide
a section around the bushing for a sealant groove to keep the
water out of the interface between the bearing and the fitting
even though it is press fit. We forbid deep freezing bushings
because of the tolerance and condensed water problem.
Fig. A-5 is a 260 H.T. bellcrank on a droop mechanism. It
was designed for stiffness and did not need the 260,000 strength
but it failed in a fatigue sense. This was pretty much an
interior part when it was on the deck and the droop was retracted.
However, there was full flowing air going around this part
during the extended position and it got enough corrosion to
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provide a pit. Again, the heat treat was dropped down to 200,000
and then the corrosion effects did not appear to be as critical
in fatigue. We also went to more protection, did a little
aluminum spraying in the beginning, and then went finally to
electrolytic cad.
Fig. A-6 seems to be hard to explain. This is the main
fin beam in both the F-8 and A-7 airplanes and it is about
^0 x 35". It is forged from a U3U0 billet and in the center
where normally the worst material would be, the part is split
in two directions. There are holes drilled into it, and it
has only primer for protection. The part is 260,000 heat treat,
has 3 million flight hours on it, and has never failed. By
the way, the note "crack" in the figure only refers to a specimen
which they tried to straighten during a heat treat operation.
Now you could say that the reason for no failure is that
this part is lowly stressed or is in a mild environment. Well,
this part does not have a sustained load like in a pressure
cylinder or in a pressed-in bushing. It is designed for a
gust condition which rarely occurs and the total spectrum life
is easy. But since you have to stay out of the 220-2^0 range
for this type of steel, the next jump down to 200 would have
been too big. The design also has no sharp corners and the
holes are straight for standard close tolerance bolts. Besides,
it is an interior part in warm, dry air and is protected from
the engine heat by a stainless steel shield. Even with all
these good things I am still surprised that we have a zero
failure rate.
This last example shows that you should not panic if a
catastrophic failure occurs on some part at the same strength
in the, same steel. We had some other parts in the airplane
which were not loaded any higher but were in more exposed areas
and failed. It is hard to tell the designer when he is really
in trouble about corrosion unless the environment can be very
accurately defined.
I might say that we have had some cleanliness problems in
steel but we tried to control them by specifying values for
reduction of area in specified locations in each heat of steel.
This seemed to give the fewest problems along the way in
unpredicted failures. We felt this was our protection but,
at the same time, how do you explain an empirically picked
number to the designer?
Well, I just wanted to show you some histories of how we
have given the designer some problems and have complicated
them right along. Designers and structures engineers need to
understand the effect of stress raisers, residual stress due to
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processing and induced assembly stresses due to clevis type
parts or other misalignments. Effects from stress corrosion
and hydrogen embrittlement have to be considered in selecting
strength level. When working with high-strength steels,
process engineers, designers, tool planners, and manufacturing
personnel need to be educated in the catastrophic effects of
grinding, plating, cold-straightening, cleaning, weld repairing,
etc., without proper post stress relief treatments.
The designer also needs more education along the lines of
NDT so that he knows what defect size can be detected. Even
if we are great believers in magnaflux, you still can magnaflux
a part and not find a crack which is there. I think, almost
intuitively, our own people have backed up from welding ideas
in high strength steels quite a bit. Talking about steels of
300,000 psi, they are wary of sustained stresses and are trying
to keep the stress level down at a fairly conservative level.
That hurts from the weight and cost point of view pretty fast.
We worry not only about things that happen in our own shop
but we are also indoctrinated by the troubles everyone else
has. Risks are involved in this area and when you want to move
off to something new, you have to convince not just your engineering
and manufacturing management but you are involved pretty strongly
with the operating management even when they are not engineering
oriented.
Most failures in high- strength steels result from three
major sources, namely: (l) improper design; (2) improper
processing; (3) undetected flaws. Now we are giving the designer
a new input from fracture mechanics, with new tools and new
concepts and there is no table where he can look up the answers.
Few failures are the result of fracture toughness per se but
its effect on premature failure must be understood.
I would like to conclude in saying that there is no
substitute for communication. We have to get engineering,
manufacturing, and quality control together but I think we
also will have to develop a more definitive and quantitative






































































Abstract: Three general approaches are used to design aircraft
structures for a long service life: control of design
details, establishment of design stress levels, and
analysis combined with experiments. These approaches
are discussed and illustrated by examples from previous
experience. Examples include the use of the stress
severity concept and how it relates to fatigue life,
fatigue quality index, and design stress levels of
similar structures -- emphasizing that determination
of safe life is not yet an exact science and must be
based on previous experience.
The previous speaker gave us some examples of how to make
use of experience. As you know, there is no good theoretical
approach for predicting fatigue life of an aircraft component
and so, in order to circumvent this problem, previous experience
is used to form a baseline from which to work.
Structures which have performed adequately over a long
period of time provide assurance that a similar design for a
similar application will perform just as well. However, problems
arise when trying to exploit new materials and new technology
where previous experience is lacking. In this case, experience
must be supplemented by adequate test data, although it is not
always easy to obtain test data applicable to what is going to
happen ten or twenty years hence . In this presentation I would
like to discuss how our previous experience is used to the best
advantage in coming up with new designs and how it relates to
the overall problem of design, detail design and advanced design.
Figure B-l illustrates how service experience is utilized
in the design of new aircraft and where the information is used
in relation to each phase of the program. A satisfactory service
life can be achieved by approaching the problem on three
different levels
:
a. Control of aircraft design details -- based on service
experience of design details from previous structures;
b. Establishment of design stress levels — based on stress
levels utilized in previous aircraft structures;
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c. Theoretical and experimental considerations -- for new
designs where previous experience is not available.
For any new aircraft structure each of the three above approaches
must be utilized to achieve a good design from a fatigue point
of view. Therefore, I would like to illustrate the use of these
three approaches with some examples.
In the first approach, information gathered from experience
has to be presented in a simple format and brought to the
designer's attention so that he will look at the data and try
to avoid these problems . Figure B-2 shows a common type of
design detail in connection with access holes. Small holes in
the vicinity of a bigger hole inevitably mean superposition of
stress concentration. An acceptable solution can be achieved
for many applications by eliminating the fastener hole in the
vicinity of highest stress concentration due to the cut-out.
For the preferred solution of using a clamp-on door, consideration
must be given, of course, to the effect of fretting fatigue due
to rubbing action between the clamp-on door and the structure.
Figure B-3 shows another type of problem which is often
encountered in service and which consists of cracks in the
corners of door cut-outs. Attempts have been made to try to
reinforce these areas to reduce the stress levels and prevent
the crack; however, this has not always been successful. The
best approach in this case is to make a fairly generous radius
in the corners of these types of cut-outs, using the rule -of
-
thumb shown in Fig. B-3- With this type of design concept,
fewer cracking problems have developed in service
.
Figure B-k illustrates another area which may easily be
overlooked as not a structural problem. A forging of this type
needs to be attached to some type of jig for machining to final
dimensions . Tooling holes are drilled at various locations
for the purpose of holding the forging to the jig during
machining. Often these tooling holes are located where the
bending stresses are essentially zero. However, the shear
stresses in a beam are usually high where the bending stresses
are low and fatigue cracks due to high shear stresses have
occurred at these locations. Also, often the tooling holes do
not have as good a surface finish as attachment holes in other
parts of the structure. For example, tooling holes may have
scratches or other imperfections which amplify the stress
concentration effect of the hole. As shown in Fig. B-k, plugging
tooling holes with interference fit fasteners can increase the
fatigue life 1+-fold while reducing the fatigue quality level,
K^est? "k° less than k.O. On our new designs we prefer to reduce
the stresses by reinforcing locally around the hole.
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Figure B-5 refers to a problem which is often overlooked.
This is fatigue cracking as a result of deflections from one
part of the structure induced on another part of the structure
.
In this example the nacelle fillet region had a doubler attached
to the nacelle skin to prevent localized buckling. To prevent
fatigue cracking at the end of the doubler it was necessary to
extend the doubler and install additional rows of fasteners to
stiffen up the area.
These simple types of examples provide the designer with
some basic information as a first line of defense against fatigue
cracking problems. Next, let us consider the selection of
design stress levels. There are two ways of specifying design
stress levels, either by putting limitations on the design
ultimate tensile stress of the material or on the stress due to
lg loading conditions
.
Figure B-6 shows one technique of selecting preliminary
design stress levels. Based on service experience on previous
aircraft, it relates maximum allowable design stress level to
the number of flights when fatigue cracking problems were
encountered. Most designs fall within the cross hatched band,
therefore the percentage of ultimate tensile strength which can
be utilized for a new design depends on the fatigue life that
is desired in future service.
The results of spectrum fatigue tests of components can
also be utilized to aid in the selection of design stress
levels. The fatigue quality index, K, is determined from
fatigue test results as illustrated in Fig. B-7. The analysis
is based on the test spectrum which was applied to a given
structural component up to the time when a fatigue crack was
initiated, and a set of S-N curves for various Kj. values
representative of the material in which the crack was started.
With these data, a fatigue analysis is conducted for several
Kj. values, determining S n/N for each case, and finally
calculating by interpolation on the K^ value which corresponds
to E n/N = 1. This K-t value is designated the fatigue quality
index K, of the structural component.
A number of components have been analyzed and compiled as
shown in Fig. B-8. This Figure shows the distribution of K
values obtained from h-Z test results. The fatigue quality index
ranges from slightly below 3-0 to above 5.0, with a mean of
3.65 or 3.7. So we can say that the fatigue quality of aircraft
structures is something a little worse than an open hole which
would have Kt = 3.0. For a new design, you might not want to
use the average K value as a basis for structural design since
you would have only a 50$ chance of passing a fatigue test.
Therefore, we usually try to design for a fatigue quality level
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of about U.O. In some areas of the structure a poorer quality
or higher K value can be tolerated because the stresses have
to be low for reasons other than fatigue. This type of analysis
is just a one -parameter (K) analysis. There are a lot of other
variables that have an effect on fatigue life, but with k3
results, you really do not have enough data to consider more
variables in the preliminary stages of design.
Figure B-9 shows how to use the K value to arrive at a
preliminary design stress level. For a new application, you
first develop spectrum loading conditions which the structure
is likely to encounter during its service life . Then you
perform a fatigue analysis with the same S-N data that was
used for the analysis of fatigue test results. If various
materials are being considered, you can conduct the analysis
using S-N data for the various materials to obtain a relationship
between the design stress or reference stress and the fatigue
quality index as shown in Fig. B-9- For this particular example,
if you picked a K value of k as being the type of quality you
think can be achieved in the structure, then a ^3,000 PSI
stress level would be permitted for 202U-T3 aluminum alloy.
This analysis was conducted for a particular service life so
that the values in Fig. B-9 are all for the same number of
flights or the same number of flight hours anticipated in
service
.
Assuming you have done the best job you can and are coming
up with satisfactory design stress levels and design qualities,
however, there are still new materials, new fasteners and new
approaches that you want to apply to the structure for which
you have no previous experience. In this case, you will have
to conduct various types of tests to develop information and
correlate the data with similar tests on structures in which
you have confidence. So, let's look at some of the types of
tests that are conducted and the results of some example cases .
Figure B-10 shows some results of two -row lap joint tests
with aluminum countersunk fasteners. The peculiar S-N curve
is the result of three types of failure. In the low-cycle
high-stress region, the failure occurs where you would normally
expect it, i.e., originating at the center of a fastener hole
where the highest stress concentration is located. In the
transition section, failure occurred in the countersunk sheet
away from the fastener holes, and in the high-cycle low-stress
region, the failure took place in the plain sheet also away
from the fastener ho3.es. In the high-cycle region (> 300,000
cycles), the cracks initiated at the edge of the attachment
holes in the interface between the two sheets. This is where
the greatest rubbing action takes place and failures were caused
by fretting fatigue. The data in Fig. B-10 illustrates dangers
of extrapolating from previous experience, say less than
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300,000 cycles, into a different region of life expectancy. For
this example, you would get over a 50$ reduction in stress
level over what you'd expect with a normal extrapolation from
low cycle part of the S-N curve.
Fatigue tests have been conducted on simple lap joints
using lubricants, shims, etc. to try to eliminate the fretting
fatigue type failure. Aluminum bronze between mating surfaces
worked pretty well, teflon films did not work very well. How-
ever, for each application, tests have to be conducted to find
out each technique that will work because with fretting fatigue
the same technique doesn't always work for different applications.
Figure B-ll is another example of a fretting fatigue
failure. This is the case of a countersunk hole in the skin of
the fuselage and the example shown is from a pressurized panel
test. Fatigue cracks initiated in the black area in the
transition region from the countersunk to the cylindrical portion
of the hole opening due to the flexure and fretting action
when the fastener was rubbing against the sheet material in
this general region. To avoid this type of problem, it is
necessary to install more fasteners or larger fasteners to
reduce the bearing and bending stress
.
Figure B-12 shows the results of a series of tests on
three-row lap joints conducted to investigate what type of
fastener might be best for a given application. None of these
failures represent bolt failures . The normal theory for the
design of mechanically fastened joints is that if you use
interference fit fasteners, you are going to get an improvement
and if you use high clampup, you are going to get an improvement.
So, combining these effects, you should get a terrific improvement,
Oddly enough, the results did not come out that way. We got a
very small amount of difference between the various fasteners
tested. Only the two upper fasteners gave a little better
result; however, it still isn't a dramatic improvement. The
main reason for this anomally, I think, is again that fretting
fatigue failure is coming into the picture and it is limiting
the degree of improvement you can get by changing the fastener
and the interference. Therefore, the state of the art of the
material fastener system was pushed to the point where fretting
fatigue type failures were occurring and something else must be
done to avoid this problem.
Figure B-13 shows the results of some other tests, where a
series of tests were conducted to evaluate various design
alternatives in order to come up with a good design. This
example is a typical fuselage joint encountered in an aircraft
structure. A continuous stringer is attached to the skin and
the continuous frame inside of the stringer is attached to the
1-26
skin by an angle which is cut out in the stringer region. The
first concept was the simplest one without any attachment between
stringer and frame. Crack initiation was at 10,000 cycles in
the angle at the rivet attachment to the stringer.
The next design used a slightly different stringer shape
which allowed a rivet attachment between stringer and frame
.
This gave an almost 9-fold improvement in crack initiation time.
The crack was in the stringer at the rivet attachment to the
frame which moved the fatigue critical point away from the skin.
A third design resulted in an additional 10-fold improvement
in crack initiation time. This was due to an added clip on the
side of the frame so that the load was more evenly distributed
across the stringer. This shows how simple joints can be
developed in the laboratory by running simple tests . This is
probably the best way to go in many cases since the analysis
is unreliable and rather difficult. It does indicate what
good detail design can accomplish for you.
Another approach for coming up with a good design is to
use finite element analysis techniques. Figure B-lU shows
four different designs for a wing-to-fuselage joint with tapered
stringers. The first two designs have a combination shear and
tension connection, the last two designs are double shear
joints. Normally, a tension-shear type connection is not a
very good design from a fatigue point of view, but you can make
it work provided you put enough material in the right places.
For this particular application, it was considered because of
the simplification of final assembly.
The finite element analysis takes into account the
flexibility of the fastener systems, so the load transfer
from skin to stringers is more or less properly accounted for.
The resulting stress concentration or stress severity factors
are shown at various places in Fig. B-lU. The finite element
analysis model is very useful for looking at various methods
of shaping the material and for reducing the stress concentration
down to a minimum. It permits one to come up with more or less
an optimum design for each concept instead of running many
fatigue tests. The example shows how a good design can be
evolved using computer analysis techniques in conjunction with
a minimum amount of test data.
The finite element type of analysis results in a stress
severity factor and does not really predict the lifetime. So
a correlation was developed between the stress severity factor
(obtained from finite element analysis) and the fatigue quality
index which is obtained by fatigue analysis of test failures.
The correlation is shown in Fig. B-15 which indicates that a
stress severity factor of about 3 corresponds to a fatigue quality
index of about k .
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After design details and stress levels have been established
and basic testing has been conducted, the final proof comes by
conducting a full-scale fatigue test on the complete aircraft
structure. There you integrate the effects of adjoining structure
which you cannot simulate adequately in the laboratory on
components. Fatigue is not an exact science yet, but much can
be learned from experience and applied to new types of design.
The use of this experience in conjunction with a suitable fatigue
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NARROW FILLtT SKIN DOUBLER
(2 ROWS OF SPCTWELDS)
FILLET SKIN
WIDE FILLET SKIN DOUBLER EXTENDED TO HERE
(4 ROWS OF SPOTWELDS)
SECTION A-A
LOCAL BUCKLING OF THE WING-NACELLE FILLET, INDUCED BY DEFLECTIONS OF
THE NACELLE, CAUSED FATIGUE CRACKING IN THE FILLET SKIN AT THE EDGE OF
THE NARROW FILLET SKIN DOUBLER 12 ROWS OF SPOTWELDS). THE DESIGN WAS
IMPROVED BY THE USE OF A WIDE FILLET SKIN DOUBLER 14 ROWS OF SPOTWELDS).
NO CRACKS OCCURRED WHERE THE WIDE FILLET SKIN DOUBLER WAS INCORPORATED.








































REAL SCALE FATIGUE DATA
N(REAL SCALE)
STANDARD S-N OATA FOR MATERIAL-
CONDITION, MEAN STRESS, ENVIRONMENT
FATIGUE QUALITY INDEX "K" IS THE
INTERPOLATED S-N CURVE = K
WHICH MAKES S -77 = 1.00N
N CURVES
LOG In OR N LOG N
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS OR CYCLES
LABORATORY TEST DETERMINATION OF FATIGUE QUALITY INDEX
Fig. B-7
MBAN OF AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS
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FAILURE IN COUNTERSUNK SHEET
THROUGH THE FASTENER HOLES
FAILURE IN COUNTERSUNK SHEET
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FAILURE IN PLAIN SHEET
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IN DESIGN AND MANUFACTURE
¥. C. Dietz
General Dynamics - Fort Worth
Abstract: Problems encountered on the F-lll in detail design and
inspection procedures are discussed; subsequent programs
toward establishing service life integrity and fracture
mechanics data are described; and methods for deter-
mination of inspection intervals and crack retardation
are given. The designer's problem is summarized as
shown in Fig. C-39, ^0 -- emphasizing the need for
intimate association of the designer with manufacturing
and inspection operations
.
As you are all well aware, there are many basic considerations
involved in structural design. These have been briefly summarized
and shown on Fig. C-l. I would like , however, to discuss two
specific items concerned with service life, Detail Design and
Manufacturing, as they have been responsible for most of the
difficulty in service life structural certification of the F-lll,
and in fact, I believe are the major contributors to service
life problems on most aircraft.
Before discussing these items in detail, I believe it is
important to get a feel for the significance of the structural
problems which have occurred in military aircraft service usage
and to view them from the proper perspective. An examination
of the statistics covering a period of about eight recent years
indicates the incidents of inflight primary structural failures
of military aircraft as shown on Fig. C-2. Only a fraction of
the failures shown have resulted in loss of the aircraft but the
magnitude of the problem is evident. It is also apparent that
the majority of failures occurred in the wing structure.
Fig. C-3 shows the loss statistics for USAF fighters due
to all noncombat causes. An average yearly loss of 139 airplanes
translates to a little over 11 airplanes destroyed per 100,000
flight hours. More specifically the losses due to structural
failures have been about one per year or an average rate of
.103 per 100,000 flight hours, or just under 1% of the total
USAF noncombat fighter losses. Fig. C-h presents the same
data by aircraft type.
I would now like to discuss a few of the problems which
occurred in the structural history of the F-lll during structural
certification and service usage. The most significant of these
have been associated with the high heat treat steel parts and
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have been the result of the detail design or the fabrication and
inspection aspects. Most of the problems, as shown on Fig. C-5?
were isolated in the laboratory during full-scale fatigue tests
or during the course of inspection and proof test of the airplane
.
However, there has been one inflight structural failure. You
will note that our experience is in part similar to the experience
of LTV described in an earlier presentation in that three of the
problems were due to stress corrosion cracking, none of these
were service induced.
There is a considerable amount of high heat treat steel
used in flight critical parts on the F-lll airframe. The
definition of critical in this case is a part or component
essential to maintaining structural integrity of the primary
flight structure. The total usage of steel represents approximately
20$ of the structual weight of the airplane or about 5*000 pounds.
As shown in Fig. C-6, the use of steel in critical parts is
essentially concentrated in the heavily loaded structures, such
as the wing carrythrough box, wing pivot fittings, tail support
bulkhead and longerons . With few exceptions , the steel employed
in the F-lll is D6AC, a derivative of an alloy which was initially
developed by Ladish. It is similar in many of its characteristics
to U3U0 except it does not exhibit a blue brittle heat treat
range. Extensive use is made of welding on the three major wing
fittings; however, this has not been a source of any service or
test problems
.
The F-lll structural test program included a full-scale static
test and a full-scale fatigue test article. Fig. C-7 shows the
fatigue test article set-up for testing. The fatigue test
originally was planned to be conducted, as shown on this chart,
on a complete airplane including wing, fuselage and tail. As
the program progressed it was revised to test individual major
components to expedite the program. This was particularly
feasible for the F-lll due to the nature of the wing attachment to
the fuselage inherent in the variable sweep design.
The first failure in the airplane fatigue test program
occurred in the wing carrythrough structure approximately 2.\
years ago, as shown on Fig. C-8. Approximately 1800 cycles of
kg load had been applied when failure occurred in this wing
support structure. The origin of the failure was a taper-lok
bolt which attaches an aluminum door to the rear spar structure.
The crack at the point of unstable crack growth was approximately
.2", and progressed across the sculptured lower plate of the box.
In the bolt hole adjacent to the origin of the failure, it was
discovered on post-mortem examination that a fatigue crack also
existed.
In view of this early failure, an extensive investigation
was undertaken, and it soon became obvious that there were two
problems. As shown in the magnified pictures of Fig. C-9, it
was found that some rather rough drilled and reamed holes
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existed. The profilcorder measurements shown indicate the
surface condition. Measured with a profilometer, the surface
finish is RMS of 200 to 250. There was also concern about the
stress levels in view of the evidence of fatigue in the adjacent
hole to the failure origin, and a stress survey was conducted
in the steel flange corner radius. Strain gages were installed,
as shown on Fig. C-10, on the flange and slug area not only on
a full-scale test specimen which was set up specifically for this
purpose, but also on the static test airplane and on a flight
test aircraft. With a nominal stress of approximately 80,000
psi in the slug area, a factor of about 2.5 times this value
existed on the top edge of the flange
.
The solution therefore involved both design and manufacture.
Figure C-ll is a simplistic chart but it makes the point. With
the high stress concentration as measured and the rough hole
surface finish a low fatigue life is indicated. It was necessary
to lower the stress level and to reduce the taper -lok bolt loads
by design, and additionally, revise the manufacture technique
to improve bolt hole finish and obtain better bolt fits to
achieve a lower effective stress concentration.
As quite a large number of parts had already been manufactured,
retrofit considerations were of prime importance. A considerable
amount of analytical and test effort was required to develop a
simple retrofitable fix that could be applied without causing
other problems within the constraints of minimum rework to the
high heat treat steel structure. The final design is shown in
Fig. C-12 and represents the design correction aspect of the problem.
The gusset design, though not evident from the chart, required
precise sculpturing to obtain the optimum stress distribution
necessary to reduce the flange stresses and to achieve minimum
bolt loads. The significant reduction in stress level achieved
is apparent from the chart.
At the same time and during the period of several months of
testing of the design improvement change, process improvements
were also being vigorously pursued. The resulting changes are
shown on Fig. C-13? and involved the development of special
multi-fluted carbide tapered reamers, and revised manufacturing
procedures including such things as use of improved coolants
for the reaming process. An extensive test program on effects
on fatigue life of bolt interference fit was also conducted, and
as a result the installation tolerances were considerably
tightened.
These detail changes in design and manufacture were
subsequently proven by subjecting a full-scale test specimen to
the equivalent of 2U,000 flight hours or 6 service lives with-
out failure
.
As noted previously, the fatigue test program was revised
to test major components, and Fig. C-lU shows the wing in the
fatigue test fixture. The F-lll contractual requirements are
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that the airplane be designed and tested to four lives. At
just over three lives in the initial test of the wing a failure
occurred at the point shown in Fig. C-15. Figure C-l6 is a
photograph of a production part with the failure line indicated.
The failure initiated in the lower plate of the fitting at one
of the fuel flow holes machined in the integral ribs
.
Figure C-17 shows the fractured part at the point of failure
origin. The test had been run in repeated spectrum loaded blocks
so the block markers were quite clear and permitted the determination
of the crack growth rate. The critical crack depth for this
part is about jy" which results in a surface crack length of
approximately £". We were well aware that these fuel flow holes
did represent a stress concentration and this area was used as a
fatigue analysis control point. Moreover, a number of element
tests of the part had previously been run satisfactorily to
specification requirements. It was determined on examination of
these original test specimens and the full-scale wing test that
the surface finish of the test specimens was better than the
fatigue test full-scale wing.
When this part was initially designed, we were not as adept
at using finite element analysis as we have since become and
subsequently, a fine grid finite element analysis was made of
this area as depicted in Fig. C-l8. The average stress field of
103,000 psi, used as a reference, corresponds to the maximum
stress expected in the fatigue test spectrum. The close
correlation of the calculated values to measured values, which
were taken from strain measurement of a full-scale part is
evident. The origination of the fatigue crack was at the left
lower corner of the fuel flow hole where the stress levels
indicate approximately 190 ksi.
Again, the problem existed of having a large number of parts
manufactured and installed on airplanes which were flying. While
this particular failure represented no immediate service problem,
in view of the relatively long demonstrated life, improvement
was required. Figure C-19 shows the application of an epoxy
boron reinforcement on this steel plate. It was fortunate that
the outside surface of the fitting was relatively flat without
any ribs or stiffeners thus providing a good surface for bonding
of the composite. Through development test and analyses, a basic
design and orientation of boron laminates was selected which was
most compatible with the modulus of elasticity of the steel, and
provided acceptable bond shear loads. The objective of this
reinforcement was fatigue enhancement, not static load since
static testing had been successfully completed, so the design
was tailored to specifically accomplish the objective of reducing
the stress levels at the fatigue critical point. Figure C-20 is
a photograph of this somewhat unique application of filamentary
composites as a reinforcement. It is quite easily applied in
production in an autoclave, and can be installed on complete
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wings with use of portable tools employing electric heaters and
pressure bags. The reinforcement weighs 6 pounds, and by-
analysis essentially doubles the fatigue life of the part. This
design has been tested on a complete full scale wing through
five lives without evidence of any fatigue distress.
Figure C-21 illustrates the effectiveness of the reinforcement.
The values are measured stress levels from a full scale test wing
and show the significant reductions and uniformity of stress
level achieved. The finish of the rib intersections with the
plate were also improved.
I would like to touch on one other problem which resulted
in a flight failure. Figure C-22 indicates a manufacturing
defect in a wing pivot fitting which escaped detection during
manufacture. The small light zone at the base of the black area
is the only region showing evidence of fatigue. Failure occurred
during a kg maneuver after a relatively short time in service.
While we had been concerned in the past with the problem of
fracture of these high strength materials , as a result of the
aforementioned test experience, a rigorous fracture mechanics
test and analytical approach had not been applied. As a result
of this flight failure an extensive fracture mechanics program
was initiated and has progressed a long way toward understanding
and quantifying crack propagation and brittle fracture phenomenon.
Some of these actions taken on the F-lll will undoubtably benefit
and be reflected in future programs
.
Figure C-23 shows the elements which essentially constitute
the service life integrity program for the F-lll as modified to
include fracture mechanics considerations. Involved in quantifying
the Fracture Mechanics inspection interval calculations is the
prediction of crack growth rates and critical crack sizes as
indicated. This required a considerable test and analysis program
as an adequate test data base and analytical procedures to
accomplish these analyses did not exist. The basic elements
of this program are shown in Figure C-2i+. Essentially, the
procedure starts with the service usage spectrum used for fatigue
analysis with the additional consideration of the temperature
and chemical environment. As it is not practical to perform
an analysis for every part of the airplane, it was necessary to
isolate the critical parts which, if they fail, would cause
catastrophic failures. In some instances the criticality of
parts could be determined by simple examination. However, in a
large number of cases extensive failure analyses were required.
Flaw growth models were also required that were representative
of the structure and correlated with spectrum test. It became
apparent that there was a considerable difference between
spectrum loading and constant amplitude cyclic loadings on
crack propagation in steel and this type testing was included in
the specimen test program. Another unique procedure adopted for
the F-lll was to proof test airplanes on a production basis and
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this was made an integral part of the fracture control program.
Also, a statistical risk assessment analysis was performed which
was useful in establishing the relative criticality of important
structural part.
Figure C-25 illustrates the basic proof test concept. The
premise is that the test will demonstrate that a crack greater
than a critical depth will not exist at a given stress level
and temperature. Further, in actual operation, the airplane
will in all probability experience some lesser stress level and
at a higher temperature than the proof test values . Advantage
can be taken of both the lower stress and the fact that steel
parts have a considerably reduced fracture toughness level at a
low temperature to provide a margin as illustrated which can be
converted to flight hours for a crack, if present, to propagate
to critical size. In essence, the procedure is simple however
there are a considerable number of problems involved in the
practical execution. Figure C-26 is a superimposed photograph
of an F-lll airplane subjected to positive and negative loads
in the cold test chamber. As previously mentioned, the assumption
is that any cracks which may exist in the structure are below
their critical crack size for the conditions tested or catastrophic
failure would result.
The basic fracture mechanics data program conducted for the
F-lll involved not only Convair but also a number of other test
laboratories participated, including those at Boeing, Battelle,
Aerospace Corp., NASA, AFML and AFFDL. A large number of tests
were required to isolate the variables shown in Fig. C-27. Close
to a thousand specimens of D6AC 220-2U0 heat treat steel were
run in this basic data program. Figures C-28 to C-30 illustrate
some of the types of specimens and typical test machines which
were used to obtain this data.
An unforeseen difficulty was encountered in establishing the
variation of K]_
c
with temperature which is required to permit
prediction of critical crack size. It was found that D6AC did
not have a single Kic variation with temperature as illustrated
by Fig. C-31. This departure from the expected situation was
determined to be a function of the cooling rate during the heat
treat quench from a material temperature of 600°F down. Values
of K]_
c
at room temperature were found to vary from Uo to 95
depending on this quench rate. It was therefore necessary to
determine the heat treat histories of all the parts installed
in the completed aircraft, and to take into account the fracture
toughness value that would produce the shortest or most conservative
inspection interval. It should be noted that the other material
properties: impact strength, elongation, yield strength and
ultimate strength, were within specifications values and did
exhibit this variation. Also, in spite of the variability of




The data plotted on Fig. C-32 is typical of the data derived
from the test program and illustrates the relative influence of
environment on crack growth for constant amplitude WOL type
specimens. The Ak range for the data presented is of the order
of 10 to 60. Similar data from the complete test program have
been assembled and will be published shortly by the Air Force
Material Lab.
As previously noted, it became apparent during the course of
the program and from evaluations of data available that the
constant amplitude test specimen program data was not consistent
with results from spectrum tests. A considerable retardation
effect was evident from these spectrum loaded tests depending
upon the order of the applied loading and environment. To resolve
this difference an extensive spectrum/environment effects program
was initiated as summarized in Fig. C-33- A baseline program
was run with certain conditions held constant as noted and variations
evaluated against this baseline. There was a total of 109
specimens in this program and again a number of laboratories
participated in addition to General Dynamics. Figures C-3^- and
C-35 show some of the typical test set-ups used.
To establish an analytical correlation, a mathematical model
was developed by Dr. Wheeler of Convair, as shown on Fig. C-36.
This model accounts for the crack retardation which takes place
when a large initial load is followed by subsequent smaller loads.
The derivation of this equation has been published and is
available in the engineering literature. The significance of
the retardation effect is shown in Fig. C-37- The particular
test illustrated was run to a 5g maximum load and a mission
developed spectrum in a JP-^ fuel environment. The spectrum
loads were applied in 58 random load levels. An analysis based
on constant amplitude test data would predict that the crack
would propagate to a .20" depth after U00 hours. The specimen
as tested took 3j200 hours to progress to this depth. A prediction
based on using the retardation approach previously discussed is
shown for comparison.
I would now like to discuss one of the specific aspects of
the design problem today. In the past, fatigue analyses were
performed and tests conducted on the assumption that the service
life was a function of the time required to incubate and initiate
a crack and to have it progress to failure. The current concept
interjecting Fracture Mechanics starts with the assumption that
there is a pre-existing crack. Figure C-38 is an artist's
rendition but it illustrates the obvious fact that the left-hand
curves will produce an appreciably shorter life than the right-hand
curve. It is also generally recognized, as noted on the chart,
that there are a large number of factors involved in the development
and growth of flaws. The net result is that the design task, if
it is to take into account Fracture Mechanics considerations
directed toward specific requirements, will be considerably more
complex.
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In conclusion, I have summarized on Figures C-39 and C-Uo
the Designers problem as it can be viewed today in regard to
achieving adequate and safe service life. To cope with these
problems, new methods and procedures need to be developed and
integrated into the design process.
I-U6
• STATIC STRENGTH
• FLUTTER AEROELAST ICITY
• SERVICE LIFE
• APPLIED LOADS (Magnitude Spectrum)
• INTERNAL LOAD DISTRIBUTION
• DETAIL DESIGN (Concept, Analytical Methods. Materials)
• MANUFACTURING (Fabrication & Inspection)
• SERVICE USAGE (Operational. Maintenance!
Fig. C-l
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• ABOVE FAILURES OCCURRED DURING 196? THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1970 TIME PERIOD
EXCEPT FOR B-52 AND B-57 FAILURES.
• B-52 AND B-57 FAILURES OCCURRED DURING 1959 THROUGH 1969 TIME PERIOD
• FAILURES INVOLVE HOIH USAF AND USN AIRCRAFT AND IN SOME CASFS






• i SAI FIGHTERS DESTROYED ALL NON COMBAT CAUSES
• Avcrag si per Year
• Average Rate per 1 000 Flighl Hours
>
-
• USAr FIGHTERS DESTROYED IAIIHRL OF PRIMARY STRUCTURE
• Average Losses per Year., .
• Average Rate per 100 000 Fligl I Ho n
• Portion ol Total Fighter Losse; Ca i I by Failure
of Primary Structure .
.
. ! 25
• FAILURE OF PRIMARY STRUCTURE IS CAUSE OF ABOUT 1 % OF ALL USAF NON -COf/.BAT
FIGHTER LOSSES
NORTON AFB DOC. AS-XI6 INCLUDES F-4, F-5, F-86, F-100,
F-IOI, F-102, F-104, F-105, F-106, 4 F-IIIA I D i
Fig. C-3






TOT PLIGHT LOSS RATE LOSS RATE FAILURE OF
HOUrc 1 ALL CAUSES PRIMARY STRUCTURE




















































Total 1 111 10 9.689,622 11 47 103
N r P Doc. AS-XI6
'Not Con parable Due fo Piograr:








• SOURCE OF PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
• FATIGUE TEST (4)
• SERVICE USAG1 111
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• MREE-STAGE REAMING SEQUENCE
• IMPROVED COOLANT FOR FINISH REAMING
• POWER FEED IAPER REAMING
• 18-1 IBIDE FINISHING REAMER : ' 15 RMS
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SPECIMENS: ICT, ST DOB >
MATERIAL: (Plate Forging, Prod. Parts)
HEAT TREAT PROCESS (Ti ' itures,
Quench Rate, Quenchant, Circulation)
THICKNESS . 10 25 to 75 in )
DIRECTIONALITY: ( RT, RW, WR TR. WT. TW i

















ENVIRONMENTS: (Dry Air, Lab Air, jp-4,
Distilled Water. 3-1/2* NaCI, Prussian
Blue, Relative Humidity)
V V
FREQUENCY 11,6, 50, 130, 600 cpm)
LOAD RATIO: (0.1. 0.3, 0.51
V
DEPTH TO LENGTH: ( a/2c . 09 to 56
)
DEPTH TO THICKNESS: <a/t=.29to 99)
V
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• CONSTANTS: K|C Flaw, Spectrum, Material Form, Thickness, Unit Stress
• 4 ENVIRONMENTS: Dry Air Rel. Hum. JIM Fuel, Dist. Water
• 2 or More Crack Growth Curves/Environment






• STRESS LEVEL (Unit Stress)
• SPECTRUM SHAPE
• LOAD SEQUENCE
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TEST PLAN: • 5.0 G MAC SPECTRUM
• 58 LOAD LEVELS
• RANDOM SEQUENCE OF
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II MICRO MACRO CRACK DEVELOPMENT
III CRACK PROPAGATION
FACTORS
A - INTRINSIC MATERIAL PROPERTIES
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• ACHIEVEMENT OF ADEOUATE SERVICE LIFE AT ACCEPTABLY LOW RISK IS DEPENDENT
ON A LARGE NUMBER OF FACTORS, (some of which are beyond the D>rert Control ot
the Designer) MANY OF THE FACTORS WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED ARE IN TURN
SUBJECT TO A LARGE NUMBER OF VARIABLES. STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS OF
SERVICE LIFE AND RISK CAN BE USED TO ASSIST IN THE DECISION MAKING
PROCESS; HOWEVER. WHAT CONSTITUTES ACCEPTABLY LOW RISK HAS NOT BEEN
ESTABLISHED.
• TO ACHIEVE DESIRED PERFORMANCE, INCREASING USE IS BEING MADE OF MORE
EXOTIC MATERIALS AND MANUFACTURING PROCESSES
• HIGH STRENGTH METALLIC ALLOYS
• FILAMENTARY COMPOSITES
•HIGH FATIGUE RESISTANCE FASTENER SYSTEMS
•WELDING, ADHESIVE AND DIFFUSION BONDING
• SURFACE FINISHING
IN ORDER TO ASSURE THAT THE EXPECTED BENEFITS IN SERVICE LIFE ARE ACHIEVED
THE DESIGNER MUST HAVE A MORE INTIMATE ASSOCIATION WITH THE MANUFACTURING
AND INSPECTION OPERATIONS AND PROVIDE MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION AND
DIRECTIONS
Fig. C-39
• THE CURRENT TREND TOWARD A DESIGN CRITERIA BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION OF
PRE-EXISTING FLAWS AND A DEFINITION THAT FATIGUE LIFE IS BASED ON THE
TIME A FLAW BECOMES OF DETECTABLE SIZE REQUIRES NEW KNOWLEDGE ON THE
PART OF THE DESIGNER OF THE VARIABLES AFFECTING SERVICE LIFE INCLUDING
WHAT THE PRODUCTION MANUFACTURING PROCESSES WILL PRODUCE AND IN-
SPECTION CAPABILITIES WILL FIND
• TO AVOID THE PROBLEM OF CATASTROPHIC FAILURE IN MONOLITHIC STRUCTURE
THERE HAS BEEN A TREND TOWARD CONSIDERATION OF FAIL SAFE DESIGNS
THIS DESIGN CONCEPT HOWEVER PRESENTS A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS
• PERFORMANCE DEGRADATION (Weiyht)
• COST - INITIAL AND MAINTENANCE
(Additional Piece Parts and Joints*
• VERIFICATION BY TEST OF FAILURE MODES
A FAIL SAFE STRUCTURE IS NOT FAIL SAFE UNLESS THE FIRST FAILURE CAN BE
READILY DETECTED AND CORRECTED
Fig. C-J+O
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SOME COMMENTS ON FAIL-SAFE DESIGN
Walter S. Hyler
Battelie-Columbus
Abstract: Tensile design properties are based on strength
distribution curves with mean stress and standard
deviation. No similar curves are available for
fracture resistance. Data are presented to show the
large scatter of Klc , depending on slight processing
variations as well as on location within the same
sheet. A coefficient of variation indicates whether
processing is well under control. Improved material
characterization will be necessary for fail-safe
design with thick, moderately thick, and thin
structures --again requiring close interrelation
between design and materials and processing.
The talk by Mr. Dietz this morning was very impressive to
me, probably not only because it was done so well, but also
because it touched upon many concerns that I have relative to
fail-safe or damage tolerant design. One thing which came out
clearly was his statement about the need for positive interaction
between the designer and the materials and process engineers,
since in damage -tolerant design of high-performance systems, we
are concerned with fracture and fatigue-crack propagation for
which analytical methods still are being developed and for which
optimum materials processing is necessary. This is where I
wanted to start my discussion and what I wanted to amplify on
because I believe that it really is a fairly critical point.
In the old days—and I say this with a smile because I really
don't know about structural design in the old days --it seemed
we were interested in ultimate strength, in limit load, and in
developing positive margins, and then we would go on to the
next design problem. With our high-performance airplanes, we
have more complexities. We may still be computing ultimate
load, limit load, and positive margins, but with damage tolerance
we are also concerned with establishment of minimum detectable
flaw sizes, crack propagation by fatigue, establishment of
inspection intervals and useful life , and the strength of flawed
structure
.
For handling ultimate and yield load design calculations,
we have learned to employ and have become comfortable with the
use of design allowables based on statistically established minimum
design properties. It is obvious that we have not nearly approached
that point yet in terms of fatigue-crack propagation and fracture;
but as we evolve design concepts, such as fail-safe or damage
tolerance, then I think that we will have to give some attention
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to the establishment of minimum design allowables for these
behaviors
.
Both fatigue -crack growth and fracture are sensitive to
geometric factors in component geometry, to composition and
structure of the material, and to processing details in the
fabrication operations. The measures of these behaviors, such as
KQ , Kjc , and da/dN versus A K have grown out of the development
of fracture mechanics as a stress -analysis tool and can be used
in design analysis. In the discussion today, I make reference
to only one of these measures, Kj ; however, the philosophical
implications also apply to problems associated with plane-stress
fracture and fatigue-crack propagation.
While Kjc has historically been considered a constant for a
material under a plane-strain stress state, this is an over-
simplification when one considers the reality of materials in
structural components. If one simply considers a material in a
product form, such as plate, processed by procedures reasonably
well under control, we know from countless tensile tests that
there is a variation in tensile properties of 15 to Uo ksi,
depending upon the material and its strength level. Similarly,
one can expect the same material to exhibit a variation in Kj
c
of some appreciable, but generally unknown, magnitude. Now
consider the same thick plate material fabricated into a useful
but complex piece of structure with distinct changes in thickness
and plan-form and finally heat treated to the desired strength
level. If the material is quench-rate sensitive or sensitive
to some other processing procedure, one can expect that the
variability in Kj
c
from location to location may be appreciably
greater than in the prior case. A design philosophy such as
damage tolerance that is based in part on fracture toughness
considerations is not on too solid a footing unless there is a
realistic appraisal of this variation.
Figure D-l provides some rationale for the above statement.
In this figure are shown for three generic materials (with their
representative F^u levels), the critical surface crack length
associated with various Kjc levels. If one decides, based on
limited testing of simplified shapes that "reasonable" Kjc
levels should be 60, 60, and 25 ksi inch (for steel, titanium,
and aluminum, respectively), and if the real material in a complex
component shows variations of -30 percent or more (which is not
unlikely), the possibility exists that a flaw will grow to
instability long before it can be detected with high probability .
This is a consequence that may accompany inadequate determination
of minimum Kj
c
values. For example, for the steel alloy in
Figure D-l, the carck length is shown to be 0.l6 inch. However,
if the distribution of Kj
c
in real parts can vary by -30 percent,
application of the limit load stress might result in failure
with a surface crack of only 0.07 inch; hardly a detectable
crack with high probability.
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For static properties, as stated before, the aerospace
industry has "become accustomed to the use of statistically based
design allowables, such as the A and B values in MIL-HDBK-5.
I would like to review briefly some features of A and B values,
since some of the ideas are instructive in considering fracture
and fatigue-crack propagation. Figure D-2 shows the analysis
of tensile yield strength for 7075-T6 sheet.
In this figure are shown two bell-shaped distribution curves
based on an analysis of test data. The solid curve was obtained
from test samples sectioned from one sheet. The dashed curve
came from a large number of quality control tests on many lots
of the alloy. It is seen that in either case the properties
fall in a broad range, and for this collection of data the
single sheet data covered over half the range obtained from the
multHot test data. It is from this type of analysis that the
aluminum industry developed the concept of A values as a minimum
design mechanical property. Thus, the A value is a minimum
strength above which it is expected that 99 percent of all
future production will lie with a confidence of 95 percent. I
have shown on the figure what I terms an A' value that represents
a maximum strength value, below which 99 percent of all future
production will lie with a confidence of 95 percent.
For this alloy, the "process capability" is such that
98 percent of all production is expected to lie between A and A'
.
The term "process capability" implies that for a given production
process schedule, there will be a recognizable distribution in
strength properties, definable by a reasonable population of
test data. The range of properties reflects acceptable limits
on composition and structure and on all the controls utilized
in each processing step.
When we consider fracture as exemplified by Kj , it may be
that for small quantities of a given material, heat treated
carefully and consistently, that Kj
c
will be a reasonably constant
value. If one can convince one's self that such values represent
the material in a complex structure, it (Kj
c )
provides a good
engineering tool to employ in damage tolerant design. However,
many modern aerospace structural materials are sensitive to
various states of processing so that unless one knows the "process
capability" of a material with regard to fracture, one may be
led to unsafe design conclusions. The next several figures
and accompanying discussion amplify this point.
Figure D-3 shows the distribution curve obtained from
quality control data on current production Ti-6A1-^V mill-
annealed plate. The statistical analysis resulted in the
A, A', X, B and B' values indicated. One concludes from the
analysis that the process capability of this alloy is such that
98 percent of expected future values will lie between 118 ksi
and lU6 ksi.
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Figure D-k shows the relationship between F, and Kj
c
for
the same titanium alloy in about the same thickness range. In
this figure, each horizontal line, vertically tic marked at
the ends, marks the minimum and maximum Kj
c
value observed for
a given plate with the appropriate TYS. Two or more tests
were conducted for each plate. The excessively large scatter
is disturbing since the material is essentially that which
can be purchased according to the confines of present military
specifications and, as such, corresponds reasonably well in
tensile properties to the material shown in Figure D-3.
Consequently, the ordinate scale on Figure D-1+ is tic marked
to indicate A', B 1 X, B, and A values from Figure D-3.
From data, as shown in Figure D-U, one must establish a
representative Kj
c
value for use in damage -tolerant design
considerations. There are several possibilities for this
selection:
(l) Assume a typical value. A natural selection would
be a Kj
c
value associated with the mean strength,
X; thus, a K-r of about 65 ksi inch.
5
(2) Establish a trend line, such as the downward sloping
solid line in Figure D-U, and select a minimum Kj
value associated_with the A' value; thus, a Kj
c
of
about U2 ksi inch.*
(3) By statistical analysis, using regression techniques
and introducing probability and confidence (not
necessarily 99? 95) , establish a minimum curve and
select a minimum Kj
c
value associated with the A'




' inch, or less
.
(h) The fourth alternative is to lump all of the data
and compute by statistical techniques the X and s
associated with the data and a minimum value based
on some agreed-upon probability and confidence. A
K-r value about the same as in Alternate 3 would
be anticipated.
Neither Alternates 3 nor h provide a design value for Kj
that would excite the designer (based on this data collection;
since this results at a limit load stress of F^/l.5 in the
need to confidently find surface cracks less than about 0.25
inch according to Figure D-l. Alternates 1 and 2 appear less
* The A' value is chosen since the TYS distribution indicates
that this is an expected value for this alloy.
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desirable, since they ignore the distinct probability that
substantially lower values of Kjc will actually be present in
the material (particularly for Alternate l). There is some
belief that for fracture critical components the assumed
Alternate 1 value can be screened with quality-control tests.
This rationale appears to be potentially erroneous if the
distribution of Kj
c
values in a single plate shows a range of
expected values nearly as broad as that from a large sampling
of plates -- along the lines suggested for TYS in Figure D-2
.
It should be stated that other information than shown in
Figures D-3 and D-k (relative to composition and microstructure
and their influence on K-r for this alloy) suggests that the
extensive scatter may not be real for this alloy, providing
some further examination of process control is done in order
to sort out what contributes to the variability and how process
controls can be modified to lessen variability. This is the
essential point that Mr. Dietz was addressing in promoting
much closer interaction between design people and materials
and processing people.
Another material of considerable interest these days is
D6AC, a modification of 1+3^-0. Figure D-5 shows the distribution
curve for yield strength for this alloy based on a large sampling
of producer and user quality control data. It was a normal
distribution with X at 2lU ksi. The process capability was
such that 98 percent of future production would be expected
to fall within the range 200 ksi to 228 ksi with a confidence
of 95 percent.
Figure D-6 begins to delineate the real-life situation
for this alloy with regard to fracture, or Kjc . This is a very
busy figure that requires some preliminary orientation. The
rectangular border represents the boundary of l6 different
plates of D6AC (2 feet by 3 feet) all processed similarly by
General Dynamics /Fort Worth and identically heat treated
according to a procedure that I have identified as heat treatment
A. Each plate had been laid out to provide a variety of specimens
for tensile tests, fracture toughness, etc. On Figure D-6,
each of the sixteen plates is identified by a distinct symbol.
The symbols on the drawing represent the approximate location
in each plate from which a fracture specimen was taken (usually
more than one fracture test was conducted and Figure D-6 contains
all of the data). The numerical values adjacent to each symbol
represent the observed Kj
c
values.
Within the circle at the lower right-hand corner of the
figure are data for six different plates. It is seen that Kj
c
for the plates at this confined location ranges from about 59
to 86 ksi yinch. Within the circle at the lower left-hand corner
also are data for six plates, where some plates in this location
duplicate those in the right circle. For this second circle,
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the range in Kjc is from about 55 to 91 ksi '/inch. Where plates
are represented in both circles, a plate with Kjc on the high
side of the range in the right circle may not be similarly
ordered in the left circle. In fact, if one were to draw a
number of circles at various other locations on the plate
plan-form and examine the details of the data within each circle,
comparing the data with that in other circles, one would conclude
that with this particular heat treatment a fairly large variation
in Kjc can be expected within a plate and among the many plates
.
Detailed perusal of the figure shows this range to be from
slightly less than 50 ksi ' inch to slightly more than
90 ksi inch.
Figure D-7 shows the same fracture -toughness data plotted
as a function of TYS, with the A', X, and A values from Figure D-5
tic marked on the ordinate. Of the l6 plates, 11 had accompanying
tensile test data, so that the horizontal lines represent the
plate tensile yield strength; the tic marks at the ends are the
maximum and minimum Kj
c
values in the plates from two or more
tests . The lowest horizontal line on the figure is for the
five other plates, where TYS is an assumed, but reasonable,
value. It is evident from this display that the heat-treat
process capability with regard to TYS is quite satisfactory.
However, one concludes that although the fracture toughness
information also is consistent, the inordinate scatter in results
may prejudice the utilization of the material since the capability
of heat-treatment A would yield a design allowable for Kjc of
approximately 37 ksi inch (for 99? 95 on probability and
confidence).
Figures D-8 and D-9 illustrate a happier story. Figure
D-8 shows Kjc data from eight plates of D6AC that were identically
heat treated, but in a different way than the previous 16 plates.
This heat treatment, I have identified as heat -treatment B. The
plotting scheme in Figure D-8 is the same as for Figure D-6.
Examination of the somewhat fewer data in Figure D-8 shows
(l) an encouraging uniformity in fracture toughness within a
plate and among the plates, and (2) a substantial increase in
fracture toughness. The range in Kjc values is from about
91 to 102 ksi /inch.
Figure D-9 shows the Kjc values plotted against TYS as in
Figure 7; however, there were tensile data for only two of the
plates. The middle line at TYS of about 220 ksi is for the
remaining six plates. Since so few tensile data were available,
it is difficult to say any more than that there appears to be
a greater spread in TYS associated with heat-treatment B than
for A. More important, however, while the fracture test results
for D6AC with heat-treatment A suggest a possibly severe sensitivy
to nonuniform quench rates along the plan-form and from plate
to plate, heat-treatment B suggests that its process capability
is compatible with achieving high and uniform fracture toughness
.
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Not only that, but a designer familiar with the use of statistical
design allowables for static strength would have a much more




inch to which manipulation of these data lead
one.
This type of materials and processes research, which has
been conducted at General Dynamics/Fort Worth, interfacing with
the stress and structures people is the way that confidence will
be built into the use of the damage tolerant design concept.
Figure D-10 is illustrated to recap some of the statistical
measures that were employed in preparing several of the other
figures . Information shown for the three materials and two
strength attributes are coefficient of variation, C; average
strength, X; and standard deviation, s. As one examines the
right-hand column (s), it is immediately evident that the
standard deviation for fracture toughness of heat-treatment A
for D6AC is excessively high, certainly suggesting that processing
is yielding an intolerable variability in results. On the other
hand, heat-treatment B exhibits an s value even less than that
for TYS, when processing has been examined and developed for
the strength attribute of importance.
In the column for coefficient of variation, which is a
measure of dispersion, s, normalized by the average value of
strength, several features stand out. First, the C value for
Ti-6A1-Uv alloy for TYS is in excess of 50 percent higher than
the comparable value for the other two materials . This suggests
,
based on this and other information, that process control for
this alloy probably can be improved. This process control, in
turn, may significantly alter the fracture toughness display of
Figure D-U. Recent work at North American Rockwell relative to
the B-l is beginning to bear this out. Finally, the almost
order of magnitude difference between C values for TYS and
fracture toughness (A heat treatment) for D6AC reinforces the
idea that process development and control for fracture toughness
was needed.
This discussion has been an attempt to quantify, by examples,
my thoughts and those expressed independently by Mr. Dietz and
others at this meeting that the development of the damage tolerant
design concept presents a challenge in the aerospace industry
that encompasses design engineers as well as materials and
processing personnel. The challenge is not only in developing
and understanding the design concepts utilizing fracture mechanics,
Equally important is to recognize that the mechanical behaviors
associated with damage tolerance, fracture toughness, and
fatigue-crack propagation are structure and process sensitive.
This sensitivity will require perhaps an order of magnitude
increase in materials and process research, development, and
characterization on aerospace systems contracts in order to assure
that the material in future structural components will have high
and uniform fracture toughness.
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FIGURE D-1
CRITICAL SURFACE-CRACK LENGTH VALUES FOR SEVERAL GENERIC
MATERIALS WITH ASSUMED K|C VALUES
Steel, Ftu = 280 Ksi Ti, Ftu = 130 Ksi Al. Ftu = 75 Ksi
K|C 2C, inch K IC 2C, inch K IC 2C, inch
20 0.017 20 0.078 15 0.14
40 0.07 40 0.31 20 0.25
60 0.16 60 0.70 25 0.39
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FIGURE D-2. DISTRIBUTION OF TENSILE YIELD
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FIGURE D-3. DISTRIBUTION OF TENSILE YIELD
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FIGURE D-5. DISTRIBUTION OF TENSILE YIELD
STRENGTH VALUES FOR D6AC
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FIGURE D-7. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TENSILE YIELD
STRENGTH AND FRACTURE TOUGHNESS
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FIGURE D-9. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TENSILE YIELD STRENGTH
AND K
Ic
FOR D6AC PLATE, HEAT TREATMENT B
ALCAD 7075-T6
Tensile Yield Strength - 0.027
Ti6AI-4V
Tensile Yield Strength - 0.042
D6AC Steel (220-240 Ksi)
Tensile Yield Strength - 0.027
Fracture Toughness, A— 0.17
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FIGURE D-10. STATISTICAL MEASURES FOR THE THREE ALLOYS
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IMPACT OF PROCUREMENT PRACTICES
ON C-5 STRUCTURAL DESIGN
W. T. Shuler
Lockheed-Georgia
Abstract: Contractual factors which affected the structural
design of the C-5 are analyzed and evaluated, including
guaranties on performance, low weight empty, and crack-
free fatigue life as well as fixed price contract and
program for concurrent development and production. No
revolutionary change in procurement practices is recom-
mended, but areas of possible improvement are indicated
and discussed.
Only the abstract is available.
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STRUCTURAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR
A SPACE SHUTTLE
F. F. W. Krohn
General Dynamics - San Diego
Abstract: Details of structural arrangement and thermal protective
system for a space shuttle booster are shown and
corresponding design conditions are given including
thermal expansion, creep, shock impingement, acoustic
environment. Design considerations for high-temperature
materials, and structural features for components
incorporating a safe -life or a fail-safe approach are
discussed -- indicating a new order of complexity
compared to aircraft design.
I would like to present to you design considerations for a
space shuttle booster. The design requirements on space shuttle
vehicles are a unique combination of the design requirements for
aircraft and rocket launch vehicles. This is something brand new
and the combination of these requirements will impose on us quite
a number of new problems in materials and design.
For those who might not have followed the space shuttle
project, there have been four teams engaged in design studies.
McDonnell-Douglas has a design effort on the booster as well as
on the orbiter in Phase B. North-American Rockwell and General
Dynamics Convair have a split in tasks, with us at General
Dynamics doing the booster and North-American doing the orbiter.
Then there is a team of Grumman and Boeing and the fourth is one
company again -- Lockheed.
The objective of the space shuttle system is to put payload
cheaply in orbit with re-usable vehicles. The different versions
which have been studied accomplish this with marked difference
in cost. Some of the systems throw away tanks which weigh up
to 60,000#. Payload cost in orbit varies from $75 for fully
re-usable to $200 plus for partially re-usable systems.
I will address myself to a system which mounts the orbiter
parallel to the axis of the booster -- a polar orbit design
mission with a payload of Uo,000# and an orbiter with two engines
requiring a staging velocity of 10,800 ft/sec. This results in
the most difficult booster and this vehicle system was studied
in depth. However, we had a re-direction as we found out rather
lately, through side studies, that it would be much more advantageous
to have three engines on the orbiter. This brings the staging
velocity down to less than 8000 ft/sec, even for the polar missions.
As stated I will, however, address myself to the particular system
with 10,800 ft/sec staging velocity.
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The approximate lift-off weight on the pad, with the orb iter
mounted, is slightly in excess of 5 million pounds for the
combination -- a rather staggering weight. As far as the booster
is concerned, our lift-off weight is ^,l88,OOC#. The landing
weight is 638,000#. The rest is propellants
.
The vehicle is really a huge tanker with 12 rocket engines
mounted at its base. To give you some idea about the dimensions,
the booster has a wing span of lkk feet and a total length of
256 feet. For cruise back it has JP propellants of approximately
lUU,000#. It has an ascent propellant weight of 3,382,000#.
Of the total vehicle weight, essentially more than half is
oxidizer.
Now let us get a little bit into the description of this
vehicle system. It takes off vertically. The orbiter is
connected with a reversible link system which is sized in such a
fashion that the orbiter can be ejected even with the orbiter
engines dead. This is accomplished by the thrust on the booster.
In normal operation the orbiter has its thrust run up to
approximately 50$ at time of separation. There is still a very
large force in the horizontal direction on the linkage system.
After the orbiter has been separated, the vehicle will
assume an angle of attack of approximately 60° and spend its
kinetic energy very rapidly. The whole heating cycle is exceedingly
short and the heat-up is very steep. Here, you will see, we have
very severe implications for structural design. Everything on
the outside will be hot and any inside structure will just lag in
temperature. The vehicle, during the time of re-entry, is
controlled by a set of reaction controls because the tail is
fully ineffective and also the wings are not very effective at
this time.
We have 12 jet engines in this vehicle. They are deployed
and run up one after the other following re-entry. The last
engine will have run up approximately two minutes after the first
has been deployed. The vehicle then will cruise home or it will
cruise to the next airfield. The vehicle has the capability just
like some of the orbiters to ferry back to the launch pad.
In structures arrangement there is a very large difference
between the design requirements for 10,800 ft/sec staging velocity
and a vehicle staging with less than 8000 ft/sec. A 10,800 ft/sec
vehicle requires a substantial thermal protection system (TPS).
An 8000 ft/sec vehicle can be built around what we call the heat
sink principle. Here temperatures are controlled by allocation
of sufficient mass in the surface. Use of heavy aluminum gauges




Now let us look at the structural arrangement shown in Fig. F-l.
The vehicle has a thermally protected backbone structure consisting
of thrust structure, LH2 tank, intertank, LO2 tank and forward tank
extension. All major vehicle loads are introduced into this thermally
protected core.
The wing is link-attached with vertical and drag links. Once
we fuel the LH2 tank, the tank wall will go to approximately -100°F
and shrink very substantially while everything around it will stay
at room temperature. So, all supports have to be statically
determinate
.
The orb iter attachments are backed up by two large bulkheads
which are essentially external in the region of the LH2 tank and
one very deep forward bulkhead which is inside the LO2 tank. This
forward support takes the brunt of the loading.
Figure F-2 shows the heat shield which shrouds the body. It
is composed of large semistructural elements. We did not follow
the usual route of having TPS panels of 2 or h feet square . Instead
we have large panel shells with slip joints and a horseshoe element
directly attached to the wing because the temperatures of the
upper wing surface and this shroud are approximately the same.
One must make sure to get compatible expansion. The best way to
enforce this is to attach the heat shield to the wing directly as
a root web. All other shell elements are supported in the center
and expand fore and aft with respect to the substructure.
The great advantage of this arrangement is that it reduces
the potential leak area in seals and slip joints to less than
1000 ft length compared to some miles in a conventional panel
system. This makes it possible to control the containment of
purge gas. There is a purge envelope over the LH2 tank separated
by a bulkhead from the purge cavity over the L02 tank. Both
cavities are filled on the launch pad with dry nitrogen.
In up-flight, we bleed off the purge gas to avoid large
internal pressures on our heat shield. Just very shortly before
staging, the bleed-off vents are closed and kept closed during
the time of maximum heating. We will have some loss of purge gas
during this time without any doubt. We have a self-imposed spec
of permissible leakage area (not to exceed 350 square inches) and
this permits us to go through this environment with a quite high
degree of assurance that we will not get hot plasma into the
purge cavities. After we have suffered through the re-entry, the
tank pressure will be reduced and the vents will be opened to
take air on board for pressure equalization. So much for the




The design criteria shown in Fig. F-3 indicate for the launch
mode an ultimate factor of l.k x limit and for the aircraft mode
an ultimate factor of 1.5 x limit. Buried in this arbitary
limit-to-ultimate factor are 80 million dollars . That is the cost
to conduct a full-scale separate static test.
Now, what are we really after? We are after a vehicle which
is capable to take limit loads at the end of its useful structural
life. We have proposed to the contracting agency to leave these
factors in for design but to drop the whole static test program
except for development testing. Instead, we would go through four
lifetimes of operational flights and then subject the structure to
1.15 times limit load. We feel that this is a much more useful
type of testing. Arbitrary design criteria which we have set up
with the ratio of yield-to-ultimate factor on one outdated
aluminum alloy in mind most certainly are suspect in our time
and age.
The tanks, which compose a very large portion of the structure,
are not really designed by these external load factors. They are
designed by fracture mechanics or, to put it another way, by proof
-
testing requirements . The tests are conducted with a proof
pressure which precludes the presence of a crack which could grow
to critical size with actual operational pressures and projected
crack growth during 150 flights. This imposes a very severe burden
on the materials community because now we really need to know
crack growth rates and cannot be content anymore with K-j_
c
alone.
All our gages are thin enough to be neither plane strain nor
plane stress, but something in between. And here we have a very
substantial lack of data, even on the 2219 material which we have
selected and which is excellent for the application.
One of the new criteria coming in is creep. This is a wide
open field. We have limited our creep to .2% plastic deformation.
We do not know if this is right because we don't know what really
happens with a panel that has experienced this much creep. One
could have panel flutter. One also has steadily changing conditions
as far as overall dynamic behavior of the structure in flutter is
concerned. We have designed around many of these problems, just
to be on the safe side.
Figure F-U shows peak limit load intensities and the load
envelope of the vehicle with 25 different loading conditions.
As you can see, not much is designed by the aircraft mode of
operation, mostly localized structure only. Figure F-5 shows that
the tanks are designed for safe life and only a relatively small
portion of the structure is designed for fail-safe criteria.
We made a valiant attempt to get fail-safe tanks and looked
into crack stoppers as they are presently employed on commercial
jet fuselages. We found that they would have to be at a prohibitively
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close spacing of approximately hjt" . We were quite uncomfortable,
as aircraft designers always are, with all this safe life
situation.
Then, by fracture mechanics analysis, we found to our delight
that the tanks will leak long before we get to critical crack
size. We really could fly with a subcritical, leaking crack on
quite a number of missions before it would become critical. We
have to make very sure that we install sensors in the purge
cavities to find out if we have somewhere a slow leakage . This
should warn us and we then could take a closer look at the tank
wall.
Figure F-6 shows the structural backbone of the vehicle with
thrust structure, LH2 tank, intertank, LO2 tank, and forward tank
extension. Orbiter support points as well as landing gear
attachments are shown. A heat shield is mounted approximately six
feet away from the rocket nozzle exit plane. Before we go into
these components and their design logic, let us have a look at
the crew compartment.
Figure F-7 shows the structure of the crew compartment which,
however, is not designed to structures requirements at all for a
very unique reason. Severe noise levels caused by the captured
shocks between booster and orbiter noses require this component
to be designed for noise suppressions, e.g. with heavy skins.
The crew compartment and the electronic compartment behind it
are suspended from the outer heat shield shell which will expand
substantially during heat-up in re-entry. The shell is conventional
aluminum alloy construction. We have fused silica glass windows
and there is a local area around them which is designed to
thermo-structural requirements. The side enclosures can be swung
open and the crew can eject out to both sides. This is required
since the orbiter is mounted on top. Seats can be swiveled for
vertical and horizontal flight.
We have stringers, very few of them, on the inside and the
frames are on the outside. The whole enclosure is enveloped with
low-density fiberglas insulation and 1" dynaflex over it to maintain
the temperature environment in the compartment.
Figure F-8 shows the forward tank extension with nose gear
support and a large JP tank located here for stability during
re-entry. The forward segment of the heat shield is supported
here with two links and guide rollers. When we re-enter, the heat
shield which is bolted to the sub-structure at the rear end of
the lox tank, expands at this point approximately 6" forward.
Tank extension construction material in the forward portion is
202U. In the aft portion it is 2219, principally for compatibility
with the wall of the lox tank which will see temperatures of
-320°F.
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Figiire F-9 shows the lox tank which is made of 2219 aluminum
and designed principally for fracture mechanics considerations.
The nose gear loads do not tax this structure very much at all
and there is a minimum amount of stiffening. We have integral T
stiffeners longitudinally and truss-type frames. The reason for
not going to a web-type frame is, of course, that the tank shrinks
and we had to tailor the stiffness of the frame very carefully
in order to prevent large pull forces on the tank stiffeners in
chill down. The rather massive bulkhead at the orbiter forward
attachment was mentioned before.
All fittings are designed of two elements. Why not three for
fail-safe? The reason is that we always would have covered one
of the elements and therefore could not have inspected one of the
elements visually.
The lateral load on the forward orbiter attachment is 1.25
million pounds limit and also the vertical load is very substatial
but, nevertheless, all this does not design the structure here
because stiffness requirements are critical. We had to meet a
natural frequency with the orbiter mounted on top of approximately
.8 cps. We made .9 cps after many trials and many computer runs.
No large thermal stresses are encountered on a lox tank
because the whole structure system will cool down simultaneously.
We are definitely working in the mixed mode as far as fracture
mechanics is concerned. Tank walls are approximately l/8"
in the upper portion. There are also quite a number of baffles
mounted in the tank.
Figure F-10 shows the intertank section. It connects the
LO2 tank with the LH2 tank. It is crammed full with equipment.
Again we are dealing with an aluminum structure, local reinforcements
in titanium, and here, fortunately, we can go inward and get our
stiffness by depth. So, no advanced high stiffness materials are
employed
.
The canard and the orbiter drag link are attached in this
region. The all-movable canard is streamlined during re-entry
since reaction controls are used. This effectively eliminates
temperature differences between upper and lower surfaces. Regarding
the critical orbiter connections we are becoming quite cautious
and are toying with the idea to subject any of the critical
orbiter connecting elements to proof loads for qualification.
Figure F-ll shows the IH2 tank, made of 2219 aluminum,
approximately 120 feet long and 33 feet in diameter. On the




These two bulkheads experience their main load at the moment
of separation but, interestingly enough, the exceedingly turbulent
flow around these vehicles forced us into the ultimate of stiffness
design on the frames because otherwise we could probably have
fatigued this area half-way through the first flight at the point
where the stiffeners join the frames. Whereas we quite succeeded
in meeting the overall natural frequency requirements for the
combined booster and orbiter with aluminum frames in this location
here, we now had to beef up the caps with beryllium for local
stiffness
.
Of course, we could take other materials here. It is beryllium
because its price has come down substantially and we laminated it.
Even if we should have a crack in one of the laminations we still
do not lose our stiffness because a very localized area would be
effected. Of course, we could have taken another route by lowering
the height of the stiffeners joining the bulkhead here but this
would have resulted in a substantial weight penalty.
Figure F-12 shows the landing gear support structure. Essentially
it is a wheel well, structurally fully enclosed. Vertical and drag
links introducing the loads into bulkheads and into longerons
which are integral with the tank wall provide an attachment system
which permits the decrease in dimensions which takes place when
we fuel the tank.
But principally we selected this system because of the need
for a meaningful drop test arrangement without involving too much
of the vehicle. The arrangement permits drop testing the landing
gear separately and with a concrete barrel on top of it because
it is supported in a determinate fashion and loads into the
structure can be determined accurately. The cost of testing
requires very careful consideration and is quite important for
the structural design of future large vehicles.
Figure F-13 shows the wing-body-TPS arrangement. A drag
brace taking the drag loads into the longeron of the tank walls
is the only fore and aft restraint of the wing and the horseshoe
heat shield attaches directly to the root rib here. Wing and
heat shield expand from this attachment point. All the dimensions
are steadily changing and there are slip joints to arrive at an
expansion-compatible structures system.
A metallic seal at the fore and aft end of the TTS horseshoe
section is provided by a bellows. We have corrugated skins all
over this vehicle because aerodynamic smoothness is of little
concern. As a matter of fact, if one would start with a smooth
surface on a high-temperature vehicle subjected to flash heating,
after the first flight you would not have it any more . This
necessary approach makes aircraft aerodynamicists shudder.
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Figure F-lU shows the cryogenic insulation system. Again, it
is something rather unique. All the cryogenic insulation systems
of the past have been one-shot systems but here we need long-time
reliability because maintenance in a tank, which is 10 stories high
and has 33 feet diameter
/
could be prohibitive.
An external foam insulation system would not work because its
specific heat is such that it would melt due to the high outside
temperatures , in spite of the short heating times . So we need the
heat sink of the structure to more or less protect the foam. We
have a gas layer system without an inner liner, reconciling ourselves
from the beginning with the fact that even with a plastic liner
hydrogen would penetrate sooner or later during a 10-year life span.
The unique polyphenyene oxide foam has a capillary system into
which the hydrogen penetrates. A gas layer is formed which is
kept in equilibrium by capillary forces at the surface. The system
is structurally beautiful because it does not impose large shear
forces on the adhesive joints. This is very important because it
is a tough proposition to hold on a cryogenic insulation system
at -U21°F and we have more than a third of an acre of it. Besides,
all the small columns of the system are so nicely stabilized
against each other that a heavy man can walk on it.
Figure F-15 shows the thrust structure. This is a fail-safe
system with multiple load paths, partly with trusses, partly with
shear webs providing a benign mode of failure which a truss does
not give us. The basic structure is titanium, reinforced by
boron-aluminum. Their coefficients of thermal expansion are
close, 5-0 x 10"" and 3-1 x 10"°, respectively. Graphite epoxy
with a coefficient of 1 x 10_D is not compatible with a metallic
structure and we would have to make the whole article of graphite
epoxy.
The problem is also that boron epoxy and graphite epoxy are
deficient in high-temperature applications . If graphite epoxy is
heated to 350°F in the presence of moisture its strength will
deteriorate. We have tested boron aluminum rather successfully
up to 700°F. There is an additional consideration. You might
have high temperature only for a short time but you need a certain
heat sink capability to prevent the temperature from going up
too fast. Lately we have done exceedingly well with boron and
graphite polyimides which would have a substantial cost advantage
but we were not quite sure of them at the time when we conducted
this study.
Let me point out the importance of weight savings . For every
pound of advanced composite we save one pound of weight in
stiffness critical areas. We attempt to put one pound of weight
in orbit for approximately $75, say $100. Let us look at the
orbiter first. Without any change in sizing, with 100 flights
at $100 a pound we generate a value of $10,000. Assuming an
average 60$ payload factor, this makes it $6000 per pound or, to
show definitely a profit, say $5000 per pound.
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For this particular booster we need a 5 pounds saving to put
one more pound of payload into the orbiter. This means for the
booster one pound of weight saved is approximately $1000. It
shows that advanced materials at a cost of about $350 per pound
don't have to frighten our community as long as we apply them in
such an economical fashion. The installed cost of aluminum is
anywhere between $35 to 150 per pound, depending on the quantity
of production. As we are progressing into this new world of
advanced materials, we will probably employ them in more complex
shapes. Right now, the easiest way to employ them economically
is just as reinforcements in localized areas. I am afraid we
will always have a mix of many materials. The world is not
built out of one material
.
Figure F-l6 shows the base heat shield which is very lightly
loaded. Here we are really going all-out with exotic materials.
There are beryllium truss systems, providing a quadruple load path
and in a conservative fail-safe approach. The performance of these
trusses on tests was just fantastic and columns with an L/p
approaching 300 are somewhat of an eerie sight. We have them
ball-jointed to prevent lateral loading which shows what you can
do if you watch the peculiarities of a material.
The outer region of the bulkhead consists of corrugated
rene kl panels while the center panels consist of coated corrugated
columbium. The reason is that the temperatures at the periphery
are reduced due to air circulation, particularly on the launch
pad. These are smaller panels, different from the heat shield
arrangement on the rest of the vehicle. It is a slip-jointed
system.
Figure F-17 shows the wing arrangement, housing the engines
with cutouts over a large portion of the structure. The acoustic
environment of the engines with an output of around 172 decibels
requires high stiffness surface panel construction in this area
which merits every type of scrutiny we could put on it. The
typical wing structure appears to be a throwback to old days
with heavy concentrated load members of titanium and semi-
structural covers. We have a fail-safe system of ribs and spars
and corrugated surfaces with the corragation running in the fore
and aft direction.
The reason for this arrangement becomes apparent when we look
at the wing structure in Fig. F-l8. The skin of Inconel 7l8 goes
up to 1350°F and can expand and flex between the attachments at the
node points while the heavy titanium spar cap has a maximum
temperature of 300°F . We have to get used to thinking in terms
of compatible heat-up because a panel could quickly deform to an
unacceptable level and move into a critical panel flutter mode.
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Figure F-19 shows the vertical stabilizer which consists of
conventional, integrally stiffened type of titanium construction.
The thermal environment is rather mild because the vertical surface
is shaded during re-entry. Only the leading edge is heat-sinked
to cope with plume impingement from the orbiter
.
Figure F-20 shows the canard structure which again is rather
conventional. The internal structure and substructure skin are
titanium but skin gages and outer surface material are determined
by thermal environment considerations. This vehicle flies by
wire so there are no linkages to the crew department.
Figure F-21 summarizes the design criteria for the booster
TPS. However, the creep factor has been lowered in the meantime
to 2 life cycles with concurrence of NASA because the penalty
would have been very severe and all structures in the TPS are,
after all, but secondary types of structure. With a cumulative
creep of .2% and a factor of 2, our plastic deformation in actual
flight experience will be .1%. Panel flutter might become
critical after such plastic deformation. Flight monitoring and
replacement, if required, should be considered since actual
conditions cannot be simulated in laboratory type tests .
Figure F-22 shows the pressures to which the outer TPS is
subjected. They are quite substantial on the lower surface but
rather mild on the upper surface.
The heating environment is shown in Figure F-23 and you can
see that we are only approximately 100 seconds above 1000 F,
that's all. So you heat up and you cool down and everything on
the inside will lag substantially. Consequently, the influence
of the local heat sink on or near the outer surface will assume a
remarkable influence on the temperatures which we actually
experience . Figure F-24 shows a plot of TPS temperature versus
thickness for corrugated and smooth TPS. With increasing gage
thickness the temperature goes down so you really can tailor
your temperatures for a vehicle like this
.
Now let us look to what we have tailored these temperatures.
Figure F-25 shows the booster body temperatures for the TPS . We
can use rene kl throughout and heat sink it down to the criticality
of this material. The required maximum gage we have determined
is .058. On the wing, the situation is a bit different and rather
serious due to nose shock impingement.. Temperatures and various
materials which have been used on the aerodynamic surfaces are
shown in Fig. F-26.
Figure F-27 shows what this flash heating will do to various
types of TPS panels. This is very interesting. The total stress
consists of thermal stresses due to temperature gradient and
bending stresses due to air loads. For the first configuration
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of .016 rene Ul the total stress is 1+3,700 psi compared with an
allowable of UlOO psi. So we applied heat sinking and went to
.055 rene Ul which gave us a total stress of 37,700 psi compared
with an allowable of 13,700 psi. We still could not make the
grade.
We found out that in flash-heating one cannot employ the type
of structure which we have used since the beginning of metal
aircraft design. So we went to the third configuration shown in
Fig. F-27. Because of the reduced moment of inertia it forced
us to a much closer frame spacing on the lower surface but with
essentially everything working at the same temperature we had a
total stress of 11,800 psi compared with an allowable of
13,700 psi.
Figure F-28 shows the frames supporting the body TPS which
are about 9" deep. We first had a titanium frame with a corrugated
web but after we had found out the very high significance of
heatsinking, we went to a quite conventional aluminum construction
with additional beryllium caps to maintain the temperature low
enough
.
Regarding the application of beryllium I would like to point
out that the principal aluminum beam is designed to take limit load
plus. However, we are stiffness critical. The weight of the
beryllium caps on these frames is in the order of 6000 pounds but
the total weight saving is far in excess of that. As far as
structural reliability is concerned, even a full crack across the
beryllium cap would have very little influence on the stiffness
of the beam.
Figure F-29 shows a panel TPS which we had to add on the
wing as we went from 10,200 to 10,800 ft/sec staging velocity. We
have flex clips for connection to the very substantial spar cap
which is really a heat sink arrangement employed to keep strength
allowables high with low temperatures. It is a system of floating
panels on the outside, ^0" long. The material in the shock
impingement area is coated columbium and the rest of the wing
lower surface is HS-188.
Fortunately, with the reduction in staging velocity we can
eliminate this TPS and even the body TPS, going to heat -sink tank
walls. The weight penalty for going from a staging velocity of
8000 ft/sec to 11,000 ft/sec is of the order of 50,000 pounds
for this booster, in addition to the dramatic effect on design
criteria.
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Figure F-30 shows the materials we use on this vehicle and
the limitations we impose on them. With all the lessons we have
paid for we are quite reluctant to jump in with new materials
except maybe by first getting our feet wet with a semi-structural
application. All this refers to the B-9U vehicle; the lower
staging velocity vehicles are not as demanding. As a matter of
fact, all these exotic materials fall more or less by the wayside
with the lower staging velocities
.
What I wanted to present to you was one of the most difficult
vehicles that we treated and I hope that I have inspired your
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LOADS ( + LIMIT PRESSURE)
PROOF PRESSURES
LOADS (+ LIMIT PRESSURE)
MAX. OPERATING PRESSURE ONLY
PROOF PRESSURE
MAX. OPERATING PRESSURE ONLY
BOOST & ENTRY LOADS
AIRCRAFT MODE LOADS
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MAX. OPERATING PRESSURE
ABORT LOADS (+ LIMIT PRESSURE)
THERMAL FORCES (+ FLT. LOADS)
THERMAL FORCES (ALONE)
F.M. = FRACTURE MECHANICS
ASSUMED SERVICE LIFE - 100 MISSIONS




PEAK LIMIT LOAD INTENSITIES o
1 1 HR GROUND HEADWINDS
2 1 HR GROUND TAILWINDS
3 1 HR GROUND SIDEWINDS
4 LIFTOFF + GROUND HEADWINDS
5 LIFTOFF + GROUND TAILWINDS
6 LIFTOFF + GROUND SIDEWINDS
7 MAX ALPHA-Q HEADWINDS
8 MAX ALPHA-Q TAILWINDS
9 MAX BETA-Q (2400)
10 3G MAX THRUST
11 BOOSTER BURNOUT
12 BOOSTER RECOVERY
13 BOOSTER SUBSONIC GUST
14 BOOSTER 2 POINT LANDING
15 BOOSTER 3 POINT BRAKED ROLL
16 BOOSTER 2 G TAXI
17 1 DAY GROUND HEADWINDS
18 1 DAY GROUND TAILWINDS
19 1 DAY GROUND SIDEWINDS
20 TWO WEEK GROUND HEADWINDS
21 TWO WEEK GROUND TAILWINDS
22 TWO WEEK GROUND SIDEWINDS
23 BOOSTER 2.5 G POSITIVE MANEUVER
24 BOOSTER -1. G NEGATIVE MANEUVER
25 BOOSTER MAX OPERATING PRESSURE
O


















BOOSTER STRUCTURE DESIGN APPROACH 7
COMPONENT INHERENT FEATURES DESIGN PROOF TEST
APPROACH REQUIREMENT
LO„ h LH TANKS
2 2
NOT PRACTICAL TO DESIGN FAIL-SAFE LO o= 1 23
LH2 , o= 1 13
FOR PRESSURE. STRINGERS ACT AS
CRACK ARRESTORS FOR FLIGHT LOADS
SAFE-LIFE
WING HIGH FAIL-SAFE CAPABILITY FAIL-SAFE ...
CANARD BOX SOME FAIL-SAFE CAPABILITY SAFE-LIFE ...
CANARD PIVOT IMPRACTICAL TO DESIGN FAIL-SAFE SAFE-LIFE ...
TPS IMPRACTICAL TO DESIGN FAIL-SAFE SAFE- LIFE ...
VERTICAL TAIL HIGH FAIL-SAFE CAPABILITY FAIL-SAFE ...
CREW CABIN WALL FAIL-SAFE WITH TEAR STOPPERS ONLY FAIL-SAFE a - 1.5
ORBITER SUPPORT FAIL-SAFE WITH MULTI-ELEMENT CAPS FAIL-SAFE
FRAMES AND WEBS
Fig. F-5



































































































ORBITER LINK ATTACH FITTINGS










DETAIL OF WING - FUSELAGE ATTACHMENT
Fig. F-ll
MAIN LANDING GEAR SUPPORT STRUCTURE
WHEEL WELL TO
LH 2 TANK





VERTICAL & SIDE LOADS
BULKHEAD
STATION 3020































CRYOGENIC INSULATION LH2 TANK
ADHESIVE
CREST 7343/1% SI LANE
OR EPON 934
PPO (POLYPHENYENE OXIDE) FOAM



























BASE HEAT SHIELD O
RENE' 41 BASE BULKHEAD
RENE' 41 SUPPORT CHANNELS
TITANIUM CORRUGATED SKIN
COATED COLUMBIUM CORRUGATED PANEL
(CENTER FOUR PANELS ONLY)
RENE' 41 CORRUGATED PANELS
RENE' 41 REINFORCING RING
BERYLIUM TRUSS TUBES (TYP)
Fig. F-l6
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• SUBSTRUCTURE SKIN & INTERNAL STRUCTURE - TITANIUM
• UPPER SURFACE TPS OUTER SKIN - COATED COLUMBIUM





DESIGN CRITERIA, BODY TPS





FACTOR OF SAFETY = 1.4
FATIGUE FACTOR OF 4 ON CYCLES
CREEP FACTOR OF 4 ON LIFE
TOTAL CUMULATIVE CREEP - 0.2%
LEAKAGE 350 IN. 2 EQUIVALENT
Fig. F-21
PANEL PRESSURES, TPS SHELL




































































BODY LOWER SURFACE, 6= DEGREES
Fig. F-23
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THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM (AERO SURFACES) O
TEMPERATURE (F)
510 A
A INNER SKIN TEMPERATURE
GZZZZZZZ3 TITANIUM





•TEMPERATURE INCLUDES 20OF FOR













































































































STRESS CORROSION CRACKING LIMITS USE AT TEMP. ABOVE 650°F TO VERY SHORT
TIME & LOW STRESS. HIGHER LIMIT OF 800°F MAY BE CONSIDERED FOR BOOSTER
COMPONENTS WHERE TIME & STRESS CONDITIONS PERMIT
l,350 o F IS AGE TEMP. OPERATION ABOVE THIS TEMP. SEVERELY DEGRADES
MATERIAL
ABOVE 1,600°F, INTEGRANULAR OXIDATION OCCURS. TIME ABOVE THIS ON
BOOSTER IS SHORT ENOUGH TO BE ACCEPTABLE
CREEP LIMITED. TIME AT TEMP. AFFECTS TOTAL CREEP. BOOSTER ACCEPTABLE
BECAUSE TIME IS APPROXIMATELY 1 MINUTE PER MISSION
LIMITED BY CREEP & HIGH TEMP. STRAIN CAPABILITY. TIME AT TEMP & LOADS
OF BOOSTER PERMIT HIGHER TEMP. APPLICATION
2,500°F IS UPPER LIMIT FOR COATING REUSABILITY
BASED ON PLASMA-ARC TESTS
Fig. F-30
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Only the figures and an abstract are available.
Abstract: Structural Engineers must continue to investigate ways
to save structural weight without losing structural
integrity. Two computing programs were used to
determine a basis for comparing advanced materials and
types of construction with existing aluminum structure.
One computing program determines the rate of crack
growth from the material characteristics (Kq = critical
stress intensity factor, R » stress range, AK = stress
intensity factor, B and n = material characteristics
and type of construction, and Rct = stress ratio of an
unstiffened panel to one with stiffeners and/or crack
stoppers). A second program solved for the probability
of structural failure using the mean 1 g stress and
coefficient of variation of mean load (dependent on the
type of mission), mean strength and coefficient of
variation of mean strength, and residual strength which
decreased as a function of the crack length and panel
stiffening at any time after first flight. Ways were
shown to calculate the probability of initiation of a
crack and its percentage of total fatigue damage. For
ease of comparison, and reduction of computer time,
all the materials compared were based on an undetected
crack of 0.2 inches initially. The theoretical results
were compared to actual tests on a 96 inch wide stiffened
panel. Modifications to the theoretical coefficients
were recommended due to practical considerations of the
slowdown in crack growth when the crack tip reaches an
attachment, when a stiffener fails, when the fracture
toughness, Kq and AK values vary with crack length, when
the value of Rc^ varies with stiffener area and crack
length, and when the stress spectra has occasional
high stress cycles that modify the plastic zone ahead
of the crack tip and actually slows down the rate of
crack growth for the average cyclic stresses.
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The materials compared were aluminum (202U-T3, 7075-T6),
titanium and graphite epoxy. The great weight advantage
of graphite -epoxy at as low as 10,000 psi 1 g stress and
the low probability of failure allowed many more flights
and longer inspection intervals (thus reducing Maintenance
Costs).
Desirable future analysis methods, material characteristic
and type of construction research, and other structural
research plans were illustrated as areas for Structural
Development to reduce the structural weight and improve
the Structural Reliability (Lower the Probability of
Structural Failures )
.
One of the most desirable results of the study are the
charts that have been prepared that represent over two
hundred data points . These charts give the Structural
Analyst the opportunity to compare materials at different
stress levels, mission load variations, mean strength
variations, number of flights, structural efficiency,
residual strength, and variation of material parameters
all versus the Probability of Failure. These overall
views of various materials and types of construction
can be very useful for choosing a material and also
determining what future research is essential for
saving structural weight and improving structural
reliability.
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DIRECT OPERATING COST = CENTS/SEAT-MILE
RETURN ON INVESTMENT = PROFIT PER YEAR/COST
DOC FLIGHT OPER COSTS
+ DEPRECIATION + FLIGHT INSURANCE + MAINTENANCE + FUEL COSTS
RANGE x PAYLOAD
RETURN ON INVESTMENT
PROFIT PER TRIP x NUMBER TRIPS PER YEAR
ORIGINAL COST PER AIRCRAFT
RANGE = 2.3 -^ (L/D)MAX LOG 10 —
-
WEIGHT AT INITIAL CRUISE
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PAYLOAD INCREASE 40 ft
PERCENT FOR 30 PERCENT
STRUCTURAL WEIGHT RATIO
REDUCTION (FOR SAME RANGE)-
---$—-
100 200 300 400 500 600
TAKEOFF WEIGHT (1000 LB)
Fig. G-5
NEW VEHICLE COST
WITH CHANGE IN STRUCTURAL COST
ASSUME 30 PERCENT STR WGT DECREASE = 60 PERCENT STRUCTURAL COST INCREASE (COMPOSITE
STRUCTURE)
30 PERCENT STR WGT - 40 PERCENT PAYLOAD GAIN






ASSUMED VEHICLE COST = 25 MILLION




$2000/FLIGHT AT 60 PERCENT LOAD FACTOR (SST)
$2000 x 4 FLTS/DAY x 300 FLTS/YR
RETURN ON INVESTMENT =
(45% BREAKEVEN L.F.) 25,000,000
R.O.I. = 9.6 PERCENT PER YEAR
NEW AIRCRAFT IS 30 PERCENT LESS STR. WGT.
25% W
NEW STR. WGT. FRACTION = = 19.2% W
1.3
LET ALL STR. WGT. DIFF. BE ADDED TO PAYLOAD
OLD PAYLOAD FOR BREAKEVEN = 0.45 x 18% W = 8.1% W
8.1 + (25% W - 19.2% W)
RATIO INCREASE IN REVENUE = = 1.72
8.1
STRUCTURAL COST HAS GONE UP 60% = 15.6% FOR TOTAL AIRCRAFT
NEW BREAKEVEN = X
1.72
(0.60 L.F. - X) = (0.60 - 0.45) X = 0.377
1.156
NEW PROFIT/FLT. AT 60 PERCENT L.F. = S2980/FLT (USING 60% - 37.7%)
2980 x 4 FLT/DAY x 300
NEW RETURN ON INVESTMENT =
(AT 37% BREAKEVEN L.F.) 28,900,000
NEW R.O.I. = 12.4 PERCENT/YEAR
PERCENT IMPROVEMENT = 12.4/9.6 - 1 = 30 PERCENT
Fig. G-7
MAINTENANCE GAINS
(1) MAINTENANCE = TWICE ORIGINAL COST OR 25 PERCENT OF D.O.C.
(2) ASSUME 20 PERCENT OF MAINTENANCE COST FOR ACCESS, INSPECTION, AND REPAIRING STRUCTURE
AT SCHEDULED INSPECTIONS.
(3) ASSUME GOAL IS TO DOUBLE INSPECTION INTERVAL (i.e.. 9,200 FLT TO 18,400 FLT)
20%
(4) PROGRAM COST REDUCTION = 2 x 2 x 25M = 5 MILLION
20%




GAIN IN DIRECT OPERATING COST
STRUCTURE WEIGHT SAVING AND DOUBLE INSPECTION INTERVAL
OLD CONFIGURATION
A U U.U. * — NEW CONFIGURATION
OLD CONFIGURATION NEW CONFIGURATION
/ PRICE = 25M\
^MAINT = 50MJ (
PRICE = 28.9M\
MAINT = 45M )
DEPRECIATION/TRIP






FUEL = 0.48 WGT
WGT = 600,000 LB
RANGE x PAYLOAD
9510







(40 PERCENT BETTER FOR
30 PERCENT STR WGT
SAVING)
$9430
CRACK LENGTH AS A PERCENTAGE OF FATIGUE LIFE









20 40 60 80 100




A SAFETY GOAL (P T, 10 ,0 ) C SUPERSONIC SPECTRUM E SUPERSONIC SPECTRUM
B SUBSONIC SPECTRUM
t 3000 hrs. R 10 000 hrs
PROBABILITY OF
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
K 1500 hrs, R 4000 hrs t, = 3000 hrs, R - 4000 hrs




I 3000 hrs R 4000 hrs G Tc = 30,000 hrs
10 20 • 30 40
FLIGHT HOURS (1000)
50
FIGURE 11. PROBABILITY OF STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF FATIGUE








pR (X > Y) = PROBABILITY THAT THE STRENGTH X IS GREATER THAN
THE APPLIED STRESS Y






IF Y' IS NOT A RANDOM VARIABLE BUT ALWAYS OCCURS (1g STRESS), THEN









1TME = T HOURS TIME =
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V /' ' \ S \LARGER OVERLAP AREA
IN RESIDUAL STRENGTH
WITH DECREASE \ /\ ^^^- EXPECTED FAILURE PROBABILITY
-J^^^ C_/ FUNCTION OF AREA OF OVERLAP
LOAD OR STRENGTH ?
Fig. G-13
PR71-GEN-20448




MEAN STRENGTH IN PSI
MEAN LOADING IN PSI (ONE g STRESS)
STANDARD DEVIATION OF LOADING
MEAN LOADING (ONE g)
STANDARD DEVIATION OF STRENGTH
MEAN STRENGTH
RESIDUAL STRENGTH








FRACTURE TOUGHNESS = VARIES WITH MATERIAL, DIRECTION OF LOADING, CRACK STOPPERS =
(TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION); SIZE OF CRACK TO PANEL WIDTH, THICKNESS.
RATIO OF STRESS IN THE REGION OF THE CRACK TIP IN AN UNSTIFFENED PANEL TO THAT IN A
STIFFENED PANEL



















-R) C v/iW TAN RANGE OF STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR






















FACTOR OF SAFETY 1.5 BETWEEN THE DESIGN LIMIT LOAD





PROBABILITY OF STRUCTURAL FAILURE vs
















1G - 10.000 PSI
NFLTS = 158,850
7075 T6
1G - 10,000 PSI
NFLTS = 50.100
1G = 10,000 PSI
Vts 51,350





















2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
fts/H L = MEAN STRENGTH/MEAN LOAD (1G)
Fig. G-17
PR71 GEN-20455
PROBABILITY OF STRUCTURAL FAILURE vs





















1G STRESS = 28.637 PSI
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PROBABILITY OF STRUCTURAL FAILURE vs






3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0
Ms/^l = MEAN STRENGTH/MEAN LOAD (1G)
Fig. G-19
PR71GEN-2045;
SUBSONIC JET TRANSPORT (DOMESTIC ROUTiy
M >- MACH = 2 SPECTRUM
„






















• ALL FLIGHT AND PRESSURE
STRUCTURE FAIL-SAFE
•TITANIUM CRACK STOPPERS IDC 8 TYPE
• 2024 T3 USED FOR FUSELAGE SHELL AND
LOWER WING
• RECOMMENDED INSPECTIONS BASED ON
ANALYSIS AND TESTS
•LANDING GEAR, PYLON AND FLAP WILL












COMPARISON OF MATERIALS FOR DAMAGE TOLERANCE
7075 T73 VERSUS 2024 T3
I „. CROSS
MATERIAL C RESIDUAL






2024T3 -168631 ' 40850




















LONGITUDINAL TWO BAY CRACK WITH
BROKEN CENTRAL CRACK STOPPfR
Fig. G-2U
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RESIDUAL STRENGTH OF UNREINFORCED PANEL
FAILURE STRESS VERSUS FINAL CRACK LENGTH




























URE DUE TO SHEET
URE AFTER CRACK
EST













1 1 ! i
10 20 30 40
TOTAL CRACK LENGTH
EXPLOSIVE FAILURE





FATIGUE-CRACK PROPAGATION IN A PANEL
REINFORCED WITH ALUMINUM -ALLOY STRINGERS




























FOR STIFFENED PANEL STRINGER
CENTERLINE
2 3 4 5 6 7











GROSS RESIDUAL STRENGTH CURVES FOR







1 BAY TESTS 1 AND 2 2 BAY TESTS 3 AND 4




\ K c - = 80,573 PSI / IN.
\
16 24 16








OF THE FATIGUE CRACK GROWTH
RESULTS FOR TEST 2 OF PANEL 2 AND TEST 1 OF PANEL 4













O MOMENT OF APPLICATION
OF PEAK LOAD I




PH I I -GEN-20538
COMPARISON OF CRACK GROWTH RATE












OBEST MATCH K c = 180,000; B
(UP TO STRINGER FAILURE]
D K
c
= 100,000; B, = 0.05 x 10
(AFTER STRINGER FAILURE R
CRACK REACHED
RH IN ATTACH
CRACK AT EDGE OF RIVETS-
0.5 x 10"
T ^-CRACK IN 2ND
STRINGER
OBEST MATCH: K c - 180.000;
B, = 0.05 x 10~ u
O K c = 100.000; B, = 0.05 x 10
13
(AFTER CRACK IN 2ND STRINGER)
PANEL TEST RESULTS
A3 BEST MATCH; K
c
= 100.000: B = 3.0 x 10"' 3 ; RCT » FUNCTION Lj/W,
<! K
c
85,000; B = 3.5 x 10 ,3 ; RCT = CONSTANT
Ct2 K„ 120,000; B - 3.0 x 10~'
3
; R^ T = CONSTANT
10 15 20 25 30
CYCLES (1000)
Fig. G-3 1^
35 40 45 50
PR71GEN-?0447
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DELAY OF CRACK PROPAGATION AS A FUNCTION












PEAK LOADS APPLIED AT CRACK LENGTH
2a = 5mm AND 2a 10mm
n - n = NUMBER OF CYCLES AFTER PEAK LOAD
TO EXTEND THE CRACK FROM
2a » 5mm TO 2a = 6mm //
- • n„-n„» NUMBER OF CYCLES AFTER PEAK LOAD
TO EXTEND THE CRACK FROM
2a 10mm TO 2a = 12mm
4>
10mm TO 12mm v y^r
Sm = 7 KG/mm 2
S = 3 KG/mm2
SHEET THICKNESS 1mm
PANEL WIDTH 70 mm
i
— — — •" ™~ ™~ 5mm TO 6mm—
-
1
i I I i i
10 14 15 16
<^ AK IKG/mm* ,
17 18 19 20
R71-GEN-20531
Fig. G-35






O TtST DAT* /
•
7 / / " 71 ALCLAO 707S-T7)UM / <//C-- CRACK ARRESTED /





























(1) PROBABILITY OF STRUCTURAL FAILURE GOOD TOOL FOR SELECTING MATERIALS AND TYPES OF
CONSTRUCTION.
(2) ONE g STRESS MOST IMPORTANT
(3) SPECTRA VERY IMPORTANT
(4) STRENGTH VARIATION NEEDS MORE TEST DATA
(5) FRACTURE TOUGHNESS AND RATE OF GROWTH NEEDS MORE ANALYSIS AND TESTING USING FULL
STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS.
(6) THE INSPECTION INTERVAL AND STRUCTURAL WEIGHT SAVING INFLUENCES THE:
(a) RETURN ON INVESTMENT
(b) DOC.
(c) MAINTENANCE COSTS
(7) GRAPHITE/EPOXY WILL BE A GOOD CHOICE FOR WEIGHT SAVING AND STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
(LIFE) IF 1g STRESS LEVEL IS APPROXIMATELY 10,000 PSI.
Fig. G-37 PR71-GEN-20444
AVERAGE AIRFRAME COSTS
PER POUND OF STRUCTURE
1970 DOLLARS
The cost may be described by:
Cost = (M + L) x [increments]
Where




L All Direct Labor Includ ing Overheads
[increments] = (1 + R) x (1+E) x (1+G) x (1+P)
R = increment for RDT&E
E - increment for ECP's
G = increment for G&A
P increment for Profit
FACTORED
RAW MATERIAL FLYAWAY WT TOTAL COST PER LB
MATERIAL COST S/LB PURCHASED WT LABOR COST 200 UNITS 500 UNITS
Aluminum 0.66 0.359 105 148 107
Steel 0.18 to 1.00 049 113 140 196 166
Titanium 11.15 0.308 227 366 309
GFRP 5.31 0.862 165 237 171
Beryllium 360.00 0.308* 656 1750 1480
"Assumed Same as Titanium
Fig. G-38
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MORGANITE COMPOSITE ill) (TYPE II RAE FIBER)
BORON COMPOSITE (II)




20 30 40 50




REDUCTION IN VEHICLE STRUCTURAL WEIGHT














REDUCTION IN TAKEOFF WEIGHT
























REDUCTION IN DIRECT OPERATING COST




























TRENDS IN MATERIALS USAGE
PERCENT
(FOR PROPULSION)
































































THERMAL EFFICIENCY = 76%
PROPULSIV'E EFFICIEN CY = 100%











HT REDUCTION OF STRUCTURAL SYSTEM IT
GOAL 45%














1 INTEGRATION OF DIRECT SYNTHESIS METHODS.
DIGITIZED DRAWINGS, AND NUMERICALLY
CONTROLLED MANUFACTURING
1 ADVANCED USE OF DIRECT SYNTHESIS METHODS
'
FULLY INTEGRATED ANALYSIS OF LOADS, STRENGTH, AND LIFE
DYNAMIC AEROELASTIC LOADS VIA INFLUENCE COEFFICIENTS
INITIAL USE OF DIRECT SYNTHESIS METHODS
ADVANCED COMPUTER ANALYSIS OF STRENGTH
PSD ANALYSIS OF GUST RESPONSE




STRUCTURAL AND DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
EMPHASIS
• AUTOMATION OF PROCEDURES
• INTEGRATION OF TECHNOLOGIES
BENEFITS
•ELEVATED VIEWPOINT FOR DESIGN ENGINEER
• MORE EFFICIENT USE OF ENGINEERS
•IMPROVED COMMUNICATION BETWEEN DISCIPLINES
• INCREASED RELIABILITY, SERVICEABILITY,
AND EFFICIENCY OF STRUCTURAL SYSTEM
Fig. G-U8
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SOME PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF RISK EVALUATION
J. W. Ellis
Worth American Rockwell- -Los Angeles
Abstract: Risk evaluation in aircraft design is still far from
being a useful tool. An approach is shown by
identifying uncertainty factors and impact factors
for determining a risk exposure index. Continuing
development is bound to take place in this field-
-
pointing toward an important tool in the design
decision process.
I almost feel that I should apologize for introducing such
an elusive subject as risk evaluation in a meeting encompassing
so many discussions on good solid, data-substantiated, hardware-
oriented problems. Why then, is this subject included here? Why
not leave this tenuous field to a management symposium? It is
true that, historically, risk has been primarily the province
of the manager, but the simple truth of the matter is -- the
manager needs help!
I am neither a program manager nor risk analyst, but in
my activity in preliminary design, whenever decision time comes
around, I feel a strong need for some methodology in the risk
area. To be of value in the detail decision procedure, this
methodology must, of necessity, produce quantitative information
which can be entered into the decision process much the same as
weight or cost. The goal of applying rational risk analysis
at the detail design decision level is not yet attainable, but
recongition of risk as a valid parameter in the decision process
has been made, and the first steps toward rational analysis
methods are being taken.
The Decision Process
Let us examine what is involved in the structural design
decision process. I believe everything that goes through the
mind of the decision-maker will fall into one of the four
categories shown in Figure H-l. The first one, the cost-weight
combination, of course, is a pretty large piece of our structural
world. It is considered here as a combination because I think
we have learned to deal with cost and weight as a trade. They
are not treated independently as they once were . Through value
engineering techniques which enable us to equate weight changes
with airframe growth, and subsequently with cost, we are able
to reconcile the weight and cost dichotomy. The second item,
reliability, is rapidly being quantified through developments
in fatigue analysis, fracture mechanics, fail-safe design
techniques and statistical approaches to structural failure
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prediction. Thus this factor is approaching the point where it
can be included in a quantitative way in the decision process.
Schedules, of course, have always occupied a commanding spot in
the decision process. We not only want to get our airplanes out
on time, but once we get locked into a master schedule, we know
we have to contribute a lot of blood, sweat and tears, and
frequently money, to change. Design decisions dependent upon
schedule factors are usually made on a go/no-go basis and thus
require but little methodology to rationalize once scheduling
is established.
The fourth decision factor is risk. It is a different type
of consideration from the other three and is certainly the most
elusive. Risk can be considered a quality of the cost/weight,
reliability, and schedule factors in that it pertains to the
likelihood of achieving goals in these areas, hence the bracket
on the chart indicating that risk encompasses the other three.
Certainly there can be no doubt that in spite of its elusiveness,
it is essential to consider exposure to loss when we are about
to make a design decision. Such consideration requires methodology.
both to assess the risk, and to express it in quantitative terms
compatible with the other factors under consideration.
Risk Evaluation
What is risk evaluation? It has been said that it is a
sophisticated way of turning chicken and I think there is
something to that; however, the subtle art of turning chicken
at just the right time is one of the key requirements of
remaining solvent in your job, your company, or your program.
The manager who always takes minimum risk, goes down in flames
when technology or his competition catches up with him, and the
manager who disregards risk, follows the same path, but his
flames have historically proven to be not only bigger but
substantially hotter.
Let us examine the basic elements of risk evaluation as
shown in Figure H-2 . All risks involve both uncertainty and
impact. There can be no risk without both of these items
present. If you have a great uncertainty, but no impact as
consequence of the uncertainty, then there is no risk; or
conversely, if you have a great impact but you know with
certainty how things are going to come out, there is no risk
there either. So we have to look at both elements of this pair
before we can say we have looked at risk.
Much of the imput data on the nature of the uncertainty
will be subjective. Generally it must be learned from opinions,
and but little will be clearly defined. However, this data must
be quantified or we cannot work with it from an analytical
standpoint. Risk impact may have a number of forms, but is
usually resolved in terms of dollars, schedule impact, or system
performance impact.
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After we have evaluated the uncertainty and the impact, I
think a professional judgment will always be involved in arriving
at the final decision, at least in the foreseeable future.
I don't believe any of the risk people claim that we will have
an automatic system that circumvents or eliminates the judgment
factor. The analytical risk work is properly used to place
this judgment on a sound factual basis. The decision may be
based on one of several criteria. It may be a decision to
minimize risk as is shown in the figure, but it may more often
consist of a balancing of risk versus advantages.
Stumbling Blocks
There are a number of stumbling blocks which will always
render the job of risk analysis difficult. Several of these
are shown in Figure H-3« Uncertainty assessment most frequently
is a subjective matter especially when we are dealing with a new
subject where we have only limited historical data. It is
subjective because we must gather our working information by
asking people to express opinions on risk. We often will have
no other way to obtain information. The uncertainty judgment
required may be a complex one. Other uncertainties may be
involved, and it is difficult for the human mind to correlate
several subjective judgments.
In the area of impact assessment, there are often multiple
alternatives rather than a single- valued solution. Impacts may
also be subject to a domino effect where one event will trigger
off a number of others requiring the ability to analyze the
system well enough to know the full extent of the dislocations
created.
Possibly the most formidable stumbling block is that of
arriving at a decision after the evaluating information is
obtained. Frequently, the evaluation may yield probabilities
of impacts in cost, schedule, and system performance simultaneously;
a mixture of apples, oranges, and grapes. A common denominator
is required to reduce the problem to manageable form.
Qualitative Risk Evaluation
Several approaches to risk evaluation exist. Figure E-k
presents a very simple one. I call it the qualitative approach.
It is based on an off-the-top-of-the-head probability evaluation,
quantified slightly by stating whether there is a high, medium
or low probability of failure . Some recognition of the impact
is taken by estimating, generally, what kind of trouble a
failure would bring. The final decision then is made by
invoking the powers of a "Big Daddy" in the organization. His
decision may be arbitrary, but it is very often unassailable.
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Before we sneer too much at this type of approach, I think we
should recognize that it has two things going for it; It is
head and shoulders above no risk analysis at all, and it is the
most commonly used method of all.
Risk Index Approach
A significant advancement over the approach just described
is in use in some segments of the industry today as a comparative
method of risk analysis. This is known as the risk index method,
and is diagramed in Figure H-5. Here we introduce a systematic
quantification of the risk factor. First we identify the risk
areas and then break them down into uncertainty factors and
impact factors . Next we identify the uncertainty factors
involved, observe their relationships, and segregate them.
This simplification makes it easier to think about the problem
as we gather subjective data from our personnel. We don't try
to treat more than one factor, or one coupling of factors at a
time. Rather than thinking about the whole problem, we look at
one piece at a time and assign probability indices to each piece.
These are usually expressed as percentage figures because we
are used to thinking in percentages.
Similarly, we look at the impacts, which may be in terms
of cost, schedule, or performance and assign an index to them.
Frequently this index can be reduced to the form of dollars
.
Finally a risk exposure index is derived by multiplying the
uncertainty, or probability of failure index, by the impact
index. Because of the somewhat arbitrary nature of the index
factors, this method is most commonly used to compare the risk
exposures of alternate solutions to a design problem. When used
in this manner, this technique can be remarkably effective at
the detail design level. Although useful as a means of comparison,
this method is more of a straightening-out-of-thinking than it
is real methodology.
Figures H-6 and H-7 show an example for a real design
problem. In this instance, consideration is being given to a
design change to composite construction for an aircraft component,
at a good saving in weight. Risks are involved, both in the
basic material properties to be used in design, and in the
validity of composite component analysis methods. In the first
case, any error would be detected early in the program through
element tests , while errors in analysis would become apparent
only late in the program in component testing. Assigning
subjective estimates of probability of failure and applying the
risk index analysis results in a risk exposure index of $55jOOO
as shown in Figure H-7.
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The index may be interpreted in several ways
. It may be
compared with similar analyses of alternate approaches to
achieving the same goals , or it may be treated in a probabilistic
manner by declaring that any means of reducing the risk to zero,
such as early tests, etc., which can be accomplished for
$55,000 or less, is a good action to take. Another evaluation
may be made by comparing the risk exposure index to the dollar
value of the weight saved as determined through value engineering
analysis.
This is about the present limit to the application of risk
analysis at the detail design decision level. The method has
several basic deficiencies which limit its value. It does not
consider a range of probabilities of failure versus various
degrees of impact, only discrete points on the curve. It also
cannot deal with the interaction of a number of probabilities
and consequences. In addition there is no provision for converting
the direct consequences of a failure to meet a goal into a
relevant impact upon the system. Finally, there is no attempt to
provide a valid comparison between the risk exposure and the
advantages to be gained. It appears that a more sophisticated
methodology is needed.
Rational Probability Risk Analysis
There has been some work done in the associated field of
contract management and incentive fee allocation, employing a
rational probability approach which may answer some of the
objections stated above. In Figure H-8, I have diagrammed a
hypothetical approach to risk evaluation using some of the
elements of rational probability analysis and, in addition,
answering some of the other objections stated above. Here we
take the proposed concept and identify the risk areas as before.
Then we set up a probability network which relates the various •
facets of uncertainty involved in the problem. We relate them
and assign values through a procedure similar to the one shown
for the risk index analysis, except that, instead of discrete
values for probabilities and consequences we describe them through
probability curves relating probability of occurence with
consequences over a range of values. Through the probability
network analysis we arrive at an output which is a resultant
probability versus consequences, again in the form of curve
data rather than discrete points. However, we are probably not
looking for the consequences as such, but rather for the response
of the system to these consequences. So we do a sensitivity
analysis to see what significance weight, delay, or any other
result really has to the system. From this we derive a relevant
impact, usually in the form of a cost, schedule, or performance
factors. We would like to reduce this to a common denominator
if possible, usually in terms of dollars.
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We can next take the probability- impact data, put them into
the form of a probability density function, and multiply probability
times the impact as we did before for the risk index analysis.
This will give us a peaked curve from which our maximum risk
exposure is determined.
The next step is to compare this risk exposure with the
concept advantage. In order to reduce the advantages to a
comparable base, they are defined in terms of system advantages
through sensitivity analysis, and then reduced to a dollar basis,
much as the impacts were treated. When all of this is accomplished,
we are then able to compare the risk and advantage on a dollars
versus dollars basis
.
The preceding example of an advanced risk analysis procedure
was highly hypothetical, presented primarily to illustrate some
of the problems which must be overcome in future development.
Problem Areas
One of the basic problem areas in risk analysis mentioned
previously is that of subjective data collection. Figure H-9
illustrates the form of the probability data which is sought
from experts in the technical areas. On the left side is shown a
cumulative distribution curve. It is fairly easy for people
to think in terms of what is least and most, or best and worst.
This type of information is obtained first and forms the first
points on the curves. The subjects must then be led to estimate
at some other level, estimating 80$ or 20$ probability for
instance; there are methods of interrogation which are being
developed in the behavioral sciences, involving such things as
choice of gambles and bets, to try to coax this kind of information
out of people
.
In addition to giving us these probability estimates,
technical groups also have to tell us what the penalties for
failure are. In this case, if we give them the cost, schedule,
and performance variations, they can tell us what this means to
the contract in dollars or to the reduction in system cost
effectiveness. This data is generally derived analytically and
is not subjective in nature.
The output of the network probability analysis can also be
represented by a cumulative distribution curve, similar to the
inputs in form. These distribution curves, as shown in Figure
H-9s can tell us a number of things in themselves. For instance,
the left-hand figure tells us that, considering all facts, all
impacts, we have a 75$ chance of meeting a certain performance
level. Now, by applying the sensitivity conversion parameters
for the system we can produce the right-hand figure. This tells
us, for instance, that we have a 90$ probability that the loss
will not be greater than a certain amount.
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Some other non-engineering problem areas are outlined in
Figure H-10. The determination of overall total impact is frequently
difficult because of factors not amenable to engineering analysis.
The company reputation might suffer damage beyond the actual
accountable dollars and cents if a project fails or is delayed
by the failure of a risk item. Delays may cause damaging
interference with other projects and failures or schedule
slippage could conceivably jeopardize other contracts.
Most of our contracts have some kind of fee or penalty
feature which can be included in the risk analysis. However,
if we are striving to reach a wise and prudent decision through
our risk evaluation, we may find that the contractural
stipulations bias the decision unduly. Then there is the
matter of self interest. Here again, the solution should be
worked out on a mutual-basis with the customer. Unfortunately,
very often the advantages you are trying to achieve accrue
mainly to the customer and the penalties are all yours.
Management acceptance can bex nearly insurmountable obstacle
in some organizations. Among managers there seem to be two
camps . There are those who agree that they most certainly need
help in making decision involving risk. They recognize the value
of quantitative help from the engineers who are most familiar
with the system. Those in the other camp oppose any infringement
upon their traditional ground by technical personnel. The
solution undoubtedly will lie in development of viable risk
evaluation methodology and the education of management in its
use.
In conclusion, I believe it is safe to say that in spite of
the visible problems, we will assuredly see continued development
in the methodology of risk evaluation and that it will eventually
alter the nature of the process by which we make our structural
decisions. If properly applied, it should lead us around a lot
of the blunders that we have perpetrated in the past in the
application of new materials and constructions.
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Air Force Materials Laboratory-
Abstract: The Air Force program on Advanced Metallic Structures
has the objective to increase structural efficiency,
integrity and reliability by sponsoring a systematic
approach to critical structural problems . The
technical requirements of this program are discussed--
emphasizing the dual aspects of applying technology
and disseminating the resulting information to the
technical community.
During the preceding presentations we have been listening
to many aspects of design problems. I would now like to give
you the outline of an approach toward their solution. Precisely
how these problems can be solved is, of course, up to the air-
craft industry. Our approach is to contract to the best offer to
do the job.
An Advanced Development Program has been initiated by the
Air Force Systems Command in the field of Advanced Metallic
Structures. Its objective is to demonstrate more reliable and
improved structural design methods, materials, fabrication
processes, and evaluation techniques. The underlying reasoning
can be found in some general trends which have become clearly
visible.
One consideration is that developments in structural
design have in the past been spearheaded by challenging tasks.
Traditionally, technological challenges have been posed by the
development of numerous new fighter and attack aircraft which
provided a proving ground for the designer's ingenuity. In
the early 1950 ' s, an average of three new projects for fighter
or attack aircraft were started each year. During the last
decade and a half, however, this average has been less than one
in three years, i.e. a shrinkage by an order of magnitude,
permitting much less opportunity for new and varied structural
developments
.
Another consideration is that confidence in new structural
designs can be established only by structural testing. Here
the lessons are learned for future developments. The record
shows that for more than 70 systems, tested over a long time
period, more than half had two or more major components failing
below design load. The percentage has not improved but actually
worsened for recent systems , indicating perhaps more rigorous
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test conditions or, more likely, a basic need to improve
analytical methods . A very small flaw can have drastic effects
and cause the loss of an aircraft. We need to improve structural
efficiency and to avoid structural failures but the lack of
opportunity to demonstrate new structures has hindered technological
developments
.
We can see this in its proper context if we realize how
the development of structures depends on basic research which
feeds into exploratory development, then into advanced development,
engineering development, and finally into manufacturing
technology. These all interact with each other. They all
provide increased confidence in design, manufacturing, and
integration. Our current problem arises from the fact that
nothing has been done in the advanced development area of
structures. Every one has been preoccupied with their own
specialties, with no forcing function such as an ADP to make
them communicate and learn from each other.
The preceding discussion is an elaboration of the objective
in the Advanced Development Program. Its purpose, as stated
before, is fairly straightforward. The approach is actually
to design and fabricate structures with best available technology
and to test them as a check on analytical methods. Feedback to
improve both analysis and test will be emphasized. Another part
of the approach is to remove the constraints which are normally
associated with systems development (in production) where time
schedule and budget considerations usually militate against a
systematic test and development program. A number of critical
design problems have been set forth for investigation during the
entire lifetime of the Advanced Development Program. The first
of them uses a bomber aircraft wing carry-through structure as
a baseline
.
Now for the philosophy on this ADP. We had to set forth
some guidelines as to what we want done and so we picked eight
technical areas which have to be carried all the way through
the whole program:
Fracture mechanics will be emphasized at all times
across the board;
Structural materials shall be exploited and evaluated
with special consideration for heat treatment and
improved processes using titanium, aluminum, and steel
as basic candidate materials but not excluding other
metals or certain mixtures of metals and composites;
Design criteria will be somewhat more severe than in
the baseline structure;
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Structural design concepts shall employ safe life and
damage tolerance considerations applied to primary
structure which is vital to vehicle integrity;
Structural analysis methods shall incorporate at
least finite element and numerical solution methods
for analysis and optimization of structural config-
urations, including fracture and damage -tolerant
analysis;
Manufacturing methods shall include any new basic
and secondary methods which are believed to meet the
objectives of this program;
Non-destructive inspection shall be evaluated and
exploited, insuring inspectability within predetermined
confidence limits;
Information transfer, last but not least, is particularly
emphasized at all times for the rapid education of the
technical community and not just the contractor.
These eight technical areas have to be considered throughout
the four phases of the program: preliminary design, detail
design, manufacturing, and full-scale test and evaluation. The
idea of the program is to be as diverse as possible in the approach
to the problem. The requirements call for starting out in the
preliminary design phase with six concepts which will be weeded
down until finally one is selected for manufacturing. Originally
we envisioned that this cycle would be done once and, if it
were so indicated, it would be done over again as an iteration.
It remains to be seen whether iteration can be carried out or
whether the costs will be too high.
In conclusion, I would like to describe why we feel that the
ADP is the way to go rather than to continue such effort through
normal systems development. If you have a problem in a system,
you are limited in your materials selection, your criteria are
fixed for you, you have to use proven design concepts and
conventional manufacturing methods, inspectability is a secondary
objective, and testing and reporting are kept to a minimum due to
time and money considerations.
Fabricability, inspectability, reliability, all these -ilities
represent the thingc about which the presentations by Dietz and
Shuler were concerned. In the ADP, we hope to improve all these
-ilities up to the next higher level. We will have many more
choices for materials. We can use innovative criteria. We can
use the best possible design concepts. Inspectability will be a
prime objective. Fabrication can consist of variable types,
whatever we happen to need. Testing and reporting will be optmized,
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With this type of a systematic approach, we should be able to
advance the state of the art in structural design and the
utilization of structural materials.
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SUMMARIZING REMARKS
CDR F. L. Cundari
Naval Air Systems Command
It is not easy to summarize these two days of conference.
I was particularly impressed by the spirit of free discussion of
the many technical problems existing in Aircraft Design. Most
importantly, I have learned that there is a considerable amount
of work to do in this area.
In this short time, two days, we did not resolve the
fundamental design problems. We did not have the time to study
in depth all of the basic issues. However, we did expose most
of the problems
. It is important that we capitalize on all the
issues which We did discuss . In order to provide a reasonable
avenue for the conclusive discussion of the salient points, I
am recommending that a short follow-up questionnaire be mailed
to each participant. Hopefully you will respond with at least
the same clarity with which you have been able to express your
points so far. Each participant would have to address in more
depth the principal issues which have concerned us here.
What are the basic issues? What are the fundamental
problems? How can we correct them?
The methods for basic static structural design are common
place. The procedures have been utilized for years. However,
we have learned that these techniques are not sufficient.
Structural design procedures must be improved by incorporating
fracture and fatigue analyses tools into preliminary design.
A second major area highlighted at this session is the
contractual procedures .of the United States Government. These
rules or regulations cannot be changed overnight and are not a
direct issue of our conference. We must, however, realize the
impact of the contract regulations on the design technology. We
are not going to change government contracting overnight nor are
we going to change the industrial response to these procedures
any faster. We will always find it difficult to conduct the
requisite engineering design, and evaluation of aerospace vehicles
when the government underestimates the task or top management
underbids a job.
Let me quickly summarize those points which have been discussed
that have an important impact on the technical details of
structural design.
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1. Fatigue and Fracture
There is a lack of knowledge concerning the basic physical
fundamentals of fatigue and fracture . It appears that
the aerospace industry is utilizing some engineering
approaches to the application of these disciplines
in design. Most likely these procedures are post
design reviews and often introduce costly modifications
or redesign rather than original criteria. So the
fundamental physical knowledge must be obtained and then
it must be converted into sound design principles.
2. Stress Corrosion
It is a difficult task to introduce the current basic
knowledge in this field into a methodological design
procedure. Presently it seems to be either a marvelous
skill employed by aerospace designers which sometimes
approaches a level with pure mystic overtones - black
magic. Often this important technical detail of possible
stress corrosion is not considered until a failure
occurs . This aspect of structural/material failure
must be considered when selecting materials and
configurations in preliminary design as well as the
whole iterative design procedure,
3. Hydrogen Embrittlement & Fretting Fatigue
Closely coupled with the first two problems are the
aspects of hydrogen embrittlement and fretting fatigue.
Both areas have not been fully characterized nor
quantified to allow the development of design procedures.
U. Structural Safety Factor
Reduction of the Safety Factor has been proposed in a
few discussions. It would be extremely difficult to
lower the factor of safety currently used in the
military. Only if a sufficient population of data
concerning the component or part in question is
available, will the service organizations be able to
accept a lower safety factor.
5. Material Characteristics
A more comprehensive data bank of material charactersitics
must be provided. This data must be in a form which is
easily interpreted and used by the design engineers. This
information must include variations with temperature,
both equilibrium and high gradient states; the effects of
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the environment including short and. long terra exposures;
and of course, fracture and fatigue characteristics, as
well as the fundamental modules and strength data.
This aspect of material characteristics is even more
important for the new composite materials, which may-
have many different reinforcing fiber orientations,
matrix materials, fiber types, and lamina thickness.
6. Materials Processing Control
The control of the material manufacturing process has
become an extremely important aspect of air vehicle
construction. Manufacturing techniques and quality
control capabilities must become a part of the basic
design philosophy. The heat treatment and aging
processes must be fully characterized to reveal the
resulting effect on the material structural properties
and the effects on the fabrication quality and cost.
7. Service/Operational Data
There is an important need to obtain more sophisticated
and accurate operational usage data. This needs to be
coupled with "lifetime remaining" type testing of
critical vehicle components. Sufficient engineering
knowledge must be available to develop the cumulative
damage analysis tools for aircraft and missile design.
It may be possible that the new emphasis being given to
vehicle prototypes will allow new, untried structural
innovations to be adequately demonstrated. This
approach could permit a better evaluation of alternative
candidate design of some major components.
8. Cost Benefit Analysis
The idea of incorporating the elements of operations
analysis or risk analysis into the initial vehicle
candidate designs is a step in the right direction.
However, the objectives of a national defense force
are not usually oriented towards pure dollar loss risks
or continual profit margin minimums . The goals are
oriented towards weapons performance superiority on
a competitive basis. Therefore, we should be developing
performance benefit analytical tools that evaluate the
potential military combat benefit available for the cost
of the candidate designs. This is more of a cost-
benefit rather than a loss-risk type of analysis. It
appears as though we should attempt to apply some of
the techniques that have been developed in other fields




There are many other important considerations in the design
of air vehicles. I have attempted to list only the major items
that have "been discussed at these sessions.
The objective of this conference was: "to recognize those
fundamental design problems which all aerospace companies have in
common, to clarify these aspects, and to indicate priorities and
guidelines for a methodological development". I feel confident
that we have discussed the problem areas. However, I believe we
have yet to determine all of the approaches for the development
of a methodological design process. I hope that our discussions
will he continued until this comprehensive airframe design process
is established.
I wish to extend, again, the thanks of myself and everyone
associated with the Navy and the Postgraduate School to all
participants. Your expert knowledge and your dedication for
improving our engineering methods have been exemplary. I know
that you will all he willing to participate in the development
of this design methodology.
I particularly want to extend my warmest appreciation to
Professor Ulrich Haupt for organizing and conducting this
conference. His extraordinary interest in airframe structural
design has kept the direction of the meeting pointed towards
the important goals of this conference and he has been a guiding





SOME UNSOLVED QUESTIONS AND VARIOUS COMMENTS

SECTION II
SOME UNSOLVED QUESTIONS AND VARIOUS COMMENTS
Discussions during the symposium began along the lines of
the designer's problems as indicated by W. C. Dietz and shown in
Figures C-39 and C-UO. Some of the comments were made during
the symposium and some more thorough comments continued coming
in afterwards . A few of them came from engineers in industry
who did not participate in the symposium but were interested
in the subjects
.
The questions which were posed are of the kind for which
there is no ready-made answer. The comments -- no matter how
contradictory they sometimes are -- may help to stimulate thinking
about some of those problems which can be anticipated but are not
yet clearly visible. After questions have been formulated and a
discussion has been started, it becomes easier to clarify one's
own thought. Questions and comments in this section should be
considered from such a perspective as somewhat of an opening bid.




la. Is a concerted effort made to establish a quantitative
plateau of acceptability for risks as a guideline for the
engineer?
Very limited. Some in establishing gust criteria, some
in repeated load and allowable stress areas
.
An effort is made but in qualitative terms rather than
quantitative. I, among others, have always felt that
each structural comnonent should be assigned a level of
risk based upon the consequences of failure and/or the
probability of experiencing the critical conditions.
Thus , we would have a variable margin of safety through-
out the airplane. This has never been done to my
knowledge -- though it has been discussed.
No. Existing specifications talk about fatigue life,
fail-safe and safe-life, s 3 structural integrity but not
risk . Risk is a bad word that implies failure. Airlines
specify a fatigue life for design of primary structure
sufficient to "guarantee" a "crack-free" structure. The
contract specifies how many flight hours and/or number of
landings are required. If the structure "cracks" before
these values the manufacturer must repair it at his
own expense. The FAR regulation requires a fail-safe
strength of 80 percent limit load as the ultimate fail-safe
strength. This implies that the residual strength can drop
from a positive margin of safety of greater than 1.5
limit load initially to a minimum of 80 percent limit load
at the end cf a structural maintenance interval and is still
acceptable. Of course the manufacturer tries to provide
an inspection interval small enough to discover cracks
before the strength drops to the 80 percent limit level.
Also, the manufacturer tries to provide crack stoppers and
a low enough 1 g stress level so that the cracks grow at a
slow rate rather than a fast crack growth rate . All these
precautions help to reduce the failure probability.
However, any loss in residual strength increases the
possibility of an occasional load cf greater than 80
percent limit load to 1.5 limit lead exceeding the residual
strength. No failure probability is specified although,
as was shown in Mr. Fischler's slides, a loss in residual




Although some attempts have been made to specify the probability
of failure, (i.e., Air Force "Rational Probability of Failure
for the Fleet" and Lundberg's 10-10 Structural failure rate
per hour), a "quantitative plateau of acceptability" must
be established which allows "visibility" without excessive
structural weight increases. "Visibility" can be achieved
by comparing the failure probability of successful past
designs to advanced future designs and trying to include
the important variables in such a way to yield a lower risk
with new materials and types of construction.
*
No. It appears that more static and fatigue testing of
elements, components and entire vehicles coupled with a
better assessment of service life failures will be required
before we can define "acceptably low risk" quantitatively
for the designer.
No — a risk must be related to factors over which the engineer
has some feel for and control, such as structural weight,
cost, life, etc. Methods of risk analysis haven't been
developed to the point where this can be done in the time
span that most technical decisions must be made.
# * #
lb. What distinction should be made between commercial and
military fields?
A very considerable distinction should be made if one can
accept the idea objectively that a big difference exists
between the consequences of failure on a 250 passenger
airliner and the consequences on a one or two man military
aircraft equipped with in-flight escape devices . This
means that design for military aircraft can and should be
based on probabilistic considerations of loads and allowables
which accepts the possibility of x failures in y hours of
operation.
* * •*
Commercial vehicles should have a lower failure probability
goal than now exists. The air transport of civilians risk
should be comparable and less than other means of transport
(i.e., car, bus, train or boat). Also, with the increase
in the use of aircraft, (growing at an average rate of 15
percent per year), failures must be fewer to physically
maintain the same quantity of failures per year. In
addition, with the advent of jumbo jets that carry twice
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the amount of passengers as the DCS's and 707 's, a failure
which results in a total passenger loss, will be so large
a disaster that it is unacceptable even if less than 50
percent as frequent. A purely economic consideration is
the large financial loss from the law suits that result
and the high cost loss per vehicle.
The high failure rate of recent military vehicles has
resulted in the loss of competent military personnel that
should not be measured, in dollar value . The required
additional development costs and repairs to correct their
deficiencies after they occur has been unacceptable.
Although less publicity is given to military failures, the
loss has reduced our military strength to an unacceptable
level.
Therefore, the failure risk of both commercial and military
vehicles must be reduced substantially.
Since commercial vehicles have a desired life of approximately
20 years with a higher yearly utilization than military
vehicles with a desired life of approximately only ten
years, then commercial vehicles must have a lower failure
probability to account for these factors. Also, if the
loss of a human being, whether a civilian or military, is
at the same level, then the risk exposure per passenger
mile should be the same. Since military vehicles normally
carry a much smaller human paylcad than commercial, over
an average shorter range, (since fighters are short range),
these factors should also be considered. Military vehicles
therefore could be designed for a higher risk of failure
structurally if the acceptable criteria is to match the
failures structurally per commercial passenger mile.
Military vehicles, in general, are designed for higher
load factors than commercial vehicles (i.e. a fighter is
designed for 7«33 limit load factor and a commercial
transport for approximately 2.5g). The load factor occurrences
per mile of a fighter however are higher than the commercial
vehicle. A higher design load factor for a fighter results
in a lower 1 g stress level. Therefore, the rate of crack
growth per hour of flight for a fighter is usually lower
than for a commercial transport. Therefore, the loss in
residual strength for a fighter, in spite of the higher
frequency of loads, is less than for a commercial transport
per hour of flight. These factors also must be considered
when comparing the expected failure rate. To overcome the
disadvantage of such a high design load factor for a
fighter, high strength steels or titanium are frequently
used. A slight reduction in strength allowables, (from
260,000 p.s.i. to 200,000 p.s.i.) for steel would increase
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the fighter life substantially. In conclusion, design of
the transport or the military vehicle is very dependent
on the desired life and the environment expected. A
proper design, considering fracture mechanics. could result
in an efficient design for either aircraft with an equivalent




The goal for both military and commercial aircraft should
be to obtain a low level of risk. However, the trade-offs
for military and commercial aircraft are usually different.
For commercial aircraft risk must be weighed against cost,
whereas for military aircraft risk is weighed against
performance primarily. Therefore, more costly solutions
to design problems become necessary for a military
aircraft as compared to a commercial aircraft.
. . . Military should be willing to accept risks to help
assure early availability of high performance systems.
-* * -*
lc. What is the trade-off between increased probability of
failure and increased performance for military aircraft?
None. Higher probability of failure should not be accepted
to increase performance except in aircraft deliberately
designed for short life or to meet national emergencies.
. . . Many failures are a function of the poor selection of
materials for structures, controls, propulsion, and poor
inspection procedures. All these areas' reliability must
be improved plus the use of new materials that are more
damage tolerant (graphite epoxy at low stress levels),
before the risk of designing for higher stress levels to
reduce the structural weight and increase the probability
of structural failure to get increased performance can be
considered. A systematic failure probability analysis
which has visibility and is accepted as a standard for
comparison to get the failure rate lower must first be
accepted and tested by actual flight performance before
considering the trade off of parameters
.
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Obviously, increasing the probability of failure should
result in a lighter, less expensive aircraft, but as the
probability of failure increases, the overall cost of owner-
ship of x aircraft in service will increase.##•*
Quantification not really possible. The military risks
unknowns of new environments and new materials. Best
thing would be to provide for tolerance of difficulties
regardless of source as opposed to acceptance of unknown
risks
.
Id. Should different levels for probability of failure be
specified for different types of failure -- partly for
psychological reasons?
Yes, but first define "failure consequences." The probabilities
should be tied not so much to the type of failure as to the
effects of the failure.
Yes . Structural failures are unacceptable by the public
.
The Martin 202 and Comet were types of structural failures
that the public would not accept. Therefore, structural
failures should have a very low value so that their
occurrence should occur once every 20 years, or based on
the expected passenger miles projected for the 1980's,
values of structural failure that result in the loss of
only one jumbo jet aircraft from a structural failure in
20 years
.
Failures occur most frequently from pilot error, power
failure, system failure, gear failures, and structural
failures . To improve the overall failure rate a study of
these failures must be done to uncover why the failures
occur. Setting different levels of failure is too premature
First a better data collection and failure analysis must
be made to discover the underlying reasons for failures
that need correction.
Yes, depending on mode of failure, e.g. partial failure
in fail-safe structure or slow crack growth in safe -life
structures detectable by routine inspection and repairable
will permit higher stress levels and conceivably better
systems performance.
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The probability of failure can not be predicted with any
degree of accuracy at the present time, so it is not
feasible to distinguish between different types of failure
at the present time. Certain parts which can cause loss
of an aircraft should be considered differently than parts
that can be lost without seriously endangering the
completion of a flight or mission.
-* *
The consequences of a local buckling failure and a tensile
failure can be vastly different with respect to safety
in flight and therefore we might tolerate a higher
probability of buckling.
# * *
Clever design should be able to provide a forgiving or




le. How can the climate in the public and in congress be changed
from an "anti-technology fad" to an understanding of the
engineering process and the risks connected with new developments?
You answered the question. If it is a "fad", time alone
will improve the climate
.
* * •*
The current "ant i -technology" fad, particularly in Congress,
is in part related to an inability to communicate in a
meaningful way. Tangled up in the problem are the economic,
environmental, and social problems that have led to a
near breakdown in meaningful exchange. It sometimes
appears that in major weapons systems developments the idea
is never clearly brought out that there are technical
problems in such developments that challenge the then current
state of engineering development and understanding, and
that their solutions cannot be anticipated at the time a
contract price is negotiated. Both the developing
organization and the purchaser (generally, a DoD agency)
will have to be more candid in discussing (l) possible
problem areas, (2) the stretching of the state of the art
to solve the problems, and (3) the risk of success or
failure. Congress will have to learn how to listen, how





By establishing a reputation for telling the truth. Better
communications with the legislators at all levels . How
about a monthly newsletter from each Contractor reporting
major test, flight, or service failures. With an
explanation of their cause, correction and technical
implications -- candid to the point of admitting errors
of commission and omission. In this some of the calculated
risks in design could be explained.
* •* -*
Better presentation of the facts and alternatives by news
media and television reporting are needed. The "anti-
technology" factions seem to get their points well
publicized even when there is little technical basis for
some of the points. The publicity during the SST debate
is a case in point. The public and many Congressmen seem
to have difficulty distinguishing the difference between
someone's theory and results based on experimental evidence.
#• * #
By the military services, the National Science Foundation,
the President's Scientific Advisory Board, the Ford Foundation,
the AIA, the AIM, the SAE, ASNE, ASTM and other groups
being contacted to have joint meetings to decide on a course
of action. Probably a T.V. public relations concern would
have to help, plus newspapers, plus the college boards,
and large corporations that need the technology.
I don't believe patience is enough. We have to use the
media to play up the good side. AIA, ATA, AIAA, SAE,
etc. all are missing the boat here.
* * *
Hostility and fads can only be neutralized by education,
* -* *
If. How much does the new outlook toward fatigue, fracture
mechanics, and service life affect our traditional attitude
about limit and ultimate load factors?
The detailed consideration of fatigue, fracture, and service
life in the design of complex aircraft systems can lead
to better and safer structures . It may reverse the trend
toward continued utilization of ultra-high strength materials
of dubious flaw tolerance, which is the direction that
ultimate and limit load concepts leads . It also is bound
to stimulate the detailed materials and processes research
necessary to develop flaw tolerant materials.
* * -*
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These are new tools which indicate that a critical crack
length must never occur, that the decrease in residual
strength due to a crack increases the risk of a load
exceeding this strength and therefore increases the risk
of failure of the entire vehicle
. To decrease the risk
of failure the margin of safety of 1.5 should be studied
further to include the time factor of rate of crack growth,
loss in residual strength, and probability of failure.
Notice that for titanium and graphite epoxy at ultimate
strength to one "g" stress must have a factor of more than
3.75 (1.5 x 2.5 g) for a transport critical for the limit
load factor for maneuver of 2.5.
-* * *
This is a healthy attitude provided it doesn't go overboard.
Structural engineers have always considered fatigue,
fracture mechanics, etc., at least since the 1930's. But
it takes a political hot potato like the F-lll and its
problems to dramatize the problem. We will always have
to be concerned about static loads -- but with more and
more emphasis on probability of occurrence.
I don't think that fatigue, fracture mechanics, and service
life is changing our attitude about limit and ultimate
load factors at the present time. The limit and ultimate
load factors used provide a sort of baseline configuration
from which to work. Structural weight must then be added
to meet other requirements such as structural life, damage
tolerance, etc. It will be some time before structures
can be designed on the basis of failure probability rather
than on the basis of an ultimate load factor of 1.50.
Design for service life makes the ultimate load factor
concept obsolete and of little value. The design must be
based on a load spectrum that includes a limit load
defined as the load the vehicle must sustain with some
prescribed probability of success on the last mission
in its total service life or in each inspection interval.
I'd say anyone that thinks traditional factors should be
attacked does not really know the vagrancies of our
knowledge base. I believe in rationalization but not
exploitation!
-* * *
It has not "sunk in" that improved methods of analysis,
materials with yield to ultimate strength ratio different
from aluminum alloys, better load prediction methods,
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process control etc., could obsolete the old traditional
ultimate (ignorance) factor. Substantial improvements
in systems performance and safety can be envisioned if
arbitrary load factors are replaced with a design criteria
system taking critical load or load spectra and critical
strength or failure mode into account. All that can be
said in defense of tradition is that such system is not
yet developed. They should however not block the work
needed since tradition is as incompatible with engineering
as it is with military science.
* * *
2. Regarding development of metallic materials
.
2a. How much can reliability be improved by close control of
processing?
Substantially. However, a check is needed at the source
of the material, before it is fabricated, and after it is




A quantified answer to this question is difficult to come
by. However, close control of processing, if it is
economically acceptable (which is part of the risk analysis
problem), can be expected to improve reliability, and may
result in higher and safer design stress levels. This is
really the reason why most major aerospace companies
maintain highly motivated and competent materials and
processing personnel.
Reliability can always be improved by closer control, but
getting the producer and processer to improve control,
particularly with no real definition on how close is
close, is impossible. Therefore, the only practical way
of improving reliability in metallic materials behavior is
to develop more definitive KDl/NDT techniques along with
fracture mechanics analysis to predict the influence on
structural strength.
A practical way of establishing meaningful producer/
processer controls would be to define a financial
responsibility. Presently, if a producer/processer gives
you "bad" material, his only responsibility is to replace
the material, not the configured part that usually costs
an order of magnitude greater than the raw material. If
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the producer/processer can be made to bear some of this
expense, control will improve dramatically.
* * *
Modest improvements could be expected in the order of 10$
less improperly processed parts. More destructive testing
of actual production parts is far more effective than
200 or 300$ visual and non-destructive tests or the
examination of standard test coupons. Particularly,
applies to welded, bonded, cast, and forged parts. Is
expensive in practice but compared to the loss of a




Perhaps a great deal for structural applications which
are not tolerant of flaws. Process controls have to be
compatible with fundamental reliability requirements and






2b. Has there been a wrong emphasis in the development of
metallic materials on increasing strength-density ratios
instead of improving fatigue and fracture toughness?
It is not entirely a case of wrong emphasis. There has been
a real trend in the development and use of high strength-
density metallic materials, in accordance with established
design practices, in order to solve, presumably, the
mutual problems of performance and weight. While fatigue
and principally fracture become more critical with this
trend, it is only recently (5 years or less) that acceptable
organized design procedures have evolved, particularly to
handle the fracture and crack propagation problems. Because
of the attention that has been paid in characterizing the
phenomena and in developing rational design procedures,
less attention has been given to the alloy development
activity. Inclusion of a damage tolerant design requirement
in the B-l is certainly going to stimulate this kind of
research, in view of the gains already evident.
The slowness in the improvement of materials for fatigue and
fracture resistance probably is more closely tied to
availability of funds than to lack of ideas. Alloy
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development for structure sensitive properties, such as
fatigue and fracture, is a time-consuming and costly-
operation. In comparison with construction materials and
automotive materials, base sales of aerospace materials
are small enough at present to discourage large-scale
research of this kind without massive interest of DoD
and NASA agencies in the form of funding.
-* * -*
The fatigue and fracture mechanics tools are relatively-
new and they certainly need to "be exploited to the fullest.
However, new metallics should be judged considering many
factors. The strength-density factor is only one ingredient
and should also be obtained. Frequently the fatigue
strength after 10° cycles is a percentage of the F-^u value.
Also, the K^
c
value is often a percentage of the F-fcu value.
The residual strength, (initially Ftu)> decreases with
crack size, stress range, stress intensity factor (Kq),
and type of construction.
The slowness of improvement in fatigue, or the recognition
of a fatigue problem, is caused by the slow development of
the finite element approach to discover the state of stress
causing a fatigue problem and/or a fracture mechanics
problem. As soon as the stress field is known the fatigue
problem becomes obvious.
Probably, although I think it is pretty much recognized
today that tensile strength is an inadequate description
of the usefulness of a material. It does provide a
"floor" for comparison.
* * *
Possibly --we are approaching minimum gage restraints
in many applications. Therefore, higher strength, per se,
may not always be needed. Most of our systems are fatigue
and crack growth critical now. Since fatigue, crack growth
and fracture toughness do not generally increase with
increasing strength, more emphasis should be placed on
these properties in developing new and improved materials.
This emphasis was probably proper in the past but in the
future we must seek a proper balance between strength,
fracture toughness and crack growth resistance of materials.
This balance depends on the particular application. For
parts with long cyclic life, the crack growth resistance
is the most important characteristic (and the least studied
and understood). The high strength of a material may not be
usable in such a case because the material has a low
resistance to crack growth or low fracture toughness.
# * #
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If this is a true assertion, ray answer "would, be yes.
However, designing to accommodate any particular deficiency
is an alternate if attributes more than balance deficiencies
* -*
Yes.
Yes, I think so, since most of structural problems are
associated with repeated tension loadings and little
advantage can be taken of the high strength properties
.
Higher fatigue properties would give us a greater advantage.
* * -*
Yes. Emphasis on strength/density ratios has been beneficial
in developing high strength materials up to the point where
toughness and fatigue transitional effects become dominant.
The strength/density emphasis was also necessary in order
to highlight the need for materials where fracture toughness
and fatigue keep pace with strength. However, strength
levels have presently reached the point where emphasis
must be placed on fracture toughness /fatigue criteria in
order that these materials remain practical for utilization
with a degree of confidence
.
* •* *
2c. How much could be accomplished with additional funding for
the development of metals? What kind of incentive is required?
To take an example in regard to what can be accomplished
with additional funding for research in metals, I cite
recent B-l experience with Ti-6A1-Uv alloy. This alloy,
the workhorse of the titanium family, has a minimum fracture
toughness variously estimated to be in the range of
30 - Uo ksi-inch1/ . With the imposition of a fracture
criterion for the airplane, funds from the Air Force, and
good work, North American Rockwell now is specifying the
same alloy with a minimum fracture toughness of 70 or 75
ksi-inchV^ . The improvement in crack tolerance, by
doubling the fracture toughness, is vitally important to
the airplane . The ingredients or incentive to accomplishing
this were (l) the requirement of fracture-safe design, and
(2) funds to accomplish the development work.
I would expect there are still improvements to be gained in
the upgrading of fatigue and fracture behavior in metallic
systems of aluminum, steel, and titanium. There probably
will be modest percentage improvements for the first two
alloy systems. I prefer to think that titanium has yet a
way to go in useful alloy development.
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The diffusion bonding of metallic parts into a rood
compression and fatigue resistant structure with light
weight foils has been attempted but the development costs
are high. If the incentive of a bonus for higher strength
small components is made with all the development costs
sustained by the government, then metallurgists and structural
engineers would devote their effort in that direction. Heat
testing a matrix which is diffusion bonded and later
etched out to reduce the wall sizes also needs to be tried
with small components.
Adding small quantities of high strength materials to low
strength materials (Beryllium, Boron, or graphite in
aluminum or magnesium or glass or an epoxy matrix)
.
Making sandwich structure with high fatigue strength of the
core with high strength edge attachments could be developed.
Etching of covers and diffusion bonding to metallic cores
to make up light weight sandwich structure has been partially
successful. However, a development program to set up a
production method using Vee cores or double Vee cores or
light weight channel sections has not been successfully
tripri
. The etching can provide fail safe crack stoppers
and end attachments
.
The sky is the limit. Physicists say we are realizing
maybe 10$ of atomic load capabilities . Profits are our
incentive -- government should give us the opportunity.
Magnitudes are not the most important -- put the money where
the capability exists and the incentive exists, i.e., where
the development falls into the company's normal sphere of
business
.
Theoretical considerations along with practical attainments,
say that steels with 500 ksi, aluminum with 150 ksi and
300 ksi titanium are totally feasible.
* * *
Funding should be concentrated in the critical, now better
understood areas of fracture strength, fatigue strength,
creep strength, and in stress corrosion and materials
process control.
The probabilities to obtain significant improvements are
s irprisingly good, judging by recent breakthroughs like the




I am a composites enthusiast but I see aluminum and steel
continuing to "be the workhorse structural materials for the
next twenty years even if no significant improvements in
properties are made. As for titanium it will continue to
be used where the operating environment requires it. I
cannot assess the probability of improvements.
2d. How much can we learn from the fact that corrosion resistance
and crack tolerance of aluminum alloys were improved considerably
in the last few years by a relatively small effort after a
stagnant situation for more than a decade?
I am not sure of the phrase "relatively small effort".
All the DoD agencies and NASA, as well as the aluminum
companies, have spent considerable sums of money in
developing alloys and tempers of high-corrosion resistance
and crack tolerance. However, in answer to the questions,
it was in part a response by a knowledgeable industry to
a known set of technical deficiencies. It represented also
an approach by the industry to protect its markets in the
face of newly emerging structural materials, such as
titanium alloys and composite materials. Finally, it
probably was stimulated by some urgent prodding by DoD
and NASA personnel, as well as the aerospace community.
The theory for crack propagation was available and the
finite element method of analysis was developed in the last
decade to confirm the theory and investigate the problem
further. Also, most important, the desire to find out
how to practically deal with the problem was present.
Many large size panel and fuselage components were tested
at considerable expense at Douglas for the DC8, DC9, and
DC10 to develop crack tolerant structure. Stress corrosion
has also been studied and corrosion resistant coating have
been successfully developed when the problem was recognized
and needed solving.
* * *
This suggests to me the classic situation that prevails in
many disciplines . A period of little apparent progress
during which research in related areas continues . And
then a period of rapid growth made possible by the synthesis
of several ideas that have incubated and reached maturity.
* * *
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During that period, objectives were not clear, research was
done by all because it was fashionable and the Government
paid for it -- achievement was not the goal used to measure
success, only budget and schedule.
State the real problem and ingenuity can find a solution.
In this case with minimum subsidy.
We may learn that progress is not so much dependent on
magnitude of funding but on clear definition of problems
which must be overcome and on time to solve them.
* * *
2e . In view of the small market in aerospace compared to the
vast automotive market, is there a possibility to apply aerospace
R&D toward reducing automotive manufacturing costs and to
establish a broader base for development funding?
We are discussing our methods with a leading automotive
company and if we can "sell" them on our advanced methods
we expect them to do more R & D in the use of applications
common to both and thus broaden the base for development
funding eventually. The first step, and only step we are
now pursuing, is to teach them advanced methods of
structural analysis.
Remember that initial tooling and manufacturing costs are
the big items, a pound of weight saved is not as important
to an automotive concern. We must convince them that the
pound saved will yield fuel economy, less braking, smaller
brakes, and the ability to put the pound into items that
will increase the life or comfort level. How much they
are willing to pay for this pound is not known. It is not
uncommon for a long life advanced aircraft to use a
$300/pound breakeven value. Can an automotive firm pay
that price? A 1500 pound automobile, if all items were
assessed at $300/pound would cost $U50,000; a 1500 pound
auto is more like $1.5 per pound. Therefore, it is only
in the analysis, manufacturing, and tooling development we
can help the automotive concern if they are willing to
use materials we are familiar with -- aluminum, titanium,
super alloy steels, and possibly composites.
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Should the question "be turned around? Is there a possibility
that automotive R&D with its broader base of development
funding can be slanted to give benefit to aerospace? The
area that is common to both is in the manufacturing
process field; forming, metal cutting, joining, shaping, etc,
I assume that manufacturing people in aerospace stay pretty
close to developments in the automotive field.
•* # *
Unlikely, since our objectives do not coincide. However,
we are each being forced to consider the others point of
view, namely, reliability, light weight, and safety of the
aircraft industry and the low cost, high automation, and
prototyping of the automotive industry. This is an exchange,
even now, of each others R&D developments, ECM, EB welding,
reenforced plastics, turbine engines, numerical control,
molded plastics, fasteners, adhesive bonding, etc. It
does not appear that the automotive community would want
to underwrite R & D in aerospace since it would not be




Not probable because aerospace objectives are totally
different than automotive, i.e., aerospace — high
reliability, long life, low production, hostile environment;
automotive — mass production, planned obsolesence, etc.
The economics of the two industries is so different that
this possibility seems very remote in a useful way to me.
*- •* *
Surel!! But who is doing it? I think the government should
provide leadership. Our professional societies have
struck out so many times.
I do not think so. Requirements are generally too different.
•* * *
3. Regarding present trends in fatigue criteria
3a. Have we challenged the designer to recognize problems and
limitations applicable to fatigue, particularly with regard
to processing and inspection capabilities?
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Many good designers are aware of some of the important
factors. However, often these designers are not as close
to the detail design as they should be. Therefore, for the
average designer a handbook should be prepared to give
him the necessary process and inspection specifications
to note on the drawing.
-* * -*
I think the designer is unaware, generally, of the potential
variation that processing has on fatigue-crack propagation,
though somewhat better informed on fatigue behavior.
* -* *
I think our designers are fairly mature with respect to
recognizing the differences between paper designs using
paper properties and the real world. This is not to say
that a continuing effort is not required to maintain and
enhance this awareness -- especially for the relatively
new and inexperienced engineer.
* * *
Designers are aware of most of the tricks used to improve
fatigue in structure, but they can only call out an existing
specification to cover processing and inspection — this
is an area that needs much work.
* * *
Designers have been challenged but it went over their
heads. Much more needs to be done in this area. Most




Designers will begin to recognize that flaws are
characteristically present in structures and that precautions
in material selection, processing and inspection are of
paramount importance, particularly where high strength
structures are concerned. Fatigue cracking rates and Kjc
data are presently still research items, however, it is
anticipated that this will reach the designer as a practical
tool in the near future.
3b. How much can be gained from materials application compared
to materials research?
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Material development needs both. Separating the materials
research from the materials application is often done for
convenience but the complete package is necessary to
prevent the designer from going from the research results
without the confirmation of an application result.
*
Materials application of improved state of the art
materials (somewhat nonconventional) will point up the
need for more research as materials and attendant
manufacturing difficulties are encountered.
•* *
Both areas are complementary -- one without the other can
only be a repetitive function, not an advancement.
Research results will not be used unless there is an
adequate materials application program.
¥ •* *
New applications should be emphasized but not at expense
of research. We must exploit what we have at hand and
at the same time provide for the longer range future.
# * *
Wrong question. They should complement each other.
3c. Would tightening of specifications and processing methods
for titanium, for instance, result in consistently finer grain
size and better fatigue properties?
I am not completely certain that we can at present specify
process controls for titanium and other alloy systems
that will optimize fatigue properties. This is one of
the research areas, particularly for titanium, that needs
definite study.
Trobably not -- only if finer grain size caused fatigue
improvement and there is contradicting evidence here — what
is needed is to define the parameters in the metal that
control fatigue behavior before we can "shot gun" an




Yes. A tightening of specification and processing methods
is desirable. However, the effect on cost should be given
also so that the designer is given a choice depending on
the material application.
*
Hopefully. I would prefer some better understanding of
what causes what and then refining.
-* *
This is needed once processes have been defined and cost
effectiveness is established.
Not necessarily. Might tend to price material out of
realm of practical utilization. Applied research and
development in addition to more stringent specification
requirements are needed. Changes in titanium specifications
brought about by alpha segregation problems have led to higher
prices. This type of defect has only contributed to
rotating engine part failures, so unnecessary tightening
can lead to higher prices and therefore decreased usage.
-* * *
3d. Realizing that fatigue analysis is not yet an exact
science and that fatigue design has to be based on previous
experience, how can this experience be evaluated systematically?
We have a fatigue checkoff list which is needed before signing
off a drawing. Also, we have put together fatigue problems
in a fatigue course. Unfortunately, the fatigue book
has not always been kept up to date with examples of
failures from other manufacturers . Perhaps the military
services should fund a project for collecting these fatigue
examples which all manufacturers would contribute to
periodically and the services would redistribute periodically.
* *• *
I assume you are asking how can we learn more from the sum
total of fatigue failures that have been experienced. We
all agree (I think) that we can learn more from our failures
than our successes in material application engineering.
But there is an understandable reluctance to publish the
failures. The most interesting technical papers I have
read have been those that were completely candid about the
wrong turns, the mistakes, and the failures, prior to the
successful solution. Let's encourage more of this through
our professional societies.
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One can write a book on this question. There are some
simple elements to approach this problem, some or all of
which are being pursued to some extent. At the design
stage, one's past experience with a similar airplane
provides a link between design loads and real loads, and
between design response (deflections and stresses) and real
response . This information coupled with careful history
on fatigue initiation and propagation in the previous
airplane, provides some semblence of how the new structure
will behave. The ingredients involve evaluation of what
happens in many numbers of a fleet of a given aircraft
during service in order to characterize realistic stress
spectra for the aircraft. Similarly, one monitors the
fleet for fatigue damage. Based on developmental fatigue
tests of structural components, on fatigue of the basic
materials, and on the fatigue test of the entire airplane,
one can compare, analyze, and evaluate real life behavior
and the basic soundness of previous programs and design
philosophy.
#• * *
First the variables affecting fatigue life must be properly
identified. Then failures obtained in service or test
would have to be defined using these same variables. These
failures could then be used as data points from which
relationships could be established between the variables
.
The relationships could then be used for predicting future
experience.
This could be the theme of a book and has been on numerous
occasions. I have no handy solution. Design handbooks of
not-to-do's come closest perhaps or, better, best-to-date
approaches could be useful.
* * *
Probably not beyond what to do and what not to do.
* •* *
Previous experience mostly allows one to better evaluate
stress concentrations and better define design load spectra,
An attempt to classify Kt for practical structural con-
figurations might be helpful. Also design load spectra
that have been inadequate for certain systems should be
corrected and applied for similar applications on the
next design. Attention should also be paid to those
systems where the design spectrum or Kt has been assumed
too severe by reducing the requirement in the next design.
* * *
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4. Regarding current trends in fracture mechanics and fail-safe
design
4a. W. S. Hyler's presentation indicated how much scatter can
exist for K^c data, even at uniform Fy . This reflects on
uncertainties of materials manufacturing, i.e., "process
capabilities". What practical conclusions can be drawn regarding
processing and specifications?
Further analysis at Lockheed of D6AC Kjc data indicates
that the Kjc value is a function of the quench rate obtained
during processing which in turn is a function of the
thickness of the part processed. The tensile properties
in this case were not affected by the quench rate or
thickness. The obvious conclusion is then that Kj
c
type
tests must be specified as part of the process control
if the fracture toughness properties are the properties
that must be controlled. It is becoming obvious that
ultimate strength tests can not be relied on to adequately
control material properties such as fatigue, fracture
toughness, crack propagation, etc.
*- * •*
After further research, a specification which indicates
the quench rate, heat soak time for grain size, and the
allowable impurities necessary, plus the inspection and
sample testing necessary, should be specified versus the
coefficient of variation versus the cost comparison for
an A, B, and C type value.
Mr. Goepfert of ALCOA, a number of years ago, indicated
on the basis of a large amount of testing and statistical
evaluation that a specification does not control a process,
rather it is the process that leads to the specification.
Therefore, the decision to establish in a specification a
minimum Kj
c
level without sufficient knowledge of how a
given process schedule influences the distribution of
Kj
c
values for the product can only lead to erroneous
values, usually too high. Specifications can provide
target values toward which the producer may move by
modifying his process. But if no process can be evolved
to acceptably meet this target, then it is the process
that controls
.
1. Don't give up — keep working;
2. Don't depend on material quality alone;
3. Recognize possible variation and design around.
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Extensive work is required to research processing effects
and to establish processes resulting in consistent properties
It is obviously feasible to get improved toughness.
*
As fracture concepts become more prevalent, Kjc criteria
will become a standard spec, item for high strength
materials. This should lead to processing methods for
optimizing fracture toughness. Vacuum melting along with
fabrication techniques designed to minimize anisotrophy




Ub. How can material be characterized clearly for fracture
mechanics with respect to processing as well as thickness?
A significant amount of testing is required in order to
establish process capability for fracture just as for
establishing process capability for F^-u and F+ .
* * -*
The fracture toughness properties must be characterized
according to the variables that can affect the properties,
e.g., quench rate and thickness for D6AC steel. More work
needs to be done on materials to determine what effect
processing variables have on the material properties, so
that better processing specifications can be written.
Sufficient tests need to be conducted so that MIL-HDBK-5A
type allowables can be established.
The averave K-j_
c
value can be tested to determine its value
versus thickness (using a close range in processing and
inspection for the samples tested). From the sample
size the confidence level can be given for each specific
thickness
.
By process specification and more exploratory work in
mixed mode fracture and ultimately design oriented testing,
* * *
We don't know yet, but it must be through experimental
correlation and improved analytical tools.
* * *
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4c. What guidelines can be established for trade-offs between
higher strength and lower IC ?
The Kj_c value influences the rate of crack growth and the
residual strength versus crack size. A chart which shows
the residual strength, rate of crack growth versus K^
with constant values of one "g" stress, desired life,
and range of stress or, (olVl)? coefficient of variation
of the loading, can show the designer the compromise he
must make on the value of K^
c
and Fy (which influences
the initial residual strength).
* •* -*
Material and component tests, if done properly, should
yield precise results.
* * *
There are many parts of a structure where one need not be
concerned with fracture. Compression surfaces are one of
these. High strength, moderate to low fracture toughness
probably provides no problems in these areas and one has
the advantage of high strength. Areas in certain aircraft
structure offering multiple load paths may be another
place that can dictate tradeoffs between strength and
toughness, depending upon considerations of risk and >
reliability.
* * *
I should think that highly redundant structures as well
as those employing fail-safe design practices could lean
more toward higher strengths at some sacrifice in K]_c .
But as noted earlier, so much depends on the application
and the acceptable risk.
* * #
The tie-in here is the allowable flaw size that can be
tolerated in the structure. If NDI capabilities are such
that the flaw size existing in the structure is very
small, then F^n or fatigue properties may design the part.
However, as the flaw size existing in the material increases,
fracture toughness properties become all important. More
work needs to be done to improve NDI techniques and the
reliability of these techniques.
For each design situation (load spectrum, initial flaw
size, and required service life) the relative importance
of ultimate or yield strength, fracture toughness and
crack growth resistance can be determined and the extent
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to which each might profitably "be increased or decreased
established. Unfortunately little such analysis has
been undertaken and none of it was evident at the symposium.
#• * *
Question whether there is a real trade-off involved.
Design around!
•*
A good fracture control plan covering all aspects from
basic material to in-service inspection.
*
The impact of reducing the strength of a material to
improve Klc would be less if fatigue life properties were
retained.







versus Fty data to determine how
rapidly Kj
c
falls with increasing Fty and practicability
of controlling material within required Kj
c
/Fty range.
3. Correlation of cyclic crack growth and Kjscc properties
with critical crack size and NDT inspection.
kd. Can any conclusions be drawn with respect to fail-safe
design?
Probably, to me, the most unsettling factor in damage
tolerant design is its use with thick section materials,
where the critical crack size may be borderline with
regard to the probability of detecting a crack. NDI
techniques are reputed to be capable of finding quite
small flaws. However, the probability of finding such
small flaws may be equally small in practical situations
Consequently, in damage tolerant design, it makes some
sense, to me at least, to base propagation life and
inspection intervals on a crack length eminently capable
of being found most of the time, rather than a length
within the minimum bounds of the inspection device.
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Fail-safe design is a design that according to the civil
specification can sustain 80 percent of limit load at any
time during its life time. To insure this, the inspection
interval must be short enough to repair any cracks "before
the residual strength decreases to the 80 percent level
or the critical crack length occurs (fast fracture occurs).
With transport vehicles, the requirements also desire
that a full bay crack can be sustained before failure.
Now, Kic influences the residual strength and the rate of
crack growth. It would be desireable that Kj_c have a
coefficient of varation small enough so that the value
used for predicting the residual strength and inspection
interval, (before a full bay crack occurs), is reliable.
As shown, in Mr. Fischler's presentation, the decrease
in the coefficient of variation, (a
s
/u-s ), increases the
probability of failure greatly especially for a V/STOL
aircraft with a high load spectra coefficient of variation,
(oj/iij). Therefore, specifications which insure values
of K^c within a narrow range are desireable.
-* * *
By fail-safe design, it is implied that cracks, if they
occur in the structure, will be found before they become
catastrophic. Therefore, heavy reliance is placed on
finding these cracks during routine inspections. To
exploit the higher strength potential of metallic materials
will require a substantial improvement in inspection
capabilities to achieve the same reliability as with
current materials at lower strength levels.
* # #
Fail-safe design has many merits, but it was not discussed
in any depth at the symposium.
* * *
I sure do not agree with Fig. C-Uo regarding fail-safe
problems. It reminds me of my dad's philosophy that "you
only get out of things what you put in". If one sets
out to prove that fail-safe designs can be devised that
have problems, he can sure do that. If he intentionally
configures so as to minimize "possible" problems, they
will not arise.
* * •*
Fail-safe design should be employed wherever feasible,
where not fracture control by use of tough materials,
proof testing, etc., should be employed.
* * *
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There is more inherent fail-safe capability in a structure
than will ever be calculated. On military aircraft there
is great danger of going overboard with fail-safe require-
ments unnecessarily. This has been shown by aircraft
that have returned with significant battle damage in
components that provide no visible fail-safe load path.
On military aircraft the fail-safe concept should be
utilized so long as it does not increase airframe weight.
5. Regarding evaluation and application of structural metals
5a. A report NMAB-2U6 was published in 1970 under the title:
An Approach for Systematic Evaluation of Materials for Structural
Application. It contains an outline for a data information
system requiring data banks on material properties, material
evaluation techniques, and applications analysis. Is there
a follow-on area where fruitful concepts could be developed,
e.g.
failure analysis to develop new test techniques;
case history development to support new test needs;
or possible contributions of information centers?
Yes/ a follow- on area where failure analysis theories can
be confirmed by tests would be desireable. I would like
to test materials, find out their F-j-u , F^ , and K values
from coupon tests, obtaining enough tests to get a high
confidence level for their coefficient of variation.
Then, using parts of the same sheet as the coupons come
from, make up a test component of structure. I would
test some with and without an initial crack at different
mean stress levels and different stress ranges, periodically
checking the residual strength by failing some of the
specimens. The specimens remaining should be continuously
cycled till every one fails. The actual life, residual
strength, and rate of crack growth should be compared to
the predicted values to determine the accuracy of the
theories . Adjustments to the theories should be suggested




I'd like to see an outfit like the Batelle DMIC try out
the ideas contained in NMAB-2U6 on a selected type of
structure or component. This should not be a big deal but
could serve as a pilot operation.
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The Case History approach is good and might he a way of
motivating more reports on failures, as for fatigue.
Perhaps Don Shinn can spark plug a Failure Reporting
System. I don't look for much results from failure
analysis per se except as it contributes to the Failure
Report
.
Tests in laboratories do not simulate real applications
and environments. Some sort of technique is required to
define the relationship that exists (assumed) between
laboratory data and the real service behavior.
* * *
Development of systematic materials evaluation techniques
should be continued and integrated into structural design
procedures with the goal of developing a highly automated
and interactive vehicle design system.
* •* -K
We feel steps should be taken to implement the NMAB suggestion,
Good accelerated service simulation tests for time -dependent
phenomena such as corrosion, radiation, creep, etc. are
musts. Case histories are good but only half of the
story — predicting and intercepting new problems is the
other half.
Regarding information centers, a major problem is how to
get people to overcome the old NIH factor. A more modern
version seems to be "I'd rather do it myself".
* * *
Data bank idea for materials is a good idea.
-* •* •#
5b. Is "full-scale" demonstration a barrier for new materials?
Yes. The cost of full-scale demonstration is usually so
high that no funds are available for new material tests
.
Full scale demonstration tests accomplish little. Usually
they load the vehicle with one spectrum critical for only
one component. Therefore, it has only limited use at a
tremendous cost. Many new material tests of coupons and





I prefer to think that a full-scale demonstration is a goal,
a successful milestone to be reached rather than a barrier.
It also serves as a way to pick up material behavior and
processing difficulties that may not otherwise be revealed
by small element tests
.
Experience with full-scale applications is essential to




No! Lack of incentive and opportunities are real barriers
* * #
No, lack of cost data and service experience are.
# * -*
"Full-scale" demonstration need not be a barrier for new
materials
.
The 5-year delay between the inceptual stage
of a new material and its first flying application is
largely attributable to the "no one wants to be first"
philosophy. R&D support for the user who is willing to
be first would encourage more risk taking, since present
fixed price contracts penalize risk taking.
#
-x- -*
5c. How is the materials -structures interface controlled?
How can or how should it be?
Usually by poor coordination between some of the necessary
parties. It should be controlled by a high level management
group with all the necessary parties represented. Because
fracture mechanics is so important, the Structural Mechanics
representative should be chairman of the group.
Several ways: (l) Material process specifications;
(2) Structures Design Hiilosophy documents at outset of
new program; (3) Structures Design Manuals (company)
which set forth design allowables, exceptions, qualifying
assumptions re. usage of materials; (h) Joint Materials
and Structures participation on Material Discrepancy
Review Boards and on Structural failure analyses; (5) Joint
review of lay-outs and detail design drawings
.
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Prefer to think of the interface as a dynamic boundary
tending to shift toward structures when well established
materials are used in design -- and towards materials
when new or unusual uses or environments are encountered
with established materials or wholly new systems are used
for the first time. Materials should characterize each
new alloy or material system, particularly regarding
properties other than strength such as: corrosion resistance,
embrittlement susceptibility, weldbondability, fracture
toughness, and protection system requirements.
One way is to have the materials man sign the Engineering
Drawing for approval of materials and processing in
addition to the Stress Engineer's sign-off.
By hard work and recognition of potential problems and
solving them in advance.
Mainly by the structures design group with coordination to
materials and manufacturing.
5d. Are there any subjects related to the preceding topics
which an NMAB Committee could usefully tackle?
Yes. The committee could decide what analysis and what
testing needs to be done to increase the reliability of
new materials for new advanced vehicles.
# * *
I'm not really current on what the NMAB Committees are
covering as of today. But — I'd like to see some
government-industry group address itself more completely
to the following:
(1) The need for and possible ways of implementing
prototype material applications. (On materials
research vehicles? More full-scale laboratory
demonstrations? )
(2) A look at the total aerospace and related industrial
materials R&D in the U. S. (both government and
private) with the objective of identifying imbalances
(3) Consider and propose several realistic approaches to
risk evaluation and probability of failure and what
types of data must be generated to make this feasible
* * *
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See latest NMAB report on Accelerated Use of New Materials.
It has many good ideas that should be followed up.
6. Regarding more general design problems
6a. Are the concepts of probability of failure and risk
evaluation bound to become a routine part of structural analysis?
Yes. Eventually. However, new tools are resisted for
long periods of time. For example:
(a) Using Power Spectral Analysis as a recognized tool
took about ten years. Even now, certain segments of
the industry will not recognize it as a respectable
tool, and will not allow specifications to be written
which include it as a criteria.
(b) The six degrees of freedom cross coupling analysis
was not accepted until a fighter aircraft's vertical
tail came off because of the additional cross coupling
loads from three to six degrees of freedom.
(c) Flutter analysis, fatigue analysis, sonic fatigue,
supersonic panel fatigue, creep, and computer analysis
was resisted until they were able to weather the
storms of protest of being called "inexact", "costly",
"unnecessary burden", etc.
-* -* *
I would hope so. But this will require an extensive
education campaign.
* -* •*




They've always been. If you mean quantification and
documentation in depth, I wonder as to the worth.
Yes, to a limited extent on components selected for fracture
control and only for tradeoff studies of significant factors
* # #
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If they do, we are going to be kidding ourselves and
others. I would have no confidence in the numbers. There
are just too many variables
.
6b. How can qualitative considerations be quantified for
tradeoff and risk evaluation?
The qualitative considerations must be put into a cost
effective analysis to determine what quantitative minimum
values are necessary. The risk for a new material, must
be less for new aircraft. To achieve this lower risk,
adequate testing must be done to at least obtain the
coefficient of variation of strength at time zero and the
residual strength after subjecting a primary structural
component to the expected spectrum for the desired service
life.
I doubt if they can, other than by the usual expedient of
assigning weighting factors.
* * *
Develop case histories over a period of time, so some
feedback is obtained on what is obtained for certain
qualitative considerations.
¥r # *
Depends upon the case. This is called operations research
or analysis a la Rand, etc.
* * *
By application studies and tests
.
* * *
Waste of time to try.
* * *
6c. What can be learned from the past to make systematic use
of available experience?
By doing analysis first, followed by controlled material
and small component tests to confirm the analysis, then
followed by only two experimental aircraft (one for immediate
flight and another for proof testing and detailed instrumental
measured flight) new materials with temperature inputs can be
understood before larger scale production is initiated.
* •* *
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First we must document our failures so that we have a
"past" to learn from.
* * *




6d. What can be done to educate materials engineers in the
problems of structural design and structural designers in the
problems of materials and processing?
By the services providing institutions and large corporations
with funds for this purpose. By making it mandatory for the
stress signout of drawings (at some later date -- 5 years
from now) to obtain a certificate that they have completed
these courses before they can signout any drawings for
military aircraft.
* * •*
The question implies that this is not being done today. In
aerospace — in my own experience, at least — I think there
is a very good appreciation by the structural designers and
the materials engineer of their mutual problems
. This may
not be so when the men first come out of school but then
at this point the men have no identity anyway as either
structural design engineers or materials engineers. This
is an on-the-job "graduate" training.
*• *• *
Each must learn enough of each others discipline so they can
effectively communicate with each other.
Have them work together on a design team.
*• * *
Age old engineering problem. Colleges and universities fall
short here. Companies seldom have time to handle basic
problem. Individuals must recognize and do job for themselves
National societies could help if they really wanted to.
* * •*
More development time and closer teamwork.
* •* -*
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They can work closer allowing each to get more involved in
the others day to day problems . Each can be rotated into
the others area for a period of time. Periodic meetings
or seminars can be held within the company and during
working hours to discuss materials and structures problems
.
Coordination between materials engineers and structural
designers should begin in the R&D planning stages. Awareness
of each others thinking from this early point through
development and application eliminates the pitfalls
encountered when each discipline just goes its own way.
* -* *
6e. What possibilities exist to break out of the ever-increasing
complexities of our situation?
The complexities will continue to increase. The only hope
is to automate as much of the detail as possible and
integrate all the needed technology into a design system.
Large digitial computers make progress in this direction
possible.
1. Less wasteful practices of the military to buy vast
numbers of aircraft simulateous with development
testing. Development testing should be done first
followed by pre-production prototypes.
2. Funding for educating engineers in multi-disciplines.




The computer by the storage of data and permiting the
technique of interactive graphics will help us at early
design stages to visually and numerically be able to
determine the effect of a material change on the weight,
shape, cost, and projected life of our design.
* -* •*
None. If continued improvement is desired or required, it
will get more and more difficult to achieve an improvement,
More factors become involved as the structural efficiency
is increased and the structural weight is decreased.
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I do not agree that the complexities are ever -increasing
nor that we have a problem of "breaking out" from them.
Certainly, it is true that viewed in total there are many
more materials, more environments, more sophistication in
the determination of design conditions and test evaluation.
But when you get down to the one for one relationship of
the individual engineer to the specific job, the situation
hasn't changed so very much from that of ten or twenty
years ago. The basic approach is essentially the same.
I am an optimist about man's ability to cope.
-* •*
Just call for and finance new designs and solve problems
on an orderly, continuous basis. Otherwise they'll
accumulate to become bigger than we all are together.
*
6f. Where do we stand with respect to a clear definition of
test requirements for structural airworthiness (component and
full-scale tests for static and dynamic conditions related to
program development) and for aerodynamic performance (prototype)?
I'd say in an excellent if not overly burdensome position.
Prototype per se are not an answer, especially for time-
dependent phenomena.
* * *
Commercial vehicles built at Douglas have had long life
without primary structural failure. We have been successful
because we have relied on thorough analysis, development
and component testing during the design stage, with large
component fatigue tests and carefully instrumented flight
testing to confirm the stresses and expected loads. Full
scale ground tests are too costly for the limited gain
expected. We have used five aircraft to develop 1500 hours
of flight to test the structure and aerodynamic performance.
Therefore we can conclude that military aircraft could use
the same techniques and save a considerable amount of
funds which could be used for new material development.
I interpret this question to mean: What are the essential
differences between a structural air-worthiness verification
program for a production aircraft as compared to a prototype
aircraft? This is being rather thoroughly debated in
industry right now. The trend is probably toward reducing
or eliminating static tests to failure as well as fatigue
tests for those prototype aircraft where essential purpose
is aerodynamic and flight research.
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ASD-TR-66-57, "Air Force Structural Integrity Program
Requirements," January 1968 gives the most complete
description of test requirements for airworthiness
throughout the life of the vehicle. What is needed is
more correlation between testing and service experience.
Testing often does not simulate service experience,
particularly with regard to environmental exposure . More
work needs to "be done to properly simulate environmental
exposure effects in the laboratory so that corrosion
and fatigue problems can be identified before the aircraft
gets in service. Lack of budget usually limits the
amount of service experience correlation that can be done.
* •* #
Generally clear definition on structure. Systems funding
should never be committed before prototype evaluations
except in national emergencies.
* * *
Airframe problems that are a result of improper structural
tests usually can be tied back to an improper definition
of the environment for design as well as test, i.e., buffet
loads, fatigue spectra, airload distribution, etc. These
factors need defining ASAP so that testing of the airframe
can be done ASAP to minimize the impact of any resulting
changes
.
7. What other questions are considered pertinent to design
problems ?
1. Should load alleviation and mode stabilization be
further developed to reduce loads? Would the funds
used for this project reduce failures more than
spending funds on structure development?
2. Should more funds be used to develop optimization
procedures with other disciplines?
3. Should items (l) and (2) be developed concurrent with
further structural development?
•* * *
a. Should the DOD encourage application of new materials
offering significant improvement by assuming more of
the risks?
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b. Should the DOD encourage the use of a material like
composites on a new major weapon system by paying the
premium for the higher materials cost even when the
usual cost-benefit analysis does not favor the use of
the more costly material?
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SECTION III
SOME BASIC CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. SYNOPSIS OF PRESENT SITUATION
1.1 Introduction
The objective of this last section is to consider some
fundamental aspects of design problems and to arrive at practical
conclusions.
The present situation regarding structural design of
aircraft is quite unique. Two different and rather contradictory
sets of facts are coming together and causing considerable concern.
On one hand there are recent developments in high-strength alloys,
filament composites, fracture mechanics, finite element analysis,
automated design, computer graphics, and other fields which give
rise to high hopes and expectations for greatly increased
structural efficiency. On the other hand, there have been
unexpected difficulties lately regarding detail design and
materials applicatication. They have occurred in fields which
nad been considered thoroughly explored and tested -- except for
some seemingly minor modification which may have caused major
trouble
.
The result is a disturbing realization that the gaps in our
understanding of traditional materials and conventional design
practices are wider than we thought they were. This has dampened
our previously so confident assurance in tackling new developments
and has made us wary of extrapolating past experience. In spite
of an impressive mastery of sophisticated techniques we are
developing a humble readiness to occupy ourselves with some very
fundamental considerations about these unexpected difficulties.
The combination of future promises and present problems
characterizes the situation in structural design. Promising
developments of the future depend on finding solutions for
recent difficulties. The difficulties have been caused basically
by the increasing complexity of technological developments and
it is this rather general aspect which assumes specific importance.
The presentations of Section I give ample evidence for the
pervasiveness of design problems. The unsolved questions and
various comments of Section II indicate their range. The basic
considerations of this Section III will draw attention to the
fundamental character of design problems and to the need for a
systematic and practical approach toward their solution.
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1.2 Survey of Other Findings Concerned with Present Situation
During the past two years several highly qualified committees
addressed themselves to specific aspects of recent problems in
aircraft structures and in materials application. References 1,
2, and 3 are closely connected with design problems and it is
fortunate indeed that they became available Just during the
final drafting of the present report.
If it would not be for these references, many of their
conclusions would have had to be deduced in the present report.
Since there is good agreement on all essential points, the
established conclusions of these references may serve as the
premises for this report which has been somewhat condensed
accordingly. A brief summary of these references is given below.
Reference 1 summarizes the lessons learned from structural
problems in connection with the F-lll development. It states
and discusses the conclusions of the SAB Ad Hoc Committee on
the F-lll. The following points are particularly pertinent
with respect to design problems
:
Application of fracture mechanics as a design tool holds
great promise. Its present limitations must be recognized
and a handbook with relevant data and analytical
techniques should be published and periodically updated.
Formal "Fracture Control Plans" are recommended as part
of development programs
.
A damage -tolerant structural concept is considered to be
an objective of vital importance. Periodic structural
configuration audits should be accomplished during the
development program for all primary structure to identify
all aspects of damage tolerance
.
To exploit the promise of advanced materials while
minimizing the application risks, research is required to
formulate effective data collection, storage, extraction
and presentation methods . A management procedure should
be instituted to ensure that materials selection,
processing and manufacturing -- the translation from
engineering to production — is under a strict control
and audit schedule
.
Quality assurance and nondestructive inspection must be
judiciously defined and rigidly applied. Inspectability
and human engineering factors must be adequately considered,
Proof-test inspection should not be considered a desirable
replacement for quality control and nondestructive
inspection.
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• Fatigue testing and analysis are the accepted approach
for substantiation of fatigue strength. Efforts must be
directed to the time compression of such tests, and to
the understanding of fatigue damage mechanism.
• Accelerated service testing of two or more aircraft from
an early production lot is recommended.
• Technology demonstrator programs, such as the Advanced
Metallic Structure ADP, can strengthen confidence in
emerging technologies
.
Probabilistic statements about risk can contribute to
sounder command decisions regarding development and
utilization of weapon or logistic systems.
Among the critical problems repeatedly encountered during
aircraft development and operation, the following are
listed:
misapplication of structural material;
improper material purchase specifications;
improper manufacturing processes;
improper detail design with respect to fatigue;
poor quality control and reliability:
inadequate auo ing of subcontractors;
improper analyses and assumptions;
deficiencies in control and stability;
change in aircraft usage;
unanticipated life extensions;
inappropriate and/or untimely fatigue, static and
flight testing.
Regarding organization and human factors , the need for a
high degree of realism during the procurement process is
emphasized and more extensive use of independent advisors
and advisory panels, with real freedom to speak their
beliefs, is suggested.
Reference 2 is a report on the Structural Integrity of
Current and Future Air Force Systems . It is based on an extensive
team study and the resulting recommendations are directed toward
most effective planning, execution, and follow-up of the Aircraft
Structures Integrity Program (AS IP) within the procurement
agency. Special emphasis is given to the need for making
realistic estimates, for understanding the impact of trade-off
decisions, and for bridging communication and apparent technology
gaps . The benefit which can be derived from independent expert
teams and review groups is also stressed.
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Reference 3 is concerned with the gap which has developed
between the development of new materials and their application in
the design of aircraft. It summarizes the findings of the
National Materials Advisory Board's Committee on Accelerated
Utilization of New Materials . The committee has investigated
the causes for the existing delay in the application of
promising new materials and concluded that it should be possible
to prevent or minimize delays. Its principal recommendation is
to establish a continuing function under the auspices of an
interagency government organization
to review the status of new materials and processes;
to identify those with a potential for wide applicability
which can benefit by coordinated support;
to organize a cooperative program to assure timely
application of selected materials.
These three references serve the purpose to evaluate recent
difficulties from three clearly defined viewpoints, namely:
experience with the F-lll program, need for early identification
of structural problems in Air Force systems , and experience with
the introduction of new materials . Their recommendations are of
special significance in view of the knowledge and experience
brought together in the committees responsible for these reports.
1.3 Purpose of Present Project
The present report attempts to take a step beyond the reports
summarized in the preceding Section 1.2. As this report forms the
final part of the project Interface of Materials and Structures
on Airframes, it is based on a more general approach which began
with Basic Design Considerations (Ref . h) and continued with a
particular concern about the Decision Process in Structural
Design (Ref. 5). These general considerations will now "be
merged with practical aspects
.
The present situation should be quite propitious for
combining fundamental and practical aspects . There is a growing
awareness that many of our present problems can be solved by
improved coordination between the fields of materials, structural
mechanics, and design. Such coordination represents a natural
process which has been developing slowly over a long time.
Much can be accomplished, however, by clarifying and accelerating
this process.
The purpose of this report is to evaluate recent design
experience from an overall viewpoint and to arrive at practical
conclusions. Such an overall viewpoint will coincide with the
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viewpoint of the designer who is responsible for the design. It
will combine the three separate viewpoints of References 1 to 3
and will take into account that a practical solution for present
design problems has to be found first, but also that a basic
approach toward the solution of future design problems has to be
established before these problems have grown beyond bounds.
l.U Method of Approach
Reference 5 recommends further consideration of the
structural design process on an industry-wide basis. In a
modified form and from a somewhat different perspective this was
accomplished at the Monterey Symposium on Design Problems in
Aircraft Structures. With its representative participation
from industry, research, and government agencies, the symposium
provided a balanced perspective for practical and theoretical
aspects
.
The proceedings of the symposium, as given in Section I of
this report, serve to substantiate the essential aspects of
design problems. The talks were arranged so that considerations
regarding high-strength steels, fatigue, fracture mechanics,
fail-safe design, procurement policies, space shuttle, probability
of failure, risk evaluation, and technology demonstration were
brought together as basic ingredients of the overall picture.
Resulting questions and comments, as given in Section II,
are obviously only a small part of a very wide spectrum. They
may help to stimulate thoughts and discussions among engineers
and researchers working in these fields. They certainly have
contributed toward putting the results of the symposium into a
wider perspective
.
Discussion and conclusions, as given in this present
Section III, are rooted both in the fundamental, but somewhat
generalized, considerations of References h and 5 and in the
practical aspects expressed during the symposium. The practical
considerations developed in articles 3^5 to 3 >1 contain the
essence of the discussion.
As stated in the foreword, there is no consensus of opinions*
in this field and the conclusions must not be construed as
representing the attitude of the Navy Department.
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OUTLINE OF DESIGN PROBLENB
2.1 General Remarks
A discussion of design problems should properly begin with
establishing the goal of structural design. In its simplest form
this can be stated in two words: Optimum structure. The word
optimum causes, of course, considerable tribulations. Let us
just keep in mind that it comprises all the compromises which are
necessary to satisfy the specified strength and stiffness
requirements as well as considerations of performance, weight,
cost, risk, time schedule, growth potential, maintainability,
repairability, inspectability, etc. After some more detailed
reflection it will be possible in Section 2.6 to arrive at a
more specific interpretation of design goals.
Achievement of an optimum structure is still in the distant
future. Optimization procedures loom at the horizon as a major
long-range problem and considerable effort is exerted in this
field. This long-range problem is inseparably connected with the
short-range problem of avoiding the type of technological
difficulties which have occurred in the recent past.
Technological difficulties have existed as long as aircraft
have been built and they have been overcome reasonably well by
different methods at different times. One aspect, however, is
new. Our technology has reached a state of complexity where
every decision has far-reaching implications. Traditional
methods become inadequate when a detail design decision can have
tremendous financial consequences, quite irrespective of safety.
The cost for rework of a problem of fatigue or stress corrosion
encountered during the guarantee period of an aircraft may
exceed the financial resources of a company.
2.2 Basic Concepts
For the following discussion it may be helpful to begin
with establishing two basic concepts which will be used in
connection with structural design.
a. Overall Responsibility of Structural Design
Structural design has many facets. It includes advanced
design which is concerned with establishing design concepts and
selecting materials and structural configuration. It also
includes detail design where the decisions made in advanced
design are translated into final working details and into full
substantiation of airworthiness and other considerations.
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The full concept of structural design must refer to
everything connected with the load-transmitting structure. It
includes selection and optimization of material, structural
configuration, and design details; substantiation of airworthiness
by analysis and tests; and determination of weight, cost,
reliability, fabricability, inspectability, and maintainability.
This indicates that structural design has to bear full
responsibility for all the complexities and consequences of
technology. Anticipation of cost overruns as well as difficulties
in scheduling, materials processing, fabrication, inspection, and
maintenance must be included in this responsibility. Much of it
has previously been left to manufacturing without giving it
proper representation during the decision-making process.
This overall responsibility of structural design is the
clear lesson learned from the experience of recent years. It is
emphasized here as a basic concept because the full significance
of this lesson is not yet completely appreciated within the
engineering community at large.
b. Team Work within Structural Design
The second aspect is a consequence of this first
consideration. It is generally not possible to combine all the
knowledge, experience, and skill required for a major design
component in a single individual. A team effort is required
and responsibilities must be clearly delegated. There are three
basic fields which are closely related but distinctly separated
by educational background:
Materials engineering will be responsible for materials
properties and characteristics, processing, fabricability,
inspectability, and maintainability as well as materials
testing, evaluation, application, maintenance, and
follow-up procedures, i.e. all aspects of materials
behavior from cradle to grave;
Structural mechanics will be responsible for static and
dynamic analysis with respect to strength and stiffness
as well as for testing of structural components, i.e. all
aspects of airworthiness at minimum structural weight;
Design will be responsible for the traditional field
of detail design as well as all the considerations of
overall concepts and trade-offs regarding cost, risk,
time schedule, and the various "-ilities", i.e. all
aspects of coordination and optimization.
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These three disciplines are integral parts of structural
design. There will always be some overlap along the border-lines
of these interrelated fields but we have to realize that
structural design is an entity and requires a team effort which
is basically different from adversary confrontation of various
disciplines. Overall responsibility for guiding this team effort
must be clearly assigned but, beyond this, each member of the
team must be aware of his responsibility as an integral part of
the total effort. The need for such a spirit of common
responsibility should be recognized as another basic concept.
2.3 Design Problems in the Realm of Technology
Having established the basic responsibility of the design
team for every aspect of structural design, it becomes apparent
that we cannot be satisfied with considering technological
problems only. They may serve as a starting point and it will
be practical to consider basic design problems as falling into
three groups: those within the realm of technology, those
beyond the realm of pure technology, and those which are problems
of policy but have a direct effect upon design.
Problems of a technical nature may be categorized as
follows
:
a. Basic Mechanics of Failure
There is still a fundamental lack of scientific knowledge
and understanding regarding mechanics of failure. This is
particularly noticeable in the fields of fracture mechanics,
fatigue, and stress corrosion. The necessary research must
take place in the field of materials science and is, although
of basic importance to structural design, beyond the jurisdiction
of the design engineer.
b. Materials Processing, Manufacturing, and Inspection Methods
Limited knowledge about fundamental aspects of failure
has been a frequent cause for trespassing unwittingly into
forbidden zones during processing and manufacturing operations.
Many typical examples are discussed in Section I and many more
could easily be found. Quenching rate, residual stresses, hole
preparation, change of vendor, nondestructive testing methods
are just some of the potential pitfalls
.
Extensive testing with a great number of parameters is
usually required. The large test programs on basic fracture
mechanics data and on spectrum/environmental effects mentioned
in Section I in the presentation by W. C. Dietz for just one
aspect of one material indicate the magnitude of the task. The
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test data on Klc values shown in the presentation by W. S. Hyler
indicate how much scatter in test results can occur within
given specifications and how difficult it may become to interpret
test data correctly.
From the perspective of the materials specialist, clearly
formulated questions about the characteristics of new materials
can be answered by systematic testing. However, when the
materials engineer becomes a member of the design team, his
problem is to recognize all potential modes of failure and to
anticipate any difficulties which may develop in manufacturing
and quality control. A multitude of environmental and operational
conditions, varying from one component to another, result in
many combinations of temperature, exposure time, stress,
sequence of cycling, corrosive conditions, etc. Slightly
modified processing techniques may influence test results
greatly. All this means that definition of significant test
conditions as well as evaluation techniques assume major
importance
.
The sheer magnitude of required materials data for
application of a new material is immense. The corresponding
problems are well known to the materials community and further
detail discussion would go beyond the scope of this report.
c. Application of Recent Technology and Techniques
Newly developed high-strength materials and corresponding
manufacturing technologies pose innumerable problems with hard-to-
predict consequences regarding crack initiation, hydrogen
embrittlement , stress corrosion, etc. Typical problems in this
field are discussed in several presentations of Section I.
W. H. Sparrow shows illustrative examples for high-
strength steel parts which failed unexpectedly. J. C. Ekvall
starts with typical problems in fatigue and surveys the present
state of the analytical airt, after a decade and a half of
intensified development in this field. W. C. Dietz presents
typical problems in fracture mechanics and gives an outline of
present techniques in this field which has come into its own
only very recently.
W. S. Hyler shows another problem which is a typical
example for the need of full coordination between new technologies
in materials engineering, structural mechanics, and design.
Slightest variations in materials processing can cause large
scatter of Klc values, affecting structural analysis and
fundamental aspects of fail-safe design.
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A large part of the present research effort is directed
toward further development of fracture mechanics as an important
analytical tool and toward far-reaching application of damage
tolerance as a basic concept in structural design. From a wider
perspective this appears as the latest, but certainly not the
last, of a long line of design problems which have included
stress corrosion, fatigue, integral structures, thin-sheet
design, etc.
d. Future Technology
Technological problems of a new type will have to be
faced in connection with high-temperature applications . The
presentation by F. F. W. Krohn is concerned with the new tasks
which may confront us for a space shuttle in the fields of
materials, structural mechanics, and design. Full evaluation
of the experience gained with recently developed technology
and a methodical approach will be a prerequisite.
There is also the field of filament composites. This
has not been included in the presentations at the symposium to
avoid distraction from basic issues. Much specialized development
work is required but systematic progress is made since the
importance of this field has been generally recognized.
Another field which should be mentioned in connection
with future technology is structural optimization. This aims
at the very core of the designer's problem, namely how to
obtain an optimum structure. Considerable difficulties exist
in the fields of mathematical programing and search methods and
work proceeds along various lines
.
e. Communication Within a Discipline
Technological information to keep abreast of newest
developments is not easily accessible, particularly to the
engineer fully involved in everyday work. Frequently there is
a flood of information but research results are published in
many different places, practical experience of others becomes
known belatedly and in rather incoherent form, and clear
conclusions are disseminated only slowly. Competitive
considerations can also have a retarding influence.
Although interest in new fields grows rapidly -- e.g.
fatigue one-and-a-half decades ago, stress corrosion in the
early 1960's, or fracture mechanics now — it is a slow and
uneven process to arrive at accepted standards. Again this
is pointed out quite clearly in several presentations of
Section I.
111-10
W. H. Sparrow illustrates how experience with high-
strength steels had to be accumulated the hard way. J. C. Ekvall
shows that determination of fatigue life is not yet an exact
science, in spite of a tremendous effort spent on it, and
depends on experience with design details on previous structures
and with previously established stress levels. W. C. Dietz
demonstrates in the field of fracture mechanics how practical
experience is related to the development of new methods.
W. S. Hyler indicates the role of experience in materials processing
Everywhere costly mistakes could be avoided if systematic
information about previous experience were available.
The problem of communication within a technical
discipline can be considered to be a technological problem.
However, it becomes apparent that it cannot be solved on the
level of the engineering specialist. This points toward
further problems which are beyond the realm of pure technology.
2 .k Design Problems Beyond the Realm of Pure Technology
The preceding problems in the realm of technology can be
recognized easily. There are other problems, however, which
are not so clearly visible and which are in an ill-defined
region beyond pure technology. They may be considered in the
following problem areas
:
a. Communication Between Technical Disciplines
The difficulties of communicating and keeping informed
within one's own technical discipline were discussed under 2.3e.
Design, however, involves several different disciplines and
communication between them can become formidably difficult.
Materials engineering, structural mechanics, and design are
closely related but the difficulty of communication between them
is emphasized strongly in several of the presentations in
Section I.
W. H. Sparrow concludes his presentations about
high-strength steels with the warning that there is no substitute
for communication between engineering, manufacturing, and quality
control. W. C. Dietz shows throughout his considerations about
fracture mechanics how important it is to have a full exchange
of specific information between engineering, manufacturing,
and inspection. W. S. Hyler begins his comments on fail-safe
design with pointing out the need for interrelation between
designer and materials and process engineers for any consideration
of fracture and fatigue crack propagation.
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Considering a large number of typical design problems,
it appears that a lack of inter-disciplinary communication can
be found either as their cause or, at least, as a contributing
factor. Such a statement should not be taken lightly. It
indicates that no amount of specialization can solve present
design problems unless the specialist develops an understanding
for interaction between his field and others
.
There is nothing new about the need for communication.
It has existed as long as there has been specialization. Some
progress has certainly taken place during the last decade but
this has not overcome the basic fact that different specialists
have different concerns and are not readily aware of each
other's line of thinking. Team work in structural design requires
full communication and understanding of interaction to a degree
which has not yet been developed.
b. Risk Evaluation
New developments in aircraft structures involve some
risk. There is, first of all, the technological uncertainty
which may be expressed as probability of failure. Beyond this,
there is the risk of exceeding cost estimates and time schedules.
All these aspects have to be incorporated in risk evaluation.
Some of the inherent difficulties are discussed in Section I.
J. E. Fischler substantiates an approach to use
probability of structural failure for the comparison of
different designs. Developments in fracture mechanics make
it possible to determine the probability of structural failure
as a function of several design parameters. This concept can
be used to compare materials and types of construction on an
equal basis
.
W. E. Ellis indicates some tentative steps toward
overall risk evaluation. Much can be learned from procedures
which have been developed by operations analysis . It will be
a long way to transform this into a useful tool for structural
design. A first and very important step is to make the
designer aware of the line of systematic thinking which has
been developed in this field and which can supplement his
engineering techniques in a significant way. Beyond this,
much thought will have to be given to the expression of
qualitative considerations in quantitative terms.
c. Ideas and Decisions
Each of the problems in structural design provokes
creative thinking and, because several solutions are generally
possible, calls for decisions in the face of uncertainties. This
requires a systematic approach in addition to technological
expertise. Structural design has to be rooted in both technology
and methodology.
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The decision process in structural design has been
discussed in Ref. 5. It will have to be based on analytical
models which combine the considerations of airworthiness and
optimization. Models as shown in Fig. B-l, C-23, and C-2U
are typical steps in this direction. Development of such a
decision process is the goal of design methodology. It has to
take place in step with the solution of the other basic problems
in structural design. A fundamental need is to provide
visibility and clarity for any design decision.
2.5 Policy Problems Affecting Design
The design problems discussed on the preceding pages give
full regard to the engineering viewpoint even if some of them
cannot be solved on an engineering level. There are other
decisions, however, which may have a far-reaching influence on
structural design without giving full cognizance to the
engineering viewpoint. These decisions are usually made on a
management level where engineering considerations are balanced
against various aspects of funding, timing, and general policy.
The two subjects of procurement policies and test programs
deserve special attention.
a. Procurement Policies
Procurement policies can have a pronounced effect on
structural design and the following discussion may help to
clarify some of these aspects.
Throughout the 1960's there was a trend toward
increasingly rigid contracts at fixed price, with a total
package incorporating R&D, production, performance, and time
schedule. It was only around 1970 when some fallacious
reasoning in this trend became apparent. Procurement agencies
were driving toward unrealistic requirements to obtain maximum
performance while bidders made over-optimistic estimates in
a highly competitive environment. The risks of an evolving
technology were not appreciated properly and resulted in huge
R&D and production costs to solve unforeseen difficulties
.
Structural design conservatism was frequently squeezed thin
between technological need and available budget or had its
flexibility for trade-offs curtailed by detail specifications.
Important lessons have come from this type of
experience and may be summarized as follows:
Pre-contractual assessments require a high degree of
technological and budgetary realism and objectivity
both on the side of procurement agency and prospective
contractor.
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Weight, cost, and time schedule require closest
control but should not be considered as fixed
quantities by themselves
. They are means to an
end and trade-offs must be encouraged in order to
obtain an optimum total design rather than a
design which is best in one aspect at the expense
of another.
Costs for research and development must be separated
from production costs and only the latter should be
subjected to penalties and incentives.
P^re -production concept proof should be emphasized
but it must be realized that this is not as simple
as just having a prototype . Time dependent
phenomena or production feasibility will not
necessarily be demonstrated in prototype programs.
In case there is concurrent development and
production, the inherent risks must be clearly
recognized and accepted.
Due to this interrelation between structural design and
procurement policies, future policy developments will have to be
scrutinized closely. The trend seems to be toward providing a
cost-reimbursement basis for the R&D phase with its higher risk
and a fixed-price-incentive basis for the production phase. Much
emphasis will be on milestone demonstrations as well as cost and
schedule control.
The future will probably also hold a shrinking market
with fewer but more sophisticated projects. There might be a
recourse to prototypes by several companies with the production
contract awarded after technical demonstration.
From the viewpoint of structural design there are two
particularly important aspects to be emphasized in connection with
any procurement policy:
The risk of new technological developments must be
clearly recognized and potential difficulties should
not come as surprises;
The program for structural testing has to be prepared
carefully not only with respect to its scope but
also with respect to its timing.
Risk evaluation and a reliable estimate of structural




Structural testing is, of course, a straightforward
engineering function. However, it is listed as a policy problem
because the necessary funding depends on policy decisions.
There will always have to be a compromise between the engineer's
desire for verification by testing and the manager's reluctance
to provide the considerable funding. Merely to set up a
consistent program for structural tests has become a task which
is not easily done. There is also the additional aspect that
expenditures for testing can result in significant economic
advantages in production as well as in improved analytical
techniques
.
Structural testing is an integral part of structural
design. With increasing emphasis on environmental conditions
and on damage tolerance the amount of testing can grow excessively.
Yet new technology requires extensive and systematic testing in
order to reduce risk to an acceptable level. Agreement between
analysis and experiment is the basis for our confidence in the
integrity of a structure. Much engineering work is still
required to obtain closer coordination between analysis and
testing and to save time, money, and talent as analysis may
eliminate some testing.
Component testing is caught in the dilemma that it can
start only after the component has been designed and manufactured
but that tests should be finished in time so that any modifications
do not affect detrimentally the production process. In view of
the advanced planning necessary for production, the necessary
compromises have to be made within the context of overall policy.
Within this need for compromising, the structures
engineer has the responsibility to recognize clearly what kind
of information is required from what type of testing in order to
substantiate airworthiness for all operational and environmental
conditions. In this connection it is important to evaluate
critically any prototype testing to see whether it plays an
important role within the structural testing program.
These few remarks may suffice to show the close
relationship which has to be established between structures
engineering and management, starting at the very beginning of a
project. Recent experience has shown that funding is always
available if a panic situation should develop but that a




The preceding broad-brush treatment of problem areas in
structural design requires, of course, much amplification before
it can be thoroughly interpreted. However, in spite of its
briefness, it seems to be adequate for the purpose of clarifying
and illustrating two basic aspects: Design problems are
rooted in technological difficulties but they branch out into
wider fields
.
After having considered separately those problems which are
of a specialized technological nature and those which go beyond
pure technology, it can be recognized that each of these two
categories has several facets. Instead of expressing the two
categories as a field of technology versus another field which
is beyond pure technology, we may think in terms of airworthiness
versus optimization, or specialization versus interrelation.
Each of these terms implies a different aspect, and indicates
the many-sidedness of each type of problems.
Technological problems can be seen clearly after they have
developed -- even if it may take a post mortem in extreme cases.
These problems have a direct effect on airworthiness, and steps
toward their solution are taken quickly. Responsibilities
are distributed among well-defined disciplines or organizational
groups and steady progress toward the solution of these problems
can be expected. There seems to be no need to pursue them any
further in this report.
The picture is different, however, for problems reaching
beyond the realm of pure technology. These problems are
ill-defined and at the same time most pervasive and elusive.
Although they are of a very different kind than the well-defined
technological problems, they may easily permeate any of them.
It became quite apparent from the presentations by W. H. Sparrow,
W. C. Dietz, and W. S. Hyler how the work of the specialist
has to be correlated with inter-disciplinary communication,
and from the presentations by J. E. Fischler and J. W. Ellis how
probability of failure and risk evaluation may play an important
role in the decision making process. This type of problems
reaching beyond traditional aspects of pure technology forms
the very essence of design because design cannot be satisfied
with just finding a technical solution. It has to strive for
an optimum solution considering all circumstances.
Much general consideration has recently been given to
design objectives and methods. Several books on design
methodology have been published just during the past few
years. Combining quotations from various authors, design must
not be confused with art or science or a form of mathematics,
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but it is a hybrid activity which depends on a proper blending of
all three. We may think of it as a creative, goal-directed,
problem-solving activity which depends on decision-making in
the face of uncertainties and is concerned with all aspects of
a problem.
Although design is a creative activity, it has to submit
itself to a rigorous logic . A large number of ideas have to be
analyzed and evaluated. Both the climate for encouraging
new ideas and the decision process for evaluating the implications
of these new ideas have assumed much importance for the solution
of design problems.
This kind of considerations leads toward a more specific
interpretation for the goal of structural design. The dual
nature of design problems -- specialized technology versus
optimization and complex interrelations -- is of basic significance,
We have to realize that most of our present design problems can
no longer be solved by merely concentrating our efforts on
specialized technology. Full consideration must also be given
to the interrelation between specialized fields -- both for
optimization and for assurance that no aspect of airworthiness
has been overlooked.
The following part considers these not so obvious yet
completely vital aspects of structural design problems.
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3- UNEXPLORED ASPECTS OF DESIGN PROBLEMS
3-1 General Remarks
The preceding consideration of design problems from the
designer's viewpoint drew attention to the need for going beyond
the traditional concern about specialized technology. Four
questions have particular significance:
How can communication between various specialists be
improved?
How can risk be evaluated?
How can the decision-making process be clarified?
How can available information be made more accessible?
Answers to these questions cannot be found on a purely
technological level. They require full consideration of
educational and organizational aspects.
The recurrent theme contained in these questions is the need
for providing full communication and mutual understanding among
all members of the design team. This would sound like a self-
evident and rather superfluous statement if it were not for the
overwhelming evidence -- expressed in many presentations of
Section I -- which indicates how hard it is to accomplish this
communication and mutual understanding and how close this point
comes to the roots of many or even most of our design problems.
The implications of this statement must be recognized. The
problem cannot be solved on paper. The objective will be
accomplished only when attitudes and actions of engineers express
that they think not as engineering specialists but in terms of
the overall design project. Our conventional engineering
education has not prepared us to do this
.
The following considerations begin with some basic aspects
of engineering curricula, continuing engineering education, and
engineering professionalism and lead up to a practical approach
regarding some very fundamental features of design problems.
3-2 Engineering Curricula
Engineering is based on science and the scientific approach
consists of analytical and experimental techniques applied to a
clearly defined problem. Education along these scientific methods
has been the foundation for outstanding technological achievements
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but unfortunately also for a lack of success in translating
specific achievements into an overall entity. We have to learn
how to coordinate diverse and frequently contradictory
requirements from many specialized subjects in order to obtain
an optimum overall design.
Contrary to the typical problems in science, a typical
design problem is not clearly defined. It is the responsibility
of the designer to recognize all significant parameters and to
define the problem before the scientific process of analyzing
it can take place. Usually there are several possible solutions
and the designer is responsible for determining which is the
optimum among them. Our engineering education in the past two
decades has done exceedingly well in preparing the student for
the analytical process of problem solution but has usually
neglected the basic design aspects of problem definition and
optimization.
A first reaction to the long trend of putting so much
emphasis on scientific specialization became visible in the
mid-1960 's. Development of inter-disciplinary graduate courses
was pioneered at MIT and Stanford and sponsored further by NASA.
These courses contributed much to a growing awareness for the
need of coordination between academic disciplines.
However, these courses were mostly oriented toward advanced
design concepts and were not particularly concerned with the
interaction of materials and structures, i.e. structural design.
The AIAA Aircraft Design Committee, among others, has been
concerned about the vanishing of design from aero curricula
(Ref. f ) . More than a quarter of the aero curricula seem to have
eliminated design courses entirely and only less than a quarter
devote a minimum of four semester hours to design. The need for
much closer cooperation between aerospace industry and academic
community is an obvious conclusion.
The present situation is full of contradictions. In spite
of the gloomy outlook of Ref. ^, there are a good number of very
promising starting points. Most of them are outside the field
of aeronautics . The Engineering Development Program of the
University of California at Los Angeles and the methods of Case
Studies as developed at Stanford and Berkeley may be mentioned.
There seem to be three basic difficulties in making our
engineering curricula responsive to the needs of industry.
Firstly, any changes in academic life take place at a slow pace.
Secondly, no clear guidelines have been established in spite of
much interest in the subject. Thirdly, particularly in aeronautics,
engineers in industry and faculty members at universities who may
have recognized the problem have been absorbed so much in their
specialized fields that they did not find the necessary time to
do something about this overall aspect.
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3-3 Continuing Engineering Education
Continuing education is based on the recognition that
technological developments make an engineering education
obsolescent after not too many years. Evening classes,
company-sponsored courses during working time, lectures and
meetings, and full-time short courses are most frequently used
to keep the engineer abreast of technological developments
.
All this is being done in many modifications , depending
very much on special conditions. The spectrum ranges from
courses which are given to obtain an academic degree to others
which are directed purely toward professional development.
Educational media are increasingly employed.
For instance, in regions where several aerospace companies
and a university are located, lectures given on the campus are
brought by TV into classrooms inside the companies during
working hours, frequently with two-way communication between
instructor and each individual. Such courses are usually part
of an academic curriculum and they are taken for credits as the
participants are working toward an advanced degree.
On the other hand, full-time courses which may extend over
a few days or a few weeks usually are directed toward a subject
of specific professional interest of an advanced nature. Such
courses are given by a group of specialists from a viewpoint of
sharing information on recent developments and the participants
are experienced engineers . The purpose is clearly continuing
education in the basic sense of the concept.
It can easily be seen that there is much more flexibility
in this type of continuing education than in courses which are
part of a formal curriculum. Academic credits lose their
significance, courses can be tailored much more readily to the
needs of industry or special developments, and instructors may
be chosen in accordance with their specific competence, whether
they come from faculties or industry or research.
Mich is going on in this field of continuing education.
Contrary to the slow changes in well-established curricula of
formal engineering education, everything in continuing education
is in a fluid state of early development. There seems to be a
unique opportunity to apply some of these developments in the
educational field to the design problems in aircraft structures.
3.*+ Engineering Professionalism
Engineering graduates going into industry have generally a
clear analytical mind and are well equipped to solve problems in
their fields of specialization. Some of these young engineers
are outstandingly bright but the process of advancing into
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engineering positions with broad responsibilities is slow and
tedious. Usually it takes the route of proving their excellence
in a specialized field and even for capable engineers it may take
a good deal more than 10 years before they begin to develop an
understanding for the all-important interrelation between
various fields of specialization. Basically they are left to
their own devices how they go about it.
There are, of course, highly competent engineers in industry
with many years of experience who have grown beyond their field
of specialization and have learned to communicate with adjacent
disciplines. They are in responsible positions and generally
overburdened with work. However, for each one of them there are
a great number of others in various stages of the laborious
process of trying to accumulate some experience beyond their
own field in order to broaden their horizon and make them more
valuable engineers . Would it not be plain common sense to help
accelerate this important process?
Let us look just at the typical problem of communication
between structures and materials engineers . When the structures
engineer obtains a K-lc value from the materials engineer, does he
understand sampling techniques and processing tolerances on which
the value is based? When the materials engineer proposes the use
of a certain heat treat, does he understand all implications with
respect to residual stresses, environmental and operational
conditions which may occur? The specialist's jargon frequently
expresses concepts which are not readily explained. Any attempts
of explanation may leave some essential detail misunderstood due
to differences in viewpoints and lines of thinking. Section I
contains many examples for design problems which were caused by
this type of difficulties in communication between specialists.
Management is, of course, vitally interested in improving
this communication process. So is the individual engineer
because it enhances his professional growth. No engineer worth
his keep wants to be just a cog in a big machine. A pure
specialist might too easily be unemployable as soon as he becomes
unemployed
.
3.5 Practical Considerations about Educational Aspects
We have seen that our background has preconditioned us to
think as specialists rather than in terms of an overall design
project. On the other hand there is a basic need and a willing
readiness to recognize the role of complex interactions and to
develop new methods to deal with them. The question is how this
can be accomplished.
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An answer can be found along the lines of continuing education.
There is, however, one important qualification. Contrary to
other fields, the subject matter for this type of course cannot
be prepared on the usual academic level of research and special-
ization. It rather has to be based on a systematic evaluation of
recent practical experience in structural design.
This experience has been gathered in industry. Therefore,
the subject has to be evaluated and written up by engineers
who are thoroughly familiar with recent design experience and
who understand the far-reaching implications. Nothing of this
sort has been done because it requires a joint effort of
considerable magnitude to prepare the necessary outline,
subject matter, and text material for such a course.
If the development of a course program and the corresponding
text material is sponsored by a government contract, it can be
done thoroughly and will be available to the entire industry.
The project is too important and too urgent to be left to a
somewhat haphazard development on local levels . On the other
hand, when a well-prepared text is available, qualified instructors
can be found locally. The text will serve as the backbone for
courses or seminars in continuing engineering education given
throughout, industry or for self-study. A loose-leaf textbook --to
be kept up to date -- may be the most practical format, but some
other methods of educational media may deserve consideration.
Such a project requires the cooperation of several highly
competent and motivated engineers . It will have to start with
systematically extracting, describing, documenting, and evaluating
recent experience. This has to be translated into a form which
can serve to prevent repetition of past mistakes, to provide an
introduction into newly developing fields , and to direct
attention toward new methods
.
It appears that a course subject of prime importance will be
Interaction of Materials and Structures. This requires the
cooperation of engineers experienced in structural design,
analytical methods, materials characteristics, processing methods,
manufacturing, and inspection. Improved communication and
interrelation between specialists is based on a basic understanding
of underlying principles, applicable methods, significant aspects,
and recent developments in adjacent fields. This means familiarity
with each other's outlook and methods of approach. Each
specialist has to put himself into the shoes of other specialists
and has to explain to them some basic aspects of his own field.
Emphasis will be on those aspects which have contributed to
recent design problems and which have to be understood by other
members of the design team to prevent interface problems. The
text can be tailored to the practical needs of a design team. It
is this type of information which is not available in a systematic
form anywhere and which could prevent a large percentage of our
typical design problems.
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Other course subjects should be Risk Evaluation and Decision
Making. These are strange fields to most engineers and communication
is correspondingly aggravated. In the past these subjects have
not played any role in design -- except in some of the more
abstract aspects of parametric performance studies and fatigue
.
With increasing complexities a close interaction between engineering
and operations analysis, extending to the level of structural
design, cannot be avoided much longer. The engineer needs an
introduction into operations analysis from his design viewpoint
to familiarize himself with basic possibilities, methods of
approach, and practical applications so that he does not violate
elementary rules and can recognize when there is need for
specialist advice. New possibilities can be explored only if
the engineer is able to communicate with the operations analyst.
Such educational efforts within the framework of continuing
engineering education are aimed at engineers in industry. This
should produce early results. For thorough results, however, the
aeronautical curricula at universities have to be affected and
closer coordination between universities and industry is
necessary. It seems that an advisory group made up of members
from universities and from industry could exert a very healthy
influence. Such a group would have to provide guidelines
firstly to bridge the gap which has developed between engineering
needs of industry and scientific orientation of engineering
curricula, and secondly to coordinate the efforts which will be
required in the field of continuing education. Many implications
are involved and the full spectrum of education for aerospace
engineers must be taken into account. University curricula and
continuing education have to be coordinated as two fields of
fundamental importance.
3.6 Practical Considerations about Information Systems
After having considered educational aspects as a prerequisite
for dealing with complex interactions, attention must also be paid
to another side of the problem. Much waste and frustration occur
when basically available information is not accessible for
secondary reasons — which is a problem of organization.
This has been a particularly blatant problem in the field
of materials characteristics where test data are produced in
many places but become meaningful only when correlated with other
data and evaluated with respect to clearly specified test
conditions . The enormous quantity of data being developed makes
it imperative to have clearly assigned responsibilities for
collecting, interpreting, storing, and disseminating this
information.
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The Defense Metals Information Center of Battelle represents
a basic step in this direction. It incorporates the essential
capability to interpret and evaluate data. Yet much additional
effort and funding are required. Decentralization in accordance
with available talent and facilities is quite feasible. Reference
discusses some aspects of a materials information system and
computerized methods, and Ref. 1 also points out the need in
this field. The dominant need for such centers of information as
a prerequisite for a healthy aerospace industry is easily
apparent and it can only be hoped that the various obstacles will
be overcome in the near future.
Reference 2 recommends an analogous step by establishing a
Structures Information and Analysis Center "to collect, process,
investigate, analyze, evaluate, disseminate and advise on
structural materials applications, analysis methods, test
techniques and failure modes and causes".
Another step consists of handbooks containing up-to-date
techniques in newly developing fields . Most major aircraft
companies have developed manuals of this type in fields like
fatigue and stress corrosion. Much duplication of efforts could
be avoided and more complete information and consistent
application could be assured if such handbooks would be sponsored
on an industry-wide basis. Reference 1 recommends particularly
such a Handbook on Fracture Mechanics for Aircraft Designers,
periodically updated as new data and experience become available.
A further step should consist of Case Studies, describing
the full history of significant failures and design problems
which have been encountered and solved in industry. At present
this is done to a certain extent. Important failures result in
engineering reports which have restricted circulation. Some
basic aspects eventually are filtered into technical papers or
articles. Other aspects enter into a grapevine system. However,
the full information should be available to all those engineers
who may learn from this experience to avoid similar mistakes. To
write up a comprehensive case study is a major task and Reference '
discusses the practical aspect of having this done by graduate
students who can gain much insight into design problems by
doing this
.
3.7 Practical Considerations about Overall Perspective
The preceding considerations about educational aspects and
information systems indicate some stimulating and far-reaching
possibilities which are completely within practical reach. Their
realization, however, requires an effort which can be exerted




Such a long-range viewpoint has been taken for the USAF
program on Advanced Metallic Structures. This program is
described by D. A. Shinn in his presentation in Section I. It
is based on the recognition that there is no systematic approach
available to structural design at increasing complexities and
the program is directed toward establishing a practical approach
for solving inherent problems. Special emphasis is given to an
efficient system for distributing the resulting information to
the entire technical community.
This large-scale effort toward finding practical solutions
for design problems represents an important step. To be fully
effective, however, it must be coordinated with a corresponding
effort regarding fundamental considerations. An educational
program as outlined under 3.5 can prepare the ground for such
fundamental considerations and an information system as outlined
under 3.6 can remove basic obstacles in the path of solving
design problems.
It appears that an educational program and an information
system along these lines should be considered as an important
complement to the program on Advanced Metallic Structures. Such
an approach toward three esential aspects -- hardware, software,
and education -- together with the well-recognized need for
technological research and development, would provide a logical
and promising course of action. The necessary funding for the
data information system will be considerable but can be spread
out -- besides, any delay will increase the eventual costs. For
all other aspects suggested under 3*5 and 3*6 only modest funding
is required.
As an encouraging omen it may be mentioned that the USAF
program on Advanced Metallic Structures as well as the report
by the Ad Hoc Committee (Ref . l) and the Study of Aircraft
Structural Integrity (Ref. 2) emphasize the need for a systematic
exchange of information. This recognizes an attitude that problems
of structural design should be beyond competitive considerations.
A structural failure in one aircraft hurts all others . The whole
aircraft industry is in the same boat and everybody suffers when
somebody contributes to a leak.
Technical competitions will be governed by the quality of a
design team and the corresponding probability for a successful
design. To build such a team, to provide stimulating working
conditions, and to instill a creative spirit takes a long time.
Technological expertise can be acquired by hiring a few experts.
However, an awareness of complex interactions must be developed
methodically and still begs to be recognized as a fundamental
aspect of design problems.
* * *
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There is an additional aspect which is worth mentioning as
we are looking at design problems from an overall perspective.
An important clue is provided in the conclusions of both the
Ad Hoc Committee (Ref . l) and the Study of Aircraft Structural
Integrity (Ref. 2) which emphasize very strongly the benefit
which can be derived from an independent group of experts
.
Independent of these conclusions, the principal recommendation
of the Committee on the Accelerated Utilization of New Materials
(Ref. 3) consists of having the function of such a group in the
field of materials. Correspondingly, practical considerations
about educational aspects (see art. 3. 5 of this section) point
toward an advisory group in the field of engineering education.
Some "practical" people may say that this is wishful thinking.
Yet in the field of aircraft structural integrity, where
considerable obstacles of a competitive nature had to be
overcome, an industry-wide group of experts has been in existence
for a decade, steadily growing in importance.
Much grief, frustration, and waste could be avoided and
many potential design problems of the future could be prevented
from developing if advisory groups of independent experts would
be available to provide guidance in the three fields of materials,
structural integrity, and engineering education. Even if this
is only an advisory function, such panels can exert a great




Design problems in aircraft structures can be considered as
belonging to three different categories. Each of them requires




On a technological level additional research and
development is required regarding
• mechanisms of failure, particularly in the fields of
fracture mechanics and fatigue;
• materials processing, manufacturing, and inspection
methods
;
application of recent and future technology and
techniques
.
Necessary efforts in these fields have been generally
recognized and identified. Systematic progress will depend on
the available funding for research and development programs
which have been outlined by cognizant agencies.
b. Technological Organization
Some basic design problems cannot be solved on an
engineering level. They require an organizational effort by
government agencies and top management.
Data information systems are necessary to assure that
available data become accessible to the engineering
community. DMTC of Battelle and the planned
Structures Information and Analysis Center of AFFDL
are steps in this direction but much additional
effort is required (see 3-6).
Handbooks containing up-to-date techniques in newly
developing fields should be sponsored on an industry-
wide basis (see 3-6).
Case Studies investigating all aspects of recent
failures and complex problems which have been solved
can serve as lessons to be learned by the industry.
They should be written up systematically and
circulated widely (see 3-6).
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Interaction between management decisions and design
problems requires particularly close attention in
the fields of procurement and structural testing
(see 2.5)
.
c . Engineering Education
On an educational level the engineer needs a helping
hand to grow beyond his field of specialization and to understand
the complexities of technological problems
.
Early results can be achieved by sponsoring the
development of a course outline and corresponding
text material on Rroblems of Interaction between
Materials and Structures
.
General awareness of unfolding new possibilities can
be stimulated by additionally sponsoring the
development of a course outline and corresponding
text material on Risk Evaluation and Decision Making
in Engineering.
long-range results can be influenced by an advisory
group on engineering education, representing both
industry and universities.
Details are discussed under 3^5- The funding required
for this educational effort is small compared to the large
effect it will have on the engineer's approach to complex design
problems
.
Design problems can be prevented before they develop. This
requires an approach where individual engineer, engineering
community, management, and government agencies have to pool
their competence, resources, and initiative. Increasing
complexities may result either in challenging tasks which can
be met or in frightful nightmares which are hopelessly entangled.
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